THE POSSIBILITY CONDITIONS OF NARRATIVE IDENTITY

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STATEMENT:

This research was undertaken under the auspices of the University of Wales: Trinity Saint David and was submitted in partial fulfillment for the award of a Degree of Masters by Research in European Philosophy in the School of Humanities and Performing Arts of the University of Wales.

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DECLARATION SHEET

This work has not previously been accepted in substance for any degree and is not being concurrently submitted in candidature for any degree.

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Abstract

The focus of this dissertation is narrative identity theory, i.e. the proposition that our sense of self is structured like a story. The imputed advantage of narrative identity is that it enables great coherence and guidance to our complex lives composed of multiple and often conflicting inner impulses and social demands. The manner in which this is accomplished is that narrativity functions metaphorically as a tacit, formative operation, which transfers the intelligibility inherent in the familiar domain of stories to the more elusive domain of personal identity. Narrativity is an epistemically efficient kind of discourse which can synthesize a multitude of elements into a unity called plot. A plot gives unity to the whole of a story and confers significance to its parts. Both narrativity and metaphoricity are the more recognizable products of an underlying mechanism both share, i.e. productive imagination. This faculty pervasively and continually configures the whole field of our experience, accentuating the relevant structures of our physical, social or inner, affective-mental environment (context) and projects the path through this environment towards a physical destiny, social accomplishment or resolution (direction). With the tools of classic Husserlian phenomenology and its radicalization in Heideggerian existential hermeneutics the main concepts of narrativity, metaphoricity and productive imagination can be further clarified and connected. This will enable a discussion about the question whether the ontological status of narrative identity can be construed such that either 1) personal identity merely has narrative cognition available as a pervasive, tacit tool to cope with life, or 2) whether our personal identity is nothing but the product of the productive imagination operating through narrativity.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

Each of us constructs and lives a 'narrative' . . .
this narrative is us, our identities    -- Oliver Sacks

§ 1. Introduction

This dissertation is the fruit of my research on the concept of narrative identity, i.e. the claim that our sense of self is structured like a story. While investigating this concept it became clear that narrativity functioned metaphorically, not in the sense of a literary figure of speech, but as a tacit, formative operation, which transfers the intelligibility inherent in the familiar domain of stories to the more elusive domain of personal identity, especially in regards to the intimate and often problematic significance of its life-span.

I will provisionally define identity as our sense of (inter-)personal self, maintaining a sense of continuity throughout its changeable experiences and behaviors over a temporal span, providing relative stability, situational awareness and goal-directed orientation in one's life.

Metaphors can be defined as an epistemically efficient kind of proposition which renders a more abstract aspect of life intelligible in terms of a more familiar one. Life can be understood metaphorically as if it were a struggle, journey or story, with the latter one incorporating the first two when put in narrative form. It may provide clarity by identifying hidden similarities between two different domains. Metaphors operate on the basis of transference of meanings from one domain to another and are more innovative and pervasive than initially acknowledged.

Stories can be defined as an epistemically efficient kind of discourse which can synthesize a multitude of elements into a unity called plot, i.e. the story's 'point', moral or message. Stories not only contain characters and their interactions within fictional or historical settings, leading to unintended complications and surprising turns, but also--explicitly expressed or not--the characters' desires, motivations, perspectives, thoughts, deceptions, moral perceptions, moods and emotions. And, directed to the story's audience, narratives might convey practical information, advise, warnings,
threats, existential insights; promote mythic or secular cosmologies, ethical standards, religious and political preferences, etc. These heterogeneous ingredients are all held together by the synthesizing operation of *emplotment*, which gives unity to the whole of a story and confers significance to its parts in their contribution to the overarching plot. Narrativity is also more innovative and pervasive than initially acknowledged.

One big step deeper, both narrativity and metaphoricity are the more recognizable products of an underlying mechanism both share, i.e. *productive imagination*. This faculty is harder to define. It pervasively and continually configures the whole field of our experience, accentuating the relevant structures of our physical, social or inner, affective-mental environment (i.e. context) and projects the path through this environment towards a physical destiny, social accomplishment or resolution (i.e. direction). This faculty usually goes about its way with an automaticity at lightening speed not necessarily detectable by our waking consciousness. This faculty is also operative in our more cognitive-linguistic endeavors like understanding simple propositions, grasping the sense of a metaphor, or getting the gist of a story. This faculty is so pervasive, as will be later argued (§46), that nothing meaningful can be accomplished without its aid.

Allied and overlapping with the productive imagination are the concepts of schematism, intentionality and categorial intuition. Schematism covers the tacit dimension of the rules and procedures (using schemata and images) operative as a *mediator* connecting the sensible realm of intuitions with the intelligible realm of concepts as Kant and later cognitive psychologists worked out. Or, more simply expressed, it is the mechanism by which experiences and words get connected into intelligible wholes. Schemata also enable the co-dependent interaction between sensible and bodily motor experiences (kinesthesics). We better see when we move and better move when we see.

Mostly these schematic projections pan out and are submerged in the fluency and apparent obviousness of our daily routines, whether in verbal discourse like a conversation or a physical action like finding one's way in a large building. When actions do not pan out we can get a glimpse of this faculty. When a hammer breaks
there occurs a pause in which we can reflect on how it actually came to be that we non-theoretically understand the equipmental context and sequential, step-wise goal-directedness of our hammering action. Such routines can also become deliberately slowed down and investigated through careful, phenomenological reflection in first person mode, either during a real execution or in reproductive imagination. At the same time all our behavior can of course be observed from a third-person perspective and analyzed into constituent elements through scientific inquiry.

The concepts of intentionality and categorial intuition will be elucidated later (§§12-13). These technical concepts originated in the school of phenomenology and are of such basic importance for the whole of the argument made in this dissertation that demand, and will receive, careful clarification.

Given all of the above, schematic-metaphoric-narrative identity, or just narrative identity, can be circumscribed as follows: Stories provide the open-ended templates, which are metaphorically used for our self-understanding in the form of self-narration. And narrativity, in a) its epistemic efficiency of synthesizing abundant amounts of life’s contextual and directional aspects and b) in its metaphorical applicability to our selfhood, thereby enables great coherence and guidance to our complex lives composed of multiple and often conflicting inner impulses and social demands.

Because metaphors and stories are the more innovative expressions of productive imagination and constitute in their combination our sense of personal identity, it became imperative to investigate this faculty to better understand the concept and experience of narrative identity in its evolutionary origin, its current level of functionality, and its possibly malleable, contingent nature, including the possibility of its transformation or outright suspension.

§ 2. Novice Concept of Narrative Identity

The concept of narrative identity can be illustrated provisionally with succinct quotes from representative narrative identitists¹, i.e. those who ascribe to the idea that our

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¹ The noun 'identitist' sometimes covers those who ascribe to the idea that mental states and neurological states are identical. Others have the term preceded by a qualifier like 'Christian identitist' to mean that the core of one's identity is defined by Christianity. I use it as a shorthand for those who think that our identity's core is of the format of a narrative.
personal identity is structured, lived, shared and explainable in narrative terms. One early and influential narrative identitist—and possibly the founding father of the concept—is the American Thomist philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre. He conceived narrative identity as “a self whose unity resides in the unity of a narrative which links birth to life to death as narrative beginning to middle to end” (1981: 205). “... we all live out narratives in our lives and ... we understand our lives in the terms of narratives ... Stories are lived before they are told—except in the case of fiction” (1981: 212). An oft quoted statement comes from the American psychologist Jerome Bruner, who contends that the “self is a perpetually rewritten story ... in the end, we become the autobiographical narratives by which we 'tell about' our lives” (2003; italics in original). Dan McAdams is another American psychologist who came out strongly as a narrative identitist and defined narrative identity as “a person’s internalized and evolving life story, integrating the reconstructed past and imagined future to provide life with some degree of unity and purpose” (2013: 233). McAdams was a pioneer who since the mid-1980s argued that “identity takes the form of a story, complete with setting, scenes, characters, plot, and themes” (2003: 187).

Within Continental philosophy it was the French hermeneutic-phenomenological philosopher Paul Ricoeur who firmly established the concept of narrative identity as the answer to a series of questions circling around the central question of “Who am I?” To answer this question is “to tell the story of a life. The story told tells about the action of the ‘who’. And the identity of this ‘who’ therefore itself must be a narrative identity” (1988: 246). And because the organizing principle of a story and its characters is its plot, Ricoeur tried to show that our identities “are themselves plots” (1991: 143). Narrativity also became important to the American phenomenologist David Carr, who considered it “the unifying form common to two sets of possible oppositions: it is on the one hand the unity of the lived and the told, and on the other hand the unity of the individual and the social or historical” (Carr, 1991:184; italics in original). Carr found a quote in a work by the founding father of phenomenology Edmund Husserl, stating that “the ego constitutes himself for himself in, so to speak, the unity of a 'history' ” (Husserl, 1969b: 75; quoted in Carr, 1991: 74). Following MacIntyre, Ricoeur and Bruner, the American philosopher Charles Taylor also
subscribed to the concept stating that a “basic condition of making sense of ourselves [is] that we grasp our lives in a narrative” and that “making sense of my present action . . . requires a narrative understanding of my life, a sense of what I have become which can only be given in a story” (1989: 47 & 48; italics in original). Though Taylor functions as a bridge between psychological and philosophical notions of narrative identity, the bridge is a bit narrow. Taylor only dedicated two pages to this “basic condition” and refers his reader for more insights to its pioneers. More helpful is the professor of counseling Donald Polkinghorne, who is on excellent terms with both American psychology and Continental philosophy. His study *Narrative Knowing and the Human Sciences* (1988) explores and sings the praise of the peculiar intelligibility integral to narrativity.² In a section titled “Self as Narrative” he states that “we achieve our personal identities and self concept through the use of the narrative configuration, and make our existence into a whole by understanding it as an expression of a single unfolding and developing story” (1988:150). He does not see our personal identity residing in a soul or body substance but in a constitutive process in which “the self is a concept defined as the expressive process of human existence, whose form is narrativity” (1988: 151). The last quote to share is from Wolfgang Kraus, a German narrative identitist, who wrote in his dissertation that "the self is a social self, which essentially thinks and presents itself in a narrative manner" (Kraus, 2000: 183; translated from German).

Following Aristotle's thought in his *Poetics*, this study will be structured as a narrative, which in a skeletal fashion has a beginning, a middle, and an end, and includes two main components, i.e. a series of complications and their subsequent denouement, a term borrowed from French in which it means un-knotting or dis-entanglement. Their parallels in this paper would be a series of what I would call 'complexifications', with which I mean that some complex understandings of narrativity, identity and allied concepts like metaphoricity and the imagination and all their interactions will come into play to the extent that their entanglements can become quite bewildering and

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² Polkinghorne initially found that narrative knowing, in the mode that clients try to understand and heal themselves through the stories they tell, is an effective therapeutic tool in psychotherapy. Then it dawned upon him that self-knowledge through narrativity could be transposed as a research method to academic psychology and subsequently found it fruitful as a research strategy in the human sciences in general (1988: ix - xi).
unwieldy. I do have a *denouement* from this 'dramatic' entanglement in mind, but, to be candid, I do not yet know how that will pan out. In that sense the writing of this paper will be like an adventure, which, because that would be not unlike a story, could be chalked up as justification number one for the narrative structure of this paper.

But before engaging in the hard work there are several stories to be told. The first one is the background and context of this paper and the second is the more personal *context of discovery* story of how I myself became involved in the first place.

§ 3. Background and Historical Context.

Since the mid-1980s the theory of *narrative identity* has become a research program in Continental philosophy and in psychology. This focus is part of a larger "turn to narrative" in the social sciences foreshadowed in the 1960s in France as a reaction to structuralism, resulting in a "seemingly unbounded wave of narrative theorizing" since the mid-1980s (Bamberg, 2007b: 1). Though the concept of narrative identity was not entirely new, the outstanding pioneers were the French hermeneutic-phenomenological philosopher Paul Ricoeur (1981, 1983-88, 1991); the American Thomist philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre (1981, 1992) and the American psychologists Dan McAdams (1985), Theodore Sarbin (1986b) and Jerome Bruner (1986). The concept was quickly picked up and deepened by, among others, Donald Polkinghorne (1988, 1991, 1996), Charles Taylor (1989), David Carr (1991), Michael Bamberg (1997, 2004, 2011) and Marya Schechtman (2007, 2011, 2014).

In his 3-volume *Time and Narrative* (1983-88) Ricoeur initially put the concept of narrativity in service of bridging dichotomies between scientific and subjective notions of time; between the unity of time and its dispersal in past, present and future (both named “aporetics of temporality” [1988:4]); and between descriptive science and prescriptive ethics. His project was a continuation of the philosophical investigation of time, building on the accomplishments of mainly Aristotle, Augustine, Husserl and Heidegger. He concluded that in the last analysis one has to admit to “the ultimate unrepresentability of time” (1988: 242) and that even the tools of phenomenology fell short. His central point was that “temporality cannot be spoken of in the direct discourse of phenomenology, but rather requires the mediation of the indirect

Ricoeur worked this idea out in *Oneself as Another* (1992) in which he proceeded to develop a theory of narrative identity with the tools of phenomenology, hermeneutics and narratology. His theory consists of at least the following basic propositions: 1) the self constitutes action and action constitutes the self; 2) narrativity holds both together; 3) narrativity mediates in the dialectic of our sense of changeable selfhood (*ipse* identity) and our sense of durable sameness (*idem* identity); and 4) narrative identity mediates the dialectic between Self and Other including a multitude of ethical implications (116ff, 140ff, 317ff).

In the field of psychology Dan McAdams and Jennifer Pals (2005) constructed an inclusive model of personal identity they named “The New Big Five”. In this model the narrative component comprises an individual’s most unique aspect even while integrating four other elements: 1) our inherited nature, 2) dispositional traits (O.C.E.A.N., which is the ‘old’ Big Five), 3) characteristic adaptations and 4) our social-cultural context (§ 25). Marya Schechtman developed and refined "The Narrative Self-Constitution View" (2007, 2011), though, after processing Strawson's critique of narrative identity (Strawson, 2004a), she downplayed the narrative component of identity and replaced it with the 'Person Life View' in which our embodiment and biological nature gained prominence over narrative intelligibility (2014).


What became pivotal in my reading sequence during this study was the exploration of the underlying schematism of one’s life story formation by psychologists Susan Bluck
and Tillman Habermas in their papers “The Life Story Schema” (2000) and “Getting a Life” (2000). Schematism here is interpreted as a set of four interconnected coherences enabling and limiting the construction of one’s own life story and by extension one's narrative identity—a subtle but crucial difference I will address in §50 (The Ontological Status of the Narrative Self). From these papers I bore my way chronologically back through the more cognitivist developments of the schematism concept (Neisser, 1976; Schank & Abelson, 1977; Rummelhart, 1980) all the way back to Kant’s concept of the faculty of the imagination in which the idea of schematism might have originated (1978) and from there up again to Kant's appropriations by Heidegger (1962b, 1997), Ricoeur (1977) and Johnson (1987 & 2005).

The extraordinary thing is that the crucial concepts of metaphor, narrativity and schematism, which all came into play while doing research, have gone through career paths of approximate ‘universalization’ and have become in certain research programs foundational instead of peripheral.3

The larger intellectual historical development is that the positivist research program looking for law-like deductive-nomological explanations had run into an impasse (Spector-Mersel, 2010) and that therefore more marginal concepts like metaphor, narrativity and schemata could come to the fore (Mulaik, 1995).

§ 4. Initial Aims

The title of the research, “The Possibility Conditions of Narrative Identity”, indicates an aim around a central concept. The central concept is narrative identity and the aim is to bore down as deep as possible into its possibility conditions in a phenomenological manner.

The starting point will be an explication of the central concept by gathering and melding some of the major insights from philosophy and psychology resulting in a layered concept of identity composed of a ground level of commonly shared natural characteristics, a middle level of more contingent, individualizing components, and a

3 Summaries of the career paths of narrativity and schematism can be found in endnotes xvi and xvii respectively.
top layer of the most contingent, fragile component constituted by narrativity. This will be executed in the section “Advanced Concept of Narrative Identity” (§20-32).

This aim can be pictured in layers going top to bottom from a) personal identity formation; to b) the role of narrativity as an organizing principle of personal identity; to c) metaphoricity as the source of novel meaning formations enabling narrativity to be projected upon personal identity; and to d) schematism as the mechanism of any meaningful projection whatsoever enabling metaphor-based semantic innovations. This work will be presented in the chapter Complications (§33-46).

§ 5. Plan of study: Extending Aristotle with Labov and justification from Frank

I will first give a succinct overview of Aristotle's thought on narrative structure, which then will be extended by the findings of American linguists William Labov and Joshua Waletzky about narratives' essential structural order and function. Then I will give an overview of American sociologist Arthur W. Frank's finding that the presence or absence of a narrative structure is often decisive why certain academic papers are considered publishable and others not.

Following Aristotle's *Poetics* a story has a beginning, a middle, and an end (1450b – 20-35), and includes two main components. First there is a series of *complications* comprised of actions which set the stage for a *denouement*, which encompasses all the changes of fortunes of the hero until a happy or tragic ending (1455b – 20-30). During the *denouement* a *discovery* will be made by the hero which will change his fortunes (1452a – 30). Besides setting, characters and incidents a story also has a *thought*, which would prove a particular point or a general truth. What keeps all these parts together is the “Unity of a Plot”, which not only provides “the combinations of the incidents of the story” (1450a – 15-16), but is also the most essential part of a story (1450a – 39).

The influential paper “Narrative Analysis: Oral Versions of Personal Experience” by Labov and Waletzky extended Aristotle's narratology with the help of empirical research. They looked for invariant structures in simple stories told by a wide range of Americans of different age, ethnicity and location, which could be extrapolated to any narratives whatsoever. Their findings on what they think were the function, minimal
components and structure of a narrative will be addressed later in this study under the heading Narrativity (§35). For this introduction I will only use what they saw as the sequential components of most stories, a sequence which I intend to adopt for the structure of this study.

Labov and Waletzky analyzed and identified in total six kinds of clauses or simple phrases in stories. The Abstract, which is optional, indicates the beginning of a story and presents its subject matter. The Orientation describes the setting of the story with its characters, location and time frame. Complication is where the initial action takes place made up of narrative clauses in usually chronological order. The Evaluation (congruent with Aristotle's Thought) is the part of the narrative where, either explicitly in a comment or implicitly in a more non-verbal fashion through intonation or gesture, the narrator discloses his own evaluative perspective as the point of the story. It usually is the point where “the complication has reached a maximum” (30) and something happens or is decided which represents a turn in the story. The Evaluation is followed by the Resolution (congruent with Aristotle's Denouement), which tells what finally happened and gives closure to the story. The last component, another one which is optional, is the Coda, which brings the story back to the here and now of the narrator. The terminology of ‘maximum complication', evaluation and resolution seem to overlap, which is well captured in Labov's visual schema where all three kinds of clauses come together and there is a 90° shift in direction:

![Figure 1. The Normal Form of Narrative (37).](image-url)
The inspiration and justification for adopting the Labov and Waletzky sequence I found in a paper by the Canadian sociologist and socio-narratologist Arthur Frank, titled “After Methods, the Story” (2004). Frank posed the question why certain academic papers were accepted for publication and others not. His conclusion was that, though most papers were methodologically sound and made some academic contribution, those which were published usually had a narrative structure and that the best narrative structure was the detective genre. His complaint about non-storied papers was that “... nothing happens that seems to warrant a readers’ attention” (430; italics in original). He therefore advised prospective paper writers to open with something compelling; go into uncharted territory; and give a sense where the action is. Writing is writing 'towards' and not not 'about'. It should be open-ended and adventurous. In other words, writing 'about' implies a clear bird's eye view of the territory and trajectory. Writing 'towards' is grounded in a situated, bit opaque beginning, going through an uncharted middle phase with a provisional sense of an ending.

§ 6. Note on Methodology

My disciplinary approach is within the Continental philosophical movement of phenomenology, though I am also open to more analytic, science-oriented approaches. Because of my studies with the hermeneutic phenomenologist and Heidegger expert Theodore Kisiel at Northern Illinois University I received a thorough introduction in Husserl and his '101' methods of bracketing and eidetic variation as well as in Heidegger and his grafting of existentialism and hermeneutics unto phenomenology.

Bracketing aims at suspending one's usual quotidian interpretations of the nature of experience, such that a gestalt-switch might take place going from 1) a natural attitude, including one's preferred metaphysical, religionist or scientific views, to 2) a consideration of our experiences from within such experiences and bring new observations to language with the help of a vocabulary more appropriate to experience itself, without the help of explanatory constructs which look from outside-in.
Eidetic variation, also named free imaginary variation, aims at teasing out the structures and dynamics of this 'new' field of investigation by methodically imagining variations of the phenomenon under investigation to see which components are essential and which could be regarded contingent, what temporal aspects they might have, and how they relate to neighboring phenomena.

By applying these two inter-connected investigative strategies Husserl could construe that consciousness is always already intentional, that is, it has a directional structure, a directing-itself-toward, aiming at something 'outside' itself and doing so with a mode of access correlated to its object. Husserl also pointed out that a sequential dynamics belongs to intentionality, which goes from a) empty intending, to b) possible fulfillment, to c) relative identity; and that most of our intentional acts are complexly structured content-wise by a categorial (Husserl) or syntactical (Sokolowski) kind of organization.\textsuperscript{iv}

§ 7. Caveat

As stories select and combine an economic amount of events and characters to fit its plot and make its point, this study will also have to select those which are most relevant, leaving unused multiple more detailed studies for reasons of space. One manner in dealing with the papers and insights for which there was no space is to at least mention them and possibly summarize their content in footnotes or endnotes.
CHAPTER 2: ORIENTATIONS

ORIENTATION A: BEGINNINGS

§ 8. Context of Discovery

The starting point of this project was Czech phenomenologist Jakup Čapek’s recent presentation “Experience and Storytelling: Narrative Identity and Phenomenology” (2016), which surveys theories of narrative identity by other phenomenological philosophers like David Carr (1991), Dan Zahavi (2005) and László Tengelyi (2004).

Jakub Čapek (Charles University, Prague) was a Fulbright Visiting Scholar at the Phenomenology Research Center, Carbondale, Illinois, to do research on identity. I chose his paper as a starting point because 1) it addresses the problem of identity formation; 2) and does so within a phenomenological framework; 3) the question regarding the connection between narrativity and identity (and action) seems to be an ongoing and current philosophical research program; 4) I might have studied with Čapek if I had chosen to pursue my masters in philosophy at Southern Illinois University, Carbondale.

Čapek discerns three assumptions on which the narrative account is based: 1) personal identity is conceptualized in terms of selfhood; 2) selfhood is constituted by the idea of life-unity; and 3) this life-unity has a narrative structure (2). According to Čapek, Carr tried to phenomenologically substantiate the narrative account by arguing that both the structure of selfhood and experience itself are always already narrative in nature (6-8); Zahavi has his reservations because he distinguishes between a fundamental, minimal self and a founded, narratively constituted self, though both are in harmony (9-11); and Tengelyi is diametrically opposed to the theory of narrative identity because, not only can selfhood not be reduced to a narrative structure, but narrativity actually distorts selfhood as it is merely a reduced, simplified “retrospective fixation” of past experiences and therefore negates, even suppresses, the rich, unpredictable, ambiguous nature of prospective action, which he names--following Merleau-Ponty--the “wild region of life-history”(11-15). Čapek sides with Tengelyi and finds assumptions 2) and 3) refuted while embracing the first one.

The point I want to make here is that I initially had an intuitive sympathy for the
narrativist view and caught myself defending it even though I had to admit that Merleau-Ponty's concept of a “wild region of life-history” exerted a certain appeal. After consulting some of the works mentioned I quite quickly formulated the following question which became my leading question:

§ 9. Differentiating the pre-narrative, narrative, and trans-narrative

Can one make a case for the differentiation--within the context of the question regarding narrative identity--between a pre-narrative, narrative, and trans-narrative field of identity and action? Čapek (like Ricoeur and Tengelyi) makes the case that the diachronic unity of narrative identity is still a founded (in the Husserlian sense) and sometimes even unstable intentional accomplishment and not an existentially 'given' structure (Carr), in which one is always already thrown and implicitly abiding (Heidegger). There are limit experiences which can threaten and confuse one's personal and collective narrative identity. During psychotherapy some people might regress to pre-adolescent states of identity formation, only to re-build their life story along more healthy lines (Erikson, 1968: 212-6), and during conversion there might be a wholesale switch as one world narrative gets replaced by another (Berger & Luckmann, 1966: 156). Such radical changes would indicate a more originary, pre-narrative, pre-personal field of identity and action (Heidegger, 1962; Sartre, 1957; Merleau-Ponty, 1962).

The other side of this coin is the possibility of a trans-personal, masterful overcoming of narrativity in what I would provisionally formulate as a trans-narrative, expert coping behavior, exhibiting a spontaneous or immanent teleology (or immanent narrativity) independent of any directionality integral to an explicit story-plot or long-term project. The main template for such a trans-narrative state I derived from the brothers Dreyfus and their phenomenology of skill acquisition in five stages. Their highest state of expert encompasses skillful coping on a practical level and moral maturity on an ethical level, with both dependent on a fine-grained, circumspective perception of one's situation and not on verbal-cognitive constructs (Dreyfus, 2006; Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1986, 1991).

The specific connection between the tripartite differentiation proposed above and the
investigations of the different thinkers mentioned can be found in the different ways they structure the dynamic between a) the realm of implicit, lived experience and b) the realm of explicit, reflected experience. What comes to mind is the following classification of these dynamic structures:


2. A progressive developmental model going from a) naive, implicit, through b) analytic-reflective to c) authentic, masterful coping (Dreyfus, 2006; Heidegger, 1962: §74; Krishnamurti, 1954: 50-6).

3. A tri-lectical, circular relationship between a) implicit, practical understanding, b) explicit, verbal interpretation and c) application in praxis, which will impact a) again (Heidegger, 1962: H382-87/434-49; Gadamer, 1960: 274-341; Ricoeur, 1983: 52-87).

4. The metaphor of a spiral (Carr, 1991:184) might come in handy to combine both developmental and circular (multi-dialectical) models.

Because Ricoeur enrolled narrativity as 1) a central, mediating concept in trying to solve (admittedly in gradations of success) some of the aporetics of time, while 2) also bridging with the concept of narrativity the realms of descriptive action and prescriptive ethics, as well as 3) providing the most elaborate and sophisticated hermeneutic-phenomenological justification of both personal and collective narrative identity theory, his concept of narrativity will attain a prominent position in this study. Especially important is his concept of a three-fold mimesis of a) our implicit understanding of action, b) its interpretation in narrative composition, and c) its subsequent adaptation in, and refiguration of, the world of the hearer or reader (§23). 

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4 Pagination to the 1979 Sheed & Ward edition. The relevant sections are "The Rediscovery of the Fundamental Hermeneutic Problem" (Second Part, II, 2) and "Analysis of Effective-Historical Consciousness" (Second Part, II, 3).
§ 10. Introduction

Before getting into the meat of this study I would like to insert an introductory section on 1) some of the basic concepts of phenomenology (§§10-15) and then 2) phenomenology's connection to empirical psychology, because so many of its empirical results will be 'lifted' into a more phenomenological framework (§§16-19). The first part aims at what I have experienced as one of the most crucial concepts in phenomenology and that is the capacity or skill of *categorial intuition*. It is both a very simple and straightforward kind of experience, because it underlies any and all of our experiences, but it is also, in its more sophisticated explication, a very productive concept capable of breaking open and analyzing some very complex philosophical matters. I will proceed by highlighting the following sequence of concepts: intentionality (§12); categorial intuition (§13); and eidetic reduction (§14)

The second part is about the division of labor between philosophy and psychology and within these disciplines the differentiation between investigating on one side functions and on the other side their genesis. An important part will be dedicated to Husserl's concept of internal time-consciousness (§18).

§ 11. Categorial Intuition - A

Phenomenology does explicate, develop and apply a special skill. It is the skill of having philosophical insights or intuitions essences, but now in a way in which 'having an insight' has come, within western philosophy, to an unprecedented level of self-evident self-understanding. Phenomenology's founding father Husserl called these philosophical acts 'essence-intuitions' (*Wesenschau*) and through such acts he also made some penetrating investigations into the necessary conditions to make such acts possible. This claim can become intelligible on the basis of understanding a) the intentional structure of consciousness, b) a peculiar perceptive capacity called *categorial intuition*, c) a philosophical procedure called *eidetic reduction* and d) the specific subject-matter phenomenology is interested in, i.e. the essential structures and dynamics of experience, including the for this study important experience of understanding and using metaphors, following and telling stories and, in their
combination, the lived, narrative meaning of this world and our own identity.

§ 12. Intentionality

Intentionality in phenomenology means that consciousness is always consciousness of something (Husserl, 1970a, V2: 94-125; Heidegger, 1992: 27-44; Sokolowski, 1974: 18-56). In all psychological acts like seeing, remembering, counting, discussing, etc., we are directed or focused on a certain seen, remembered, counted or discussed object and not on the act itself or the 'I' enacting the act. Consciousness is not a container within the brain, duplicating what is outside itself with the senses acting as intermediaries. Who would be then conscious, and in what way, of what is contained in the container? Another container? Properly speaking consciousness is always already outside itself, directly, through its senses, in the world of its cares, whether practical, social or theoretical.

An important part of intentionality is the phenomenon that we can emptily intend an object and also experience different grades of fulfillment of the intention, through which then the self-sameness of the object can be experienced over a minimal temporal stretch. Examples of empty intentions are: looking for a lost object, trying to remember a forgotten phone number, the content of any statement before it is personally verified, not understanding a self-evident statement like A=A, or not seeing yet that intentionality is a basic feature of consciousness. This dynamic of intentionality is important for a deeper phenomenological understanding of issues like knowledge and evidence, mistakes and misunderstandings, and the philosophical trio of necessity, possibility and actuality. It will get some deeper treatment in the analysis of minimal narrative structures (§34).

This section, with some edits, was lifted from an article I wrote for my then fellow Theosophists to make the case that Theosophy (a strand in western esotericism) and phenomenology could productively influence each other and that phenomenology also could have a similar relationship with the transformative philosophy of Jiddu Krishnamurti (Schuller, 2004b). As an aside, I found that I had this temporary belief in the Theosophical worldview in common with the translator of Husserl's *Logical Investigations*, the south-African phenomenologist John Findlay (Cohen, 1985: 9-11). For him Theosophy was a launching pad into Neoplatonism, for me into a more physicalist and evolutionary worldview.
§ 13. Categorial Intuition

The really important issue here is what Husserl calls categorial intuition (\textit{kategoriale Anschauung}. Husserl, 1970a: 269-320), a concept Heidegger found highly important (Heidegger, 1992: 47-71; Kisiel, 2002: 84-100). Categorial intuition organizes and structures, on a pre-theoretical, pre-thematic level, our simple perceptions into complex 'states of affair'. This happens for example when we go from seeing just a house to seeing that the house is white, or that it is bigger than its neighbor, or is in front of another one, or any other specific feature or relation it might have. On a more complex level we can use the example of seeing a row of trees or hearing a melody.

The peculiarity is the following. The trees and notes are sensuously given, but the row and the melody, though they are experienced, they are \textit{not} sensuously given. The pattern and melody are items that are not part of the raw data entering our senses, and because of that easily overlooked peculiarity they might even not be experienced at all. You might just see some trees and not perceive the row pattern, and you might just hear a sequence of musical notes without experiencing the melody. At the same time, when these patterns are experienced, it is obvious that they are not merely subjective in the sense of an arbitrary processing of information, or some form imposed upon the data by consciousness. Once perceived, the pattern and melody are really out there and have their own kind of objectivity, which can be pointed out to others, and shared with them. To come back to the example of the house, one could ask where or how in the sensuous experience the 'is', 'bigger' or 'in front' resides when the perception is articulated in the statement 'the house is white' or 'the house is \textit{bigger} than its neighbor' or 'the house is \textit{in front of} another'. We can see the house, the white color, its neighbors, but where and how do we see the feature and the relations? It is these kinds of structuring of our experiences that find their way, when expressed in language, in the non-sensuous parts of language, in words like 'being', 'this', 'and', 'or', 'behind', 'unity', 'plurality,' etc. These items of experience are not merely subjective forms imposed \textit{upon} sensuous experience, nor are they to be found \textit{in} sense perception. These items are given to consciousness \textit{with} and \textit{founded upon} sensuous experience, through a \textit{non-sensory} kind of perception, i.e. categorial intuition.
In short, categorial intuition is a non-sensory manner of creating *Gestalts* out of our experiences, upon which more complex linguistic acts can be built like metaphors and stories. As shall be later unpacked in more detail, all three of these acts (categorial intuition, metaphorical transference, narrative emplotment) are enabled by the productive imagination.

§ 14. Eidetic Reduction

Eidetic reduction is a procedure by which one gradually comes to understand the essence or univocal meaning of an issue through free imaginative variation (Husserl, 1973: 340-8; Gurwitsch, 1964: 189-97). If the issue is understanding the essence of the practical object 'coffee-cup,' one would take its various features and relational aspects and change them in imagination until it becomes obvious that one couldn't speak of a coffee-cup anymore. For example, imagine changing the opening at the top to being gradually more tilted and ending up on the side, at which point it can not contain any fluids anymore and therefore hardly qualifies as a cup. Or gradually change it weight, size, or material. What one ends up with are those features without which a coffee-cup wouldn't be a coffee-cup, that is, its structural essence. These features could then be gathered into an extended definition of the item, like 'a small non-porous, heat-resistant delivery device, weight- and size-wise proportionate to a human body, for intake of warm water-solved caffeine'. In the previous example the issue was the essence of a specific practical object, an issue phenomenology is hardly interested in. What it is interested in---among many issues---is the essential complex structures of the *experience* of using any practical object *whatsoever*, though it could proceed or abstract from the example of a coffee-cup, or a hammer as Heidegger does, to uncover these essential ideal forms.

§ 15. The Concept of Categorial Intuition Categorically Intuited

The last step is to show that when we make statements about the essential structures of consciousness itself we are dependent on categorial intuition. For example, when Husserl makes the case that consciousness is always intentional, he could not do so by merely reflecting upon his own consciousness. He had to structure that peculiar investigative reflective experience and have it confirmed and refined through varying
repetitions, i.e. eidetic reduction. He saw that when one wills, something is willed; when one thinks, something is thought; when one sees, something is seen, etc. He saw that every act of consciousness has its own peculiar correlative 'object' to which it is directed. Consciousness is always consciousness of. The importance here is not this structure of intentionality itself, but the idea that once you see this structure for yourself it is because of categorial intuition, which means that you are categorially intuiting a non-sensuous item with its own claim to objectivity. Moreover it is a philosophical act. It is not a scientific hypothesis to be tested in a psychological laboratory. It is categorial intuition in the first place that makes science possible by ongoingly and in ever more refined ways structuring its subject matter. Science even doesn't need to know about this possibility condition to proceed successfully. And it is not a religious experience either. Phenomenology can uncover things about ourselves, and these revealings can be experienced as a revelation of some sort, but phenomenology's subject matter does not reach farther than the necessary possibility conditions, or ideal forms, of our experiences and can't say anything about its content qua content. It is by an act of faith that faith's specific content is constituted, which will provide a content only for theology to investigate, while phenomenology can only investigate the essential structure of the act of faith and the correlative kind of being of its intended object, regardless of its content. Husserl called these philosophical acts 'essence-intuitions' (Wesenschau), which only bring out what comprises the structuring ingredients implicitly within any experience whatsoever and make them therefore more intelligible.

Heidegger refines this notion of phenomenological explication of the structures of experience with his idea of 'formal indication' (Formalanzeichnung), of which Dasein (Being-there) and Being-in-the-world are his most well known (Heidegger, 2004: 42-45; Kisiel, 1993: 169-70). These peculiar Heideggerian concepts, here emptily intended (formally indicated), will find their own appropriate fulfillment in acts of understanding, which can only be called acts of existential self-knowledge, because the concepts indicate the essential dynamic structuring of our very own being in its

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6 See here for example the existential-phenomenological investigations of Paul Tillich (1957) and the overview of phenomenological 'voices' in the phenomenology of religion by Twiss and Conser (1992).
here-and-now *thisness*, i.e. these concepts try to express in a nonobjectifying and nonsubstantifying manner the assumed ineffable "full immediacy of the individual human situation" (Kisiel, 1996).

In short, categorial intuition is an important faculty inhereing in the dynamic structure of consciousness. This 'hidden' ability can be explicated and refined with the help of eidetic reduction into a philosophical attitude along the lines phenomenologists have investigated, and applied in almost any intellectual endeavor whatsoever.

**ORIENTATION C: PHENOMENOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGY**

§ 16. Division of Labor between Phenomenology and Psychology

Introducing the second part can be done most fruitfully with the following quadrant crossing philosophy and psychology with functions and history, taking narrativity as its clue.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Functional approach</th>
<th>Historical approach</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Psychology</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A. Psychological and social coping mechanisms enabled by narrativity and narrative identity</td>
<td>B. Evolutionary and developmental aspects of narrativity and narrative identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Emplotment as the synthesizing activity of the productive imagination</td>
<td>D. Phenomenological archaeology of possibility conditions of narrativity and narrative identity</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 2. Aspects of Narrativity and Narrative Identity

Square A in the quadrant is both historically and qua accessibility the first discipline. Extensive research in psychology is available on the many functional aspects of narrativity and narrative identity. Particular functions which have already been mentioned and will be mentioned throughout this study are: social cohesion, well-being, coping, socialization, therapeutic healing, life-span organization, and transferring from one generation to the next culturally specific concepts of temporality, causality, ethical standards and know-how.

This last point of narrativity as a transmitting device for social practices segues into square B, which looks into the history of narrativity and narrative identity from two
angles, one being ontogenetical and the other phylogenetical.\(^7\) The first is developmental and addresses the emergence and development of *narrative intelligence* understood as the implicit know-how of tacitly recognizing, following and telling stories in childhood (Nelson, 1996).\(^8\) The second is evolutionary and addresses the adaptive advantage, selectionist history and possible origin of narrative intelligence. Narrativity might be the verbal extension of play, which phenomenon is observable in many species and teaches young members through mock-play some of the techniques necessary later for survival (Boyd, 2009; Dissanayake, 2017). In Boyd’s study, stories, like any other expressive art, is a "form of *cognitive play*", which can improve the functioning of our minds; engender coordination and cooperation in groups; inspire creativity in individuals and groups to think beyond the bounds of the immediate; and socially elevate artists most capable in getting our attention to engage in cognitive play (Boyd, 2009: 381-3).

Square C addresses the epistemological process of synthesis by which a story becomes constituted as the *emplotted* unity of diverse characters, actions and settings. Here the term *emplotment* might be adequate to indicate that it is a dynamic and complex process by which a story’s heterogeneous elements are synthesized by its plot, also named its theme, moral or ‘point’ (Ricoeur, 1984: 31-51 & 161-174; 1985: 1-44). Ricoeur explicitly, and Kant and Heidegger less so, make the point that the highly creative capacity of emplotment is lodged in the *productive imagination*, of which there will be much more to say (Ricoeur, 1984: 68; See §§42-46).

Square D might be the most elusive and interesting, and would investigate the necessary layers of meaning formation constituting narrativity and in extension narrative identity. This kind of meaning archaeology Husserl named *generative phenomenology*, which he executed in an exemplary manner in his shorter work “The

\(^7\) With ‘genetic’ I do not necessarily mean pertaining to biological genetics but pertaining to origin (genesis), though I would not be surprised if scientists would find a correlation between some genes and narrative intelligence.

\(^8\) In the Artificial Intelligence (AI) program the term narrative intelligence (NI) is also understood as the sub-field analyzing and formalizing narrativity, and recreating in computer programs the computational creativity to write stories (Callen, 2017; Mateas & Senger, 1999). To prevent confusion it should maybe be named Artificial Narrative Intelligence (ANI), leaving the term (natural) narrative intelligence to the developmental psychologists.
Origin of Geometry” (Husserl, 1970c).

Because the results from the work done in all of the four squares will come into play in this study, I like to also make the point about how they are connected within a Husserlian framework. The relevant ideas here are 1) the connection between static and genetic phenomenology (§17) and 2) the transposition of scientific psychological findings into a phenomenological framework (§19).

§ 17. Static, Genetic and Generative Phenomenology

Static or constitutive phenomenology investigates the structure and dynamics of consciousness (the how of experience) and its correlates (the what of experience) when relatively simple experiences are looked at in reflection, for example looking at a dice, remembering a friend’s name, walking through a classroom or multiplying two numbers. Such acts of consciousness can all be looked at from inside out by a phenomenological investigator making fine-grained descriptive analyses of the act's structure and sequence in accomplishing its intention. The last example of multiplication might not be that simple and could be subjected to a genetic investigation trying to peel off the layers of acts and their products finding ever more deeper or originary accomplishments, which would constitute a stratified logic of their possibility conditions or synthetic a priori (Husserl, 1970c).

Then there is an important difference between genetic and generative phenomenology, which can be easily conflated as both investigate the temporal genesis of our experiences, the first discerning layers of syntheses operative within one's own individuality, e.g. inner time-consciousness (§18), and the second discerning layers of meaning of trans-generational, socio-cultural accomplishments, e.g. the origin of geometry. To a large extent, and to make the difference clearer, the differentiation between genetic and generative phenomenology has its parallel in the differentiation between developmental and evolutionary psychology (§16).

Concretely speaking the investigation, or "regressive inquiry" as Husserl named it (Husserl, 1970c: 354), would first ask what kind of underlying act is necessary for a multiplication to take place. And that would be the act of counting. To know how to execute the multiplication of 3*5 one has to be able to count 5+5+5. Next step is the
question of what makes counting possible, which would be to know that numbers are ordered multitudes of single entities. So, the number five is 1+1+1+1+1. Next layer is to see what makes up the single entity of '1' and see that it is something that endures as identical to itself throughout a time-span. Then, what does it mean that a single entity can endure? How is consciousness organized that it can keep a single entity in mind and see it as self-same throughout a time span while mathematical operations are executed?

§ 18. Time Consciousness

The last question segues into the fascinating subject of the connection between consciousness and time. What could explain the experience of temporally enduring entities is the idea of a *specious now*, i.e. our experience of the present has a certain temporal thickness in which entities can endure for a little longer than the razor-thin extension the now could be abstractly conceived as. In Husserl's phenomenology of time-consciousness the holistic structure of the experience of the present is composed of three phases, which placed on a spatial time-line are (Husserl, 1964: 51-56):

Retention – Source point – Protention

At the source point the initial stimulus enters consciousness, let's say the famous first four notes of Beethoven's Fifth Symphony. Reflection on the hearing of this sequence will indicate that the notes do not immediately disappear after hearing them individually. Together they constitute a melody because the first note is somehow still retained when the second comes along, with which it combines, and then this combination is still retained when the third and fourth notes sound, all together creating an cumulative structure of retained notes experienced as a melody. When you hear the melody for the first time one might be rather more startled than hearing and appreciating the melody, but once it becomes a recognizable and reproducible musical meme in one's memory, the next time you hear the first note there will be an immediately filled protention of what is to come. This tacit protention has to be differentiated from explicit expectation. When I indicate that if you click [here](#) you will hear this melody, you will have the explicit expectation that you will hear that specific
melody, but once it enters your mind the protentive phase at for example note #2 is not the explicit expectation of note #3. You then would hear two notes and that would interfere with the experience of the melody in its sequential enfolding. Still, because of one's familiarity, note #3 announces itself at the sound of #2, but it is just-to-come or, as Heidegger coined it—catching its paradoxical nature--right-now-not-yet (1997: 234). A similar difference can be made between retention, i.e. the just-past or just-now, and memory. Once you know the Beethoven meme you have an explicit memory of it, which can be revived. But when you revive it, again at note #2, you will have retained #1, not as an explicit memory of it, but as the just-past note which combines with #2 creating a new unit, which in its own retentive phase will combine with #3, etc., till the final unit of the melody is constituted. Husserl named the difference primary and secondary expectation and remembrance (Husserl, 1964: 68f). Given the above differentiations the temporal sequence of experience within its larger temporal framework is:

Memory - Retention – Source point – Protention - Expectation

Though this presentation of the structure of the specious now is based on an analysis of a receptive, passive experience of hearing a melody, we should remember that this structure also provides the working space for the more productive, active act of multiplication with which this analysis started. Without this temporal space in which entities can endure to be manipulated by specific operations, such operations or psychological acts could not attain meaningful fulfillment. In other words, the essential tri-phase sequence of intentionality (empty - fulfilled - identified) needs a temporal working space in which the emptily projected intention can be experienced as successfully fulfilled (or not) and both assessed in their sufficiency of identity (see §12). Otherwise there would be no possibility of planned action nor verbal comprehension.

§ 19. The Transposition of Psychology into Phenomenology

One of the aspirations of phenomenology is to reform certain areas of empirical psychology (Husserl, 1970b: 203-8 & 257-65; Kockelmans, 1967b). Their critique is that empirical psychology borrowed the methods and concepts of the physical
sciences and applied them to the investigation of psychological phenomena. This would obscure the real nature of psychological acts. The most extreme example is the school of behaviorism which considers whatever happens to a person from a subjective, personal angle as irrelevant and relegates the psyche to the status of a black box. The only data relevant are measurable inputs and outputs and their correlative or causal relation. Phenomenology takes an almost exact opposite position. Instead of using the standard of mathematical physics they propose that the foundation necessary to make psychology into a rigorous empirical science is through phenomenological reflection. This reflection would be executed by the psychological research community upon their own conscious acts, and abstract from such acts its essential structures and processes, which the researchers subsequently can express, share, duplicate and critique. And with phenomenological reflection I mean the earlier mentioned sequential procedure of 1) **bracketing**--in order to suspend both one’s naive, natural attitude and usual frameworks of understanding (in this case the natural sciences)--and 2) **free imaginative variation** leading to 3) the discovery of **essentials** or relative invariant aspects of, for example, the first person, subjective experience of reading a story.

Phenomenology thereby rearranges the relationship between the relevant disciplines involved. It is not the case, as positivists would argue, that mathematical physics is the foundation of psychology, but that both physics and psychology have their own **empirical**, applicative aspect and a **pure**, foundational one. For physics the foundation is mathematics and for psychology it is phenomenology (David Carr in Husserl, 1970a: 260n4). The two-way exchange between phenomenology and psychology would be that 1) phenomenological insights could make psychology more precise and 2) psychological findings, done so in the third person mode, can be re-interpreted as accomplishments of consciousness accessed in the first person mode through emphatic imagination. For example, Ricoeur engages many narratologists who have made extensive contributions to the compilation, classification and logic of stories and their plots, and then incorporates their findings into his phenomenology of emplotment, i.e. how the temporal synthesis of heterogeneity unfolds in a story-reading experience and what basic elements can be discerned (Ricoeur, 1984: 31-51
As far as internal differentiations within phenomenology are concerned I think a strong case can be made that the previously mentioned troika of static, genetic and generative phenomenology have their parallel in act, developmental and evolutionary psychology. Act psychology would investigate faculties like memory, perception, imagination, movement, language performance, etc. with the means of experimental psychology. Static phenomenology would look at the same activities from inside out as conscious accomplishments with its particular correlative-intentional, meaningful structures and dynamics. Developmental psychology would look at the developmental arc of the acquisition of such faculties over a human's life-span, while genetic phenomenology would try to discern within one's own experience the layers of meaningful acts constituting complex, multi-layered experiences. Evolutionary psychology (and for that matter any evolutionary social science) would look at these acts and skills as adaptive mechanisms contributing to group fitness and cultural formations, and look for their origin and development over evolutionary time. Generative phenomenology would try to, emphatically from inside out, reconstruct the complex, layered network of sedimented sense necessary for their collaborative co-constitution.

One important feature in this framework is the connection between evolutionary and developmental psychology in terms of the biological theory of recapitulation, i.e. that the development of the individual duplicates the development of the species, and its implication for the relationship between genetic and generative phenomenology. For example Nelson's 'ontogenetic' framework of a triple-staged language acquisition in individuals duplicates explicitly the framework of Merlin Donald's (1991) 'phylogenetic' triple-staged evolution of human culture and cognition (Nelson, 1998: 59). And Ellen Dissanayake pointed to the importance of the long prelinguistic and preliterate evolutionary arc of humanity for understanding aesthetics and narrativity.

If we recall that for 99 percent of their evolutionary history humans were nonverbal or preliterate, it then becomes clear that contemporary ideas about the nature and

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function of narrative or poetry will gain depth and richness if embedded in awareness of aesthetic predispositions that evolved during our long and influential prehistoric past (2011: 57).

This idea of cultural and cognitive recapitulation would then be the guiding template in the relation between genetic and generative phenomenology by which individualistic-developmental accomplishments in meaning-formation are embedded in communal-evolutionary (or trans-generational inter-subjective) accomplishments.

Although this looks like a neat one-on-one pairing of sub-divisions within psychology and phenomenology, it has to be pointed out that Husserl himself did not make this tidy categorization because developmental and evolutionary psychology had not yet been established and the demarcations and relationships between philosophy, physics, biology, psychology and other emerging social sciences were continuously shifting and proliferating in variations, even to this day, and doing so without academy-wide consensus. Husserl paired in his day generative phenomenology with cultural anthropology, which then was the science dealing with communal contexts shaped by trans-generational traditions (myths, rituals, arts) and "treats individual becoming within these geo-historical lifeworlds and addresses lifeworld communities as they transform themselves over the generations" (Steinbock in Embree, 1997: 262). He also, throughout his thinking life, felt the necessity to re-arrange the scope and priorities between the three kinds of phenomenology, ostensibly settling for the generative one as the most encompassing and important one (Steinbock in Embree, 1997: 264). Based on my own experience I would make the case--parallel to Husserl's assessment of generative phenomenology as the most encompassing one--that evolutionary theory in its contribution to the social sciences would be the most comprehensive theory deepening and uniting them within its own paradigm.

**ORIENTATION D: ADVANCED CONCEPT OF NARRATIVE IDENTITY**

§ 20. Introduction

The intention of this section is to compose a mid-level complicated concept of narrative identity constructed with the building-blocks provided by philosophers, particularly MacIntyre and Ricoeur; psychologists, especially Bamberg, McAdams, and Nelson; and evolutionary cognitivists like Donald and Boyer. Though there are
quite some variations in the concept of narrative identity (Čapek, 2018: 3), most do have some ideas in common which could constitute a set of corner-stones. At the same time, because my summary cum composition will contain some original tweaks in order to make necessary conciliations, the resulting product itself will be inevitably one among the many variants of existing theories of narrative identity.

§ 21. MacIntyre

Because MacIntyre arguably is the creative fount of the concept of narrative identity this section will start with his concept, which was appropriated and further developed by Ricoeur.

In MacIntyre's account, personal identity consists of three equiprimordial moments: narration, intelligibility, and accountability. All three presuppose each other and in their unity stand in mutual presupposition with personal identity (218). MacIntyre is quite clear and adamant on this point. "[A]ll attempts to elucidate the notion of personal identity independently of and in isolation from the notion of narrative, intelligibility and accountability are bound to fail" (218). In this opening section I will present MacIntyre's understanding of all three components and end with a possible re-arrangement of all three.

Narration

MacIntyre presents multiple arguments to establish the importance of narrativity. I will summarize here three intertwined lines of reasoning by MacIntyre making the claim that narrativity is important to understand 1) the unity of virtue, 2) behavior in general and 3) intentional planning.

MacIntyre is concerned with virtue and its manifestation throughout one's life and its

10 As MacIntyre draws deeply from Aristotle I suspect that the three equiprimordial constituents of personal identity have their parallel to, or possibly origin in, the three rhetorical appeals in speech-acts: pathos (narrativity in its emotional impact), logos (intelligibility) and ethos (accountability). For the arousal of emotions in Aristotle see his Poetics (1941, ch. XIV-XV: 1466-70) and for the connection between narrative and the emotions see Keen (2011). Boyd considers social and moral emotions as the product of evolution. They are the "natural selection's way of motivating widespread cooperation in highly social species" (2009: 58) and are usually aroused in stories thereby shaping motivations and actions into pro-social channels (2009: 287f)
ipseic constancy, or voluntary commitment, throughout different situations.\textsuperscript{11} The unity of such virtue can only be evaluated within the unity of a life to assess its level of constancy, which can only be established in the unity of a narrative (205). To assess someone's courage is best done by telling that person's life story of courageous acts in diverse circumstances, preferably including moments of doubt and fear to create suspense and indicate its contingent, elective character. Not only Homer's *Odysseus* and the tales of the knights of the round table come to mind, but also the narrative of Gandhi's life as evocatively told in *Freedom at Midnight* (Collins & Lapierre, 1975).

We cannot understand behavior without understanding intentions; we cannot understand intentions without understanding the social setting in which they occur; we cannot understand such settings without understanding the agent's history and the history of the institution in which the behavior takes place; and no history is intelligible outside narrativity (206).

"Swear faith to me and receive mercy" - "I will not swear faith to a squire. Never". In Boorman's movie *Excalibur* the young, not yet king, Arthur hands over his sword to his enemy Sir Uryens, just when Arthur had him at the tip of his sword. Why? What was his intention? Well, he realized he needed to be knighted by another knight before becoming a king and Sir Uryens was the one immediately available. So, to understand and appreciate Arthur's act of supreme courage it is not only necessary to know Arthur's personal story (he was King Uther's son and had just drawn Excalibur from the stone), but also the institutions of medieval knighthood and kingship with all its rituals and social functions, which can best be understood in its complexities and riches when presented through historical narratives. Just stating that knighthood is bestowed by merely touching a squire on the shoulder with a sword and executing a speech act ("By the name of Saint Michael . . .") will not do. Such a propositional statement does not capture the solemn, affective and historical dimension of the act of knighting. Only a narrative can convey that.

A third line starts with short-term intentions, which can only be intelligible in reference

\textbf{11} *ipseic* is derived here from Ricoeur's use of the term *ipse*, i.e. the part of one's identity comprised of moral commitments to promises and agreements with others (§23). MacIntyre covers this part of one's personal identity with the concept of accountability.
to long-term intentions, which can only be understood in terms of one's longest-term or ultimate intentions, with the whole chain of intentions only graspable in a narrative history. And, as speech-acts are a form of intentional behavior, the same logic applies to them. "Both purposes and speech-acts require contexts" and "become intelligible by finding its place in a narrative" (210). Again, young Arthur's behavior can illustrate this. He gives up his sword in-order-to be knighted by a speech-act, in-order-to claim kingship for-the-sake of the country, i.e. its inhabitants. But this only becomes intelligible when captured in a story. This analysis is obviously congruent with, and borrows terminology from, Heidegger's thought on how Dasein constitutes an intelligible world comprised of a field of possible involvements it cares about, which can be analyzed in terms of a chain of actions starting with a proximate "in-order-to" to a more encompassing "for-the-sake-of-which" with an ultimate terminus in, or back to, Dasein itself, either individually or collectively, for which sake this chain is executed (Heidegger, 1962: 116-9 / H84-6).

MacIntyre then makes the switch from the epistemological importance of narrativity, which makes actions and discourses intelligible, to the idea that they are already narrative in their ontological structure in the first place. He now presents "conversations in particular and actions in general as enacted narratives" (210; italics added), because

. . . we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the action of others. Stories are lived before they are told--except in the case of fiction (212).

MacIntyre's switch from narrative intelligibility to narrative identity is quite extraordinary and might find a parallel and elucidation in how Heidegger captured his hermeneutic turn in the profound and evocative phrase 'the hermeneutics of facticity' with its preposition read in a double genitive manner, but now paraphrased for MacIntyre as 'the narrative of life'. Just like we can read the phrase 'The love of God' as meaning both 'the love directed towards God' and 'the love inhering in God', we

12 Expressions like 'my mother's father's library' are usually called double genitive or double possessive. The expression 'the love of god' is a special case of double possession because the nouns involved are both possessor and possessee. Maybe instead of 'double genitive' such expressions should be named 'mutual possessive'.

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should read Heidegger's phrase as both 'the act of interpreting directed at our existential situatedness' and 'the interpretative nature inhering in our existential situatedness'. Before we even interpret life as if it were an object, it already has in itself an interpreted nature as both its ground and product (Heidegger, 1999: 12f). Transposing this structure to MacIntyre, he goes from 'the narrative interpretation directed at human life' to 'the narrative structure as already inhering in human life'.

Combining both Heidegger and MacIntyre, we can read:

The relationship here between hermeneutics [narrativity] and facticity [human life] is not the relationship between the grasping of an object and an object grasped . . . Rather interpreting [narrating] is itself a possible and distinctive how of the character of the being of factical [human] life itself" (Heidegger, 1999: 12).

This quote is lifted from the section titled "Hermeneutics as the self-interpretation of facticity" in which Heidegger succinctly formulated the program of his philosophical research: "Hermeneutics has the task of making the Dasein which is in each case our own accessible to this Dasein itself with regard to the character of its being . . ." (Heidegger, 1999: 11). Another oft-quoted passage in Gadamer expressing this "pan-hermeneutic process" (Kisiel, 2014: 5) can also easily be transposed from hermeneutics to narrativity, implying here that the latter might be the most comprehensive and natural form of the former: "Life interprets [narratizes] itself. Life itself has a hermeneutical [narrative] structure" (Gadamer, 1979: 199). And if "life narratizes itself" in the double sense of both structuring and expressing itself in narrativity then the sense of self that humans attain would necessarily be of a narrative nature. We live off, in and through stories. Some developmental psychologists would argue that even on a pre-verbal level at infancy one can detect narrative or proto-narrative structures in play and nonverbal parent-child communication.

Back to MacIntyre. Because we are social and historical beings the narrative aspect of our identity has multiple constraints and complexities. First, we are all characters also in each others' narratives, which makes them at least the co-authors of our being. Even before we are born we are characters in the narratives and identities of our predecessors like parents-to-be and educators-to-be and after we die we might linger as characters in the stories of our successors. Then our identities are also
embedded as characters in concentric or overlapping rings in the historical narratives of larger unities like our family, generation, class, nation, etc., and most of these narratives have already been in progress when we acquire our own role.

We enter upon a stage which we did not design and we find ourselves part of an action that was not of our making. Each of us being a main character in his own drama plays subordinate parts in the dramas of others, and each drama constrains the others (213).

And once on stage our lived narrative has both an unpredictable and teleological character. Even though almost anything can happen and lives can go through dramatic turning points, at the same time we always have a sense of a goal or set of goals as the natural enfoldment of our narrative identities (215). xi

Intelligibility

In MacIntyre 's account the concept of intelligibility is another basic term intertwined with narration and accountability. As presented above, narrativity provides intelligibility to virtuousness, behavior and planning. All of these phenomena are temporally stretched and composed of multiple actions, in which each part can only be connected to the others as a "possible-element-within-a-sequence" with its own logic, context and motivation (209). For Ricoeur the understanding of a narrative sequence is made possible by understanding its overarching plot, which provides the narrative an intelligible unity with its own peculiar point or moral and in which its parts find their own temporally coherent position (§23). Applied to personal identity one can say that, at whatever life-span phase one finds oneself in, one's sense of current selfhood is not only formatted by the sequence of one's actions in the past, creating both obstacles and opportunities in the present regarding prospective actions in the future--which observation might sound trite and trivial--but, more importantly, it is also formatted by the consciously or unconsciously adopted plot schema from the stock of culturally available examples in living persons, biographies or fiction (212-3). Our lives are not a chronicle of separate, discernible logical actions, which can be cleanly retrieved and analyzed in the present to make clear-cut plans for the future, though some people might see themselves like that. We almost all know life is more messy than that. Disturbing fears, unclear desires, preferential interpretations, self-imposed deceptions, ignorance and uncertainty enter the mix of selfhood, which according to
the narrativists is only held together, and sometimes tenuously so, by one’s life story plot. Absent this synthesizing ingredient our identity would, in the words of Erickson, become diffused, i.e. we would experience a loss of center, diminished coherence and fragmentation of roles resulting in different stages of confusion up to psychosis (1968: 212).

**Accountability**

Because human actions are "flowing intelligibly from a human agent's intentions, motives, passions and purposes" (209), humans should be able to be held to account for their authorship. MacIntyre finds this feature specifically pervasive in conversation. It is in the thoroughly familiar context of conversations--a phenomenon he thinks escaped philosophical attention--that motivated actions become intelligible and agents become accountable (210). And not only do we exchange stories in conversations, but conversations themselves are "enacted narratives" in the sense that they are short, dramatic works produced by their joint authors and can be assigned genres like comic, tragic or farcical. They display all the characteristics of literary works. There is a beginning, middle and end; there are complications and resolutions; and longer conversations will have their digressions and sub-plots (211). And because conversation is the "form of human transactions in general", MacIntyre thinks what is true for conversation *sensu stricto* is also true for "battles, chess games, courtships, philosophy seminars", etc (211). They are all enacted narratives for which we are accountable. MacIntyre stresses the reciprocity of accountability and its role in constituting narratives when we do give accounts of our actions and underlying motivations. But also, by extension, conversations have an important role in constituting our identity (217-8).\(^{13}\)

Besides narrative identity having an intrinsic moral component of being accountable to others, it also has a teleological component aimed at what is good, which for MacIntyre equates to the question of "how best I might live out that unity [of a

\(^{13}\) At an empirical level this idea was worked out by Bamberg and his concept of 'small-d narratives', i.e. those that come into play in everyday settings like conversations (Bamberg, 2006; see §24). Also Heidegger observed that it is in daily discourse that we present and constitute ourselves (2007b: 204).
narrative embodied in a single life] and bring it to completion?" (218). MacIntyre takes three specific steps to further flesh out this idea. First, the unity of life has the form of a narrative quest. Second, the quest is for the good. Third, the good is not only an individual good, but more importantly also a communal good. Therefore the unity of life is the unity of a narrative quest for the common good. And because a quest is quite open-ended in both the sense that it does not know where and when it will end nor what lessons will have to be learned on the way to get there, MacIntyre formulates his rather circular "provisional conclusion" as,

\[
\ldots \text{the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life for man, and the} \\
\ldots \text{virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will enable us to understand what} \\
\ldots \text{more and what else the good life for man is} \text{(219).}
\]

In summing up one could argue that MacIntyre's concept of personal identity is a thoroughly contextualist one. Not only are social and historical contexts necessary for the intelligibility of personhood, but personhood itself is equivalent to its context. And because human contexts are not only intelligible within a narrative construction, but are equivalent to them, personhood is therefore of an essentially narrative nature. Appropriating Heidegger one could say that 'life is pan-narrative'. At the same time, and equally essential, is the idea that identity is thoroughly moral in the sense that humans always already act from a set of motivations for which they are socially accountable, that is, they should be able to give such an account, which is inevitably presented through narration.

The component of intelligibility in one's personal identity does not seem to stand as independent as narration and accountability seem to be. It seems to be too closely intertwined with narration, as the latter in MacIntyre's account seems to make the former possible. This idea of the priority of narrativity over intelligibility is an idea more explicitly pursued by Bruner (1991) and other cognitive narrativists. Here I will end with a similar idea that, at a deeper level of analysis, it might be shown that narrativity always already includes both intelligibility and accountability thereby making narrativity the more foundational phenomenon. Narrativity has its own peculiar epistemological form in emplotment, which synthesizes disparate elements into an intelligible, narrative unity, and narrativity also has its own peculiar, intrinsic morality as every story has, explicitly or not, an evaluative point, moral or message.
§ 22. Implied Narrativity in Heidegger’s Concept of Hero

Before proceeding with Ricoeur’s concept of narrative selfhood I like to dig into the concept of hero in Heidegger’s Being and Time and this for two reasons. First, the concept can be fruitfully connected with narrativity because the heroism of a hero can best be captured in a fictional or historical narrative, and second, the two senses of hero used by Heidegger provide an approximate template for the two senses of identity used by Ricoeur.

In the pivotal §74 of Being and Time Heidegger inserted a little phrase, “the possibility that Dasein may choose its hero” (437 / H385), which can be interpreted both in a sinister, prophetic manner and also as possibly opening up the entire passage in which it occurs for a narrative turn (or narrativist exposition) with wider narrativist implications. Within this phrase it is the noun hero (Held) which becomes the anchor point for these two interpretations. The ominous interpretation has a prophetic bend, because we know that it was Hitler who was for a while Heidegger’s hero and from whose authoritarian example Heidegger derived the idea of reforming the German university system along national-socialist lines, starting with the University of Freiburg where he became rector for one year in 1933 (Ott, 1993: 133f; Safranski, 1998: 225f). The second interpretation is more wholesome in more than one meaning. The idea here is that a hero is first of all a character in a fictional or historical narrative and his or her heroism can only be understood as a sequence of deeds held together by the unity of a plotted story. This narrative exposition of Heidegger is most succinctly expressed by the German-American Yale philosopher Karsten Harries:

The past needs to be interpreted. It has to be re-presented in something like a narrative presided over by a theme that binds it into a coherent whole and allows us to place our existence in that hole [sic!]. Heidegger does not speak of a theme, but of the hero. The choice of a hero, I want to suggest, gathers history into such a whole, where the place marked by the word "hero" is left disturbingly empty in Being and Time and thus presents itself to us as an empty vessel demanding to be filled . . . (2014: 169-70; bold in original).

The above is not a summary by Harries of what Heidegger wrote in §74. It is his reconstruction by adding a clarifying narrativist interpretation. The further implications of this narrative twist for the whole of Heidegger’s philosophy of Dasein and its how of being-in-the-world can be summed up as follows. There are only two ways for Dasein
to be in this world. Either it goes inauthentically along with, and immersed in, an average, everyday manner of understanding life in which the "they" (Das Man) has become its non-elected "hero" (422 / H371) or it extricates itself from this "everydayness" by realizing, in a visionary moment, its radical finitude as a mortal entity with a finite life-span, and resolutely appropriates a possible way of being based on the template of its chosen hero. In both cases, in everydayness as well as in resoluteness, the exemplary hero is not a specific person to be imitated, but represents a field of possibilities set in a narrative structure to be appropriated by Dasein by calibrating this field for its own peculiar historical situatedness thereby creating wholly new possibilities.

The deeper points here are that historical figures (and some fictional ones as well; Davidsen, 2016) are not merely exemplars to be followed and seen as images exterior to one's identity, but that they are more of the nature of templates or schemas, not only containing their fulfilled projects in their own epoch, but also, and more importantly, are full of yet-to-be-realized, long-term, trans-generational opportunities which can be picked up and adjusted to expand one's own field of possible actions and thereby becoming a part of one's identity. Or, as MacIntyre expressed it, discernibly echoing Heidegger, "an adequate sense of traditions manifests itself in a grasp of those future possibilities which the past has made available to the present" (223). And such templates--as this line of reasoning took the word hero to imply--is of the nature of a still open-ended narrative. The emplotments inhering in our subconsciously or explicitly chosen exemplary, heroic characters, and the future-oriented traditions they embody, are essential constituents of our lives and identities. Again, one can play here with the double genitive character of the expression 'the story of Dasein', implying that we not only tell stories about Dasein, but that the manner in which Dasein is temporally unified is essentially the unifying how of a story.

§ 23. Ricoeur's Concept of Narrative Identity

During the long voyage of Ricoeur's quest for an understanding of human action and suffering within a hermeneutic-phenomenological framework a considerable stretch
was dedicated to narrativity. First in his three-volume study *Time and Narrative* (1983-88), which addressed the epistemological and formative role narrative plays in our understanding of action and time, and which also introduced the concept of narrative identity. And then in his *Oneself as Another* (1992), which developed this concept fully in chapters five "Personal Identity and Narrative Identity" and six "The Self and Narrative Identity", initially as a solution to a set of problems arising from the question of "what specifies the self" and subsequently as a springboard into the connection between the narrative self and the moral self in three chapters addressing 1) the self and its ethical aims (*telos*), 2) the self and moral normativity (*ethos*), and 3) the self and practical wisdom (*phronesis*). According to Charles Reagan the "central thesis" of *Time and Narrative* is that "time becomes human time to the extent that it is organized into narratives and narratives are meaningful to the extent that they represent our temporal existence" (*Encyclopedia of Phenomenology*, 613).

The basic template presented early in Ricoeur's study on time and narrative, and underlying its unity, is a three-fold *mimesis* or triple-phased circular development of cognitive acts. This series starts with 1) our *tacit, pre-understanding* of our world of action with its meaningful structures of motivated, interacting, goal-oriented agents in their communal settings of customs and institutions (*Ethos*); then 2) the interpretation of this world of agents and actions in *poetic composition* integrating and making meaningful diverse factors like agents, goals, means, interactions, unexpected results, etc. through the creative act of emplotment (*Poiesis*); ending in 3) the act of reading or listening in which the plot or message of the poetic composition might be received and understood with the possible effect of *reformatting* the reader's own understanding of how the world is plotted including a *refiguration* of one's own field of action possibilities (*Praxis*). All three phases are narrative in structure, going from a tacit dimension of desires and actions already *pre-figured* by narrativity, to the explicitly *con-figured* dimension of literary narratives, to end in the receiver whose world of action will get *re-figured" under the sign of the plot* (1983: 77).

Only towards the end of his long study on time and narrative does Ricoeur address the applicability of his three-fold mimesis to personal identity (1988 III: 244-8). First Ricoeur construes identity as a practical category able to answer the question of
"Who did this?", which is not only answered by providing a proper name but also, and more importantly, by telling the story of the life belonging to the name. The "who" and its actions, about which stories are told, therefore "must be a narrative identity".

Second, he differentiates between 1) a formal or substantialist part of one's identity as those components which stay the same throughout one's life like certain bio-metrics and character dispositions (idem identity) and 2) a part which he names self-same or self-constant and equates with narrative identity, which "rests on a temporal structure that conforms to the model of dynamic identity arising from the poetic composition of a narrative text" (246).

Third, one's overall narrative identity will change by adding new stories and re-interpreting old ones, and these changes will change the prefiguration of one's field of action possibilities, about which actualizations new stories can be told, creating an ongoing, dynamic circle. Ricoeur positively affirms this circle to be, in its production of "chains of refigurations" throughout our individual and communal lives, entirely wholesome (248). "This [ongoing] refiguration makes this life itself a cloth woven of stories told" (246).

But, because Ricoeur had not explicitly tackled the issue of personal identity in *Time and Narrative* and what role narrativity would play in its formation, this had to wait for this "Fifth Study" in *Oneself as Another*. His theory consists of at least the following basic propositions: 1) the self constitutes action and action constitutes the self; 2) narrativity holds both together; 3) narrativity mediates in the dialectic of our sense of durable sameness (idem identity) and our sense of changeable selfhood (ipse identity); and 4) narrative identity mediates the dialectic between Self and Other including a multitude of ethical implications (116ff, 140ff, 317ff). Furthermore narrativity has the epistemological virtue of providing listeners and readers "a vast laboratory for thought experiments" (147) to not only imagine alternative ways of acting, feeling and relating, which all could be appropriated and sometimes profoundly change its readers, but also to perceive variations in the two modes of identity of idem and ipse to find out what components of self are stable and which can change. Narrativity also has the virtue that it bridges the realm of is and ought, that is, literature encompasses both the descriptive statements about characters and their actions, and prescriptive
statements evaluating them, because actions always impinge on others who will
either benefit or suffer (115 & 157). "There is no ethically neutral narrative" states
Ricoeur and stresses again the lab-like experimental nature of literature "in which we
experiment with estimations, evaluations, and judgments of approval and
condemnation". Literature thereby becomes not only "a propaedeutic to ethics" (115),
but its corner stone, because "the idea of bringing together life in the form of narrative
is the only way to give a handhold to the aim of a 'good life,' the keystone of . . .
ethics" (2005: 103).

Arguably the linchpin of Ricoeur's concept of narrative identity is 1) the differentiation
between \textit{idem} and \textit{ipse} identity including 2) their changing relationship in the course
of the individuation process. In the \textit{idem} column belong our identifiable physical and
character traits which usually endure throughout a lifetime. The \textit{physical} self can be
identified by objective criteria like its unique bio-metrics and physical marks. These
are structures maintaining their self-same permanence in time (117). The \textit{habitual} self
is composed of persevering character traits, sedimented habits and acquired
identifications with values, norms, ideals, models and heroes (121-2). Though habits
and identifications are acquired characteristics and therefore to a certain extent
contingent, they will persevere if not tinkered with by deliberation, experimentation
and resolution, which would re-open and possibly re-direct the identity formation
process. This malleability, when engaged in, would signal the change from \textit{idem} to
\textit{ipse}. In the \textit{ipse} column belongs one's sense of self in acts like faithfulness to one's
word and constancy of commitments (118 & 123-4). It includes a reflexive ownership
of one's body, thoughts, relations and long-term projects. It is not a given like the
physical and habitual self, but it is an achievement. It is not a thing-like real self but a
\textit{capable} self as a unity in action, i.e. an agent; and furthermore it is a \textit{narrative} self as
an emplotted unity of its life story, i.e. as both a character \textit{in} (143), and a narrator \textit{of},
its self-narrative (165); and it is the \textit{moral} self as a self-constant unity guided by its
conscience and giving primacy to the \textit{Other} (165). As Ricoeur pointed out himself
(309n11) these two polar modes of being have parallels with the contrasting concepts
in Heidegger of 1) the inspectable, substance-like, enduring mode of present-at-hand
(\textit{idem}) and 2) \textit{Dasein}'s self-constant mode of concerned being-with-others-in-the-
world (*ipse*).

Another crucial aspect of this differentiation is that the *ipse* aspect is not something static. It is variable and arguably constitutes a developmental arc in a person's individuation or identity formation process set on a spectrum between two limits. At the lower limit point is one's loyalty to one's sameness in character and habits, which can be so enduring that it engulfs or covers over any sense of individualized selfhood. *Ipse* would then be identical to, or overlap with, *idem* (121). At the other limit point, and only realizable in a fictive "technological dream", is a sense of selfhood disconnected from any dialectical relationship to its sameness in corporeality and thereby losing any sense of identity (124). It is the brain in the vat scenario, which denies the fictitious person in question any physical integrity and environmental situatedness (149-51). In between is arguably a moral or existential high-point when one's moral self is committed to an appropriate ethical aim, appropriate in the sense that it takes into realistic consideration one's *idem* aspects like one's bodily and dispositional characteristics in both their enabling and limiting nature. For Ricoeur this ethical aim is by definition "*aiming at the 'good life' with and for others, in just institutions*"(172).

§ 24. Bamberg and Small-d Quotidian Discourse

While Ricoeur focused on the impact of historical and fictive narrations on our identity formation process, the American psychologist Michael Bamberg looked at the contribution of what he calls "small-d discourse", i.e. "constructions of self and identity as necessarily dialogical and relational, fashioned and refashioned in local interactive practices" and "as a process of constant change" (2010: 14; italics in original). These practices are usually conversations in which people present themselves through the exchange of stories. Bamberg thinks such "moment-by-moment interactive engagements" are at best undertheorized and at worst dismissed and proposed a research program using audio-visual means to record and micro-analyze the narratives and senses of self emerging from daily encounters (8). Bamberg identifies three challenges or "dilemmatic spaces" which people have to navigate in their small-d discourse "identity activities", all of which overlap with the ontological dialectics
identified by Ricoeur.

The first dilemma is about degrees of unicity positioned between sameness and difference in the social realm, which overlaps with Ricoeur's dialectic between self and other. It is the tension between the desire to differentiate oneself from others and the desire to integrate oneself with others as far as group categories are concerned like ethnicity, class, nationality, age, friendship groups, etc. For Bamberg this is a dynamic, precognitive process, "shot through with . . . unconscious defenses", in which we experiment and negotiate versions of ourselves which might be accepted or rejected (6-7).

The second dilemma to navigate is one's degree of agency in relation to the world on a spectrum between being sufferers and victims of a world determining us and--in opposite causal direction--being heroes in having a large degree of leverage over the world. This challenge overlaps with Ricoeur's dialectic of self and world, with the lived body on the side of self and the material body on the side of world. For Bamberg this dilemma is not an impasse or dichotomy but a dynamic process where one's sense of agency might shift from situation to situation. How much we might feel boxed in by customs, genetics and institutions or find ways to transformative action depends on the leeway found in "interpretive discursive repertoires that preexist", which agents can appropriate and apply in their daily encounters (7). In short, the stories we buy into are formative of our sense of range of agency.

The third dilemmatic space is about continuity and change of one's sense of self over time. This dilemma does not necessarily overlap with Ricoeur's differentiation between stable, idem identity and changeable, ipse selfhood. It is more about the developmental process ipse identity might go through in establishing its constancy in the face of continuous change. For Bamberg the establishment of such a diachronic sense of self happens "in the process of sorting out what events qualify as formative or transformative for the emergence of identity", usually during adolescence (6). This sorting out of one's continuities and one's changes is not straightforward and it is again narratives which help navigate this challenging space, "because narratives are the genre par excellence for sorting out this diachronic aspect of identity.

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formation" (6), especially, as others would point out, in coming-of-age stories.

Again parallel to Ricoeur, Bamberg adds the ethical issue of orienting oneself towards "the human good" (7; italics and scare quotes in original). Bamberg does not present this as a fourth dilemmatic space of identity formation because the three enumerated are "already shot through with valuating practices" (7).

The more pressing issue for Bamberg seems to be how to think these three dilemmas together as the identity formation process is not confined to any of the three spaces (7-8). The temporal specifics of these spaces provides a first systematization and also a differentiation of the terms *self* and *identity* as used by Bamberg. Both the navigation of difference and sameness between self and others (the first dilemma) and the navigation of one's sense of agency between self and world (second dilemma) compose one's *synchronic* sense of *self*. These spaces are navigated on a more local and situational level. The challenge of sorting out one's constancies and changes over time (third dilemma) establishes ones *diachronic* sense of *identity* and would build upon the first two as its precursors and prerequisites (10). Establishing one's identity then comes down to "managing these three dilemmas in concert" (12) and would include assigning different narrative roles played out in the different dilemmatic spaces in terms of character and agent, and in its concerted unity in terms of speaker and/or writer:

A speaker/writer accounts for how s/he (i) has emerged (as character) over time, (ii) as different from (but same as) others, and simultaneously (iii) can account for how s/he views him-/herself as a (responsible) agent (12).

From the above a hierarchical-diachronic relationship could be deduced of 1) first being a synchronic self or *agent* dealing with the world and others (combining here the two synchronic spaces), from which 2) a diachronic identity or *character* emerges, about which 3) a *speaker/writer* can give an account. This sounds quite coherent, though MacAdams has a more elegant developmental model to sort out the hierarchical and temporal relations between the narratological terms of author, narrator, agent and character and how they apply to narrative identity.
§ 25. McAdams Stratified Model of Identity

Before discussing McAdams developmental model of identity formation I will present what seems to be one of his main proposals to integrate diverse models and research programs in personality psychology under one roof. Together with Jennifer Pals he constructed a "comprehensive framework” of personal identity they named “The New Big Five”, which consists of five “fundamental principles for an integrative science of personality”, as the subtitle describes it. In this model, or set of principles, the narrative component comprises an individual's most unique aspect even while integrating four other elements: 1) our inherited nature, 2) dispositional traits (O.C.E.A.N., which is the 'old' Big Five), 3) characteristic adaptations and 4) our social-cultural context. I will not discuss all five elements and their connections, but will provide the succinct, definitional conclusion and fill out the narrative component.

Personality is an individual’s unique variation on the general evolutionary design for human nature, expressed as a developing pattern of dispositional traits, characteristic adaptations, and integrative life stories complexly and differentially situated in culture (212; italics in original).

The definition, function and relation to culture of 'integrative life narratives' are as follows. These personal narratives, which are internalized and keep changing, integrate a reconstructed past and an imagined future such that a personal identity emerges which has unity, meaning and purpose. Individuals will differ as their life stories will have different qualities of tone, plot, themes and endings. Its function is to provide a person's life with meaning within one's culture and direction over time. And culture contains a stock of stories suggesting different life courses, which in the modern world have proliferated to the extent that there are now many competing stories among which we must choose some and disregard others (212).

§ 26. McAdams Life-span Developmental Model

In this section I am making the switch from personality psychology to developmental psychology, and would construe their relationship as parallel to the one holding in phenomenology between constitutive and genetic analyses (§17). McAdams' and Pals' 'New Big Five' proposal is arguably a synchronic model of human personality composed of five components build upon each other and interacting. Though the
model has obviously room for the more diachronic component of narrativity, it did not explicitly formulate a developmental perspective. With Keith C. Cox as co-author, McAdams broadens his integrative framework to include now the developmental arc of one's life span. And again, it is narrativity which provides unity to this field. Their innovative proposal is to see three consecutive stages, going from actor to agent to author.

People begin life as social actors; eventually they become goal-oriented agents; by early adulthood, they add to their self-repertoire the retrospective (and simultaneously prospective) author. Their paper especially appropriated William James' differentiation in the self between the 'I' and the 'Me' with the 'I' being the subjective, process-like self which through a reflexive act constitutes the 'Me' and considers its 'Me' as if it were an object for observation, evaluation and modification. This idea then is welded to the actor-agent-author arc such that all three have their own subjective 'I' and reflected 'Me' aspect.

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First there is the social actor-I who presents himself through performances like play-acts, routines and social roles. Its temporal focus is the present. When the actor-I reflectively starts to observe its own performance and its effects on its co-actors in their capacity as critics and audience, it will build up a sense of its own level of skill and efficacy as an actor and thereby births the actor-Me. The actor-self with its concerns is in force throughout one's life and its greatest and ongoing challenge is self-regulation. "How do I control myself to generate the most effective performance in my social world?" (200). We all have to play this game and are aware of our performances because the stakes are pretty high in the form of acceptance, reputation and access to resources like wealth, power and reproduction.

When the self starts to channel its hopes and desires into plans and starts to control the process of their actualization the agent-I comes on stage. Its temporal focus is on the future. And when there is a sense of achievement and self-esteem it is the agent-I feeling good about the agent-Me. "The I feels good about the Me to the extent that the me is perceived as actualizing, achieving, or making good progress in the pursuit of its most cherished goals" (201). Following Erikson here, McAdams and Cox see the
agent-self play itself out in early adolescence in the spheres of ideology, occupation and relationships, and make consolidations during midlife focusing more narrowly on family, friends and health.

The stage is cleared for the author-I or narrative identity to enter when young adolescents acquire the cognitive-narrative skills to connect their own relevant life-events and relations into temporally ordered and causally linked chains, and also can detect unifying themes and plots in their personal development—the templates for which coming from our cultural stock. The role of the author-I is to construct an internalized and evolving story of the author-Me, which would include "setting, scenes, characters, plots and themes" (201). Its temporal focus would be the whole of its life—past, present and future—including its thematic or emplotted unity. This self-story gives at least a modicum of unity, meaning and purpose to one's life and, as a task, is continuous, open-ended and is toward the end of one's life fragile and fallible.

With culture serving as the ultimate editor and literary agent, the author-self continues to work on the story over the adult life course, revising, updating, and sometimes recomposing from scratch, ever attuned to opportunities for self-transformation" (201).

In summery, the authors identify three consecutive selves, i.e. actor, agent, author, which come on-line at different life stages (infancy, childhood, adolescence), which have their own peculiar capacities (performing, planning, emplotting), accompanying self-awareness and temporal focus (present, future, whole of time).

§ 27. Katherine Nelson and the Developmental Phases of Cognitive Systems

The second developmental model comes from the distinguished American developmental psychologist Katherine Nelson. Her research focus was on the role of language in the development of children's cognitive capacities. She appropriated from the evolutionary cognitivist Merlin Donald (1991) the sequence of four stages he identified in man's development of culture and cognition over evolutionary time. Nelson applied Donald's phylogenetic model to create her own ontogenetic model of cognitive phases, especially the early ones in childhood (Nelson, 1998: 74-84). She distanced herself from classical cognitive theories "with their emphasis on the disembodied autonomous mind" (84) and allied herself with the enactive cognitivists like Varela, Thompson, Lakoff and Johnson, who see the mind as principally
embodied and the body as thoroughly socially and culturally situated, and see that "individual cognition begins with experience and experientially based knowledge" (84). And the unit of analysis is not relations to objects, but events set in an "engulfing cultural communicative society" (327). As far as spatial embeddedness is concerned Nelson sets the biological organism in its immediate socially constituted environment, which is in a mediate, larger culture, which itself is set within the natural world (327). Within this setting the modern human goes through a temporal sequence of four cognitive phases named episodic, mimetic, narrative (Donald named this mythic) and theoretic. Though the episodic phase (0-2 yrs) is pre-semantic it is quite rich in cognitive structures in the sense of children's know-how of simple routines like bathing and eating, which are usually arranged and guided events. In the mimetic phase (2-4 yrs), which can include simple language use, more complex social activities take place like games, pretend play, simple plans and rituals. The structured richness of such events then provide the scaffolding for language acquisition. And initially language is used to reconstruct past events, or mark ongoing experiences; or plan future happenings. In the narrative phase (4-7 yrs) the *storied* mind emerges, which has *narrative competence* understood as the implicit know-how of tacitly recognizing, following and telling stories in childhood. Based on this capacity children also develop early on a "narrative-based autobiographical memory system" so they can share personal narratives (331) and only later start to create a self-narrative or life story, which is not yet the same as narrative identity construction. In summarizing the role of narrative in children's life Nelson wrote that,

> the account here is that narrative emerges from and belongs to the community, but in the individual lives of children it is a vehicle through which consciousness of both self and the wider social and temporal world becomes manifest and gradually emerges as a new subjective level of conscious awareness, with a sense of a specific past and awareness of a possible future, as well as with new insights into the consciousness of other people (Nelson, 2003: 33).

During the early school years the theoretic phase starts when children grow out of their narrative phase and start engaging in arithmetic, reasoning, classifying, abstracting and other complex operations. Enormously useful and under-theorized is the use of material externalizations of symbolic forms in written language, libraries, databases and now computers and the internet. Nelson discusses the idea that if
narrative is the natural way of human knowing then rationality would be a derivative of
narrative, and as some argue, even inferior (1998: 184).

Interestingly Nelson presents a little model of the progression and loop-back of the
major cognitive phases which appears to capture the idea of the dialectic between the
implicit pre-verbal and explicit verbal realm, but now with an added differentiation
within the verbal realm between folk and formal language. The two great transitions in
cognitive systems Nelson perceives are 1) the transition from experientially, pre-
semantic know-how of events and routines to an oral, folk language system, and 2)
the transition from this folk system to the formal, theoretic knowledge system.

![Figure 3. Changes in conceptual representation systems (Nelson, 1998: 349)](image)

These levels all feed forward and feed backward. Theoretic ideas slip back into folk
language and folk language can guide and change routines.¹⁴

§ 28. Merlin Donald and the Evolutionary Stages of Human Cognition

Going from Nelson's developmental model of cognitive phases to Donald's
evolutionary model of cognitive stages should not be too hard as Nelson took her idea
from Donald in the first place. Therefore, besides some small differences, the same
sequence of episodic, mimetic, narrative and theoretic applies to the phylogenetic arc
of human development. In Donald's model *episodic cognition* (creating *episodic
culture*) is something we share with the primates and some other species and
consists of the ability to perceive "complex, usually moving, clusters and patterns of
stimuli as a unit" (Donald, 1991: 153). He considers such event-perceptions as the

¹⁴ One possible venue to explore is to connect her idea that language acquisition is intimately
connected to underlying practical dealings, with Heidegger's crucial presentations in *Being and
Time* about the relationship between the acts of tacit *understanding*, explicated *interpretation*
building block of primate and human cognition. Mimetic culture starts with *Homo Erectus* and builds upon and extends episodic culture. Mimesis is a higher form of imitation and mimicry, which enables the passing on of acquired skills like toolmaking, coordinated activities like hunting, and customs like child rearing and social hierarchization. In short, mimetic cognition enables a "culture that was successful in inventing, transmitting and maintaining complex social and technological skills"(165).

After a long transitional period between 300,000 and 50,000 years ago another shift occurred with *Homo Sapiens* from mimetic to mythic culture. Myths are the products of narrative and for Donald, following Bruner, narrative skill is "*the natural product of language itself*" (257; italics in original). Stories are not merely an aspect of language, but is the way language is used as a form of cognition. For Nelson the following paragraph lays out the central point of Donald's thesis:

Narrative skill is the basic driving force behind language use, particularly speech: the ability to describe and define events and objects lies at the heart of language acquisition. Group narrative skills lead to a collective version of reality; the narrative is almost always public. Thus, the adaptive pressure driving the expansion of symbolic capacity, the usefulness of symbolic invention, and the value of a highspeed speech mechanism with a huge memory capacity all depend upon the ability of the mind to harness these abilities toward the reconstruction of reality or . . . toward its construction in the first place (69; in Donald, 1991: 257).

Mythic culture is dependent on language skills for its maintenance and language is mainly used in narrative form. Narrative thinking is its organizational principle. This culture shifts into theoretic culture when, with the help of writing and other external memory devices, analytic thought (or paradigmatic thought as Bruner named it) starts producing "formal arguments, systemic taxonomies, formal measurements, and logic", culminating in formal theory for prediction and explanation (Nelson: 70). Again, the tremendous assistance provided by "external symbolic storage (ESS) systems" in further developing theoretic culture seems to be overlooked by cognitive psychologists (Nelson: 72).

Nelson and Donald do not say much about the role of narrative in the identity formation process of individuals. Nelson recognizes the social construction of self and society (172) and the phenomenon of self-narrative (332), but I have not found any discussion on this topic. Others have made the move from the importance of narrative epistemology to narrative ontology. It looks like that the developmental psychologists
are not necessarily on board, even though they acknowledge the primacy of narrativity in understanding the world and ourselves.


To round out the evolutionary *cum* generative part of the role of narrative in cognition (and with poetic license into narrative identity) I will discuss the fruitful contribution by Brain Boyd, professor of English in Auckland, New Zealand. His leading question seems to be: How did life evolve such that it went from simple organisms instinctively reacting to environmental affordances, to humans with an understanding of space, time and causality far beyond their immediate here and now, all enabled by language with a leading role for story-telling to efficiently develop, share and transmit cultural practices and their justifications?

Boyd ascribes to a multilevel selection theory and the idea that narratives help the evolution of cooperation as a transmission device of selected elements giving a group certain advantages in their survival. “Selfishness beats altruism within single groups. Altruistic groups beat selfish groups” (52). Therefore groups which can develop a mechanism to contain selfishness within their own members will have a better chance to beat other groups. This mechanism is 'social monitoring', which is done by mutual observations, stories and gossip. Stories enable collective survival strategies like mutualism, inclusive fitness, empathy and reciprocal altruism. Stories communicate norms, i.e. “shared memorable models of cooperation that stir our emotions” with the effect that we like to associate with altruists and not with “cheats and freeloaders” (64). So, stories can engender emotions of fairness and indignation (65) thereby shaping motivations and actions into pro-social channels (287f). Boyd sees art in general and narrativity specifically as an extension of play. Play has a tremendous adaptive value by developing survival skills through mock-play in youngsters of almost any species to prepare them for serious adult life. Narrativity is then a form of “cognitive play”, which as a “human adaptation”, has the following functions. Stories “refine and retune our minds”, they raise the status of gifted artists (and their access to resources), improve coordination and cooperation of communities, and fiction lifts us up beyond the immediate to envision alternatives (381).
Boyd seems to distance himself from narrative identity theory as he pushes back more generally against social constructivism and its resistance against applying evolutionary theory to human behavior. He sees himself as a biocultural evolutionist to make space for the understanding of cooperative behavior and pro-social emotions which evolved before language was acquired and which were only further amplified and refined with the help of stories (23-30). In any case, the connections he made between narrativity and play are of great significance in their placement in the Kantian-Heideggerian mandala (§47 & Appendix D).

§ 30. Rorty and Trans-generational Narrative Identity Development

Somewhere between the long-term evolutionary story of language and narrative cognition, and the short-term life-span course of individual identity formation, lies the medium-term development of literature itself, including its impact on identity formation. Here I will lay out the main idea and the contributions from two scholars in the way they highlighted larger or smaller chapters of this story. They are the American philosophers Amélie Oksenberg Rorty and Charles Taylor. The leading thought is that our identities have gone through changes in tandem with the changes in oral myths and written literature. If our identities are thoroughly socially constructed by the formative power inherent in narrative cognition, then it stands to reason that any changes in the plots, characters, evaluative practices and emotional evocations throughout the ages will have a profound impact on the manner we take the world and ourselves to be and what action possibilities would be open.

Amélie Oksenberg Rorty wrestled with this issue in her paper “A Literary Postscript: Characters, Persons, Selves, Individuals” (1976). She perceives an enormous amount of identity variations throughout written history and acknowledges that identity theory is at an impasse, because theorists are very far from a consensus about the criteria by which persons can be identified. She wanted a history of the notion of

15 Anthropologist and Jaynes scholar Brian McVeigh makes a similar point. "Mainstream, conventional research psychology typically utilizes two types of time: (1) developmental, i.e., the trajectory of the human life span; and (2) evolutionary or the unimaginably long passage of many millennia. But I submit that certain research projects demand a third type of temporality measured in several centuries (or in some circumstances several millennia). This mid-range type is better suited for understanding sociocultural adaptation” (McVeigh, 2019: 5).
identity and in her paper offered "a skeleton outline of some of the emotional and social spaces in which each of these move and have their being" (302). In very short order the development of identity formations throughout western history went from Greek heroic characters, for whom lineage and deeds were paramount marks of identity; to figures who are "defined by their place in an unfolding drama" (307); to persons as dramatis personae who know they are playing roles and have donned a mask and are also a "unified center of choice and action" (309); to inward directed souls and minds slightly detached from the world; to selves with legal rights and societal obligations; and to individuals as "indivisible autonomous units" feeling the dialectic of individuality and community.

She sees connecting links between the different conceptions—the themes of agency and interiority are pervasive—but doesn't see an "underlying substance" (320). If there is an abiding theme it would be that "humans are just the sort of organisms that interpret and modify their agency through their conceptions of themselves" (323). Her proposed research program to still make some sense of all variations would be to "investigate the biologically adaptive functions of the various cultural grafts: the obsession with unification and choice, salvation and simplicity, isolated integrity and achievement" (323). In short—and in congruence with the concepts of narrative identity and its evolutionary roots so far presented—Rorty sees persons and individuals (the neutral terms she uses to envelop the entire class of variations) as entities inventing themselves through self-interpretation within a cultural evolutionary context. In very short, identities are the product of adaptive self-interpretation, which went through a series changes in at least the last 3,000 years, and its record can be found in literature.

§ 31. Charles Taylor and the History of Inwardness

The second contribution to this mid-range story of the cultural evolution of identity comes from Charles Taylor. In his landmark study Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity (1989) he addresses the historical development of how identity was experienced covering more or less the same time-span as Rorty, i.e. early classical Greece to modernity. Taylor, like Rorty, highlights the themes of interiority
and agency and starts his story actually when the "inwardness" had not yet become a part of a person's experience of himself and life. He observed that in Homer the locus of strength, inspiration, thought, and passions are fragmented throughout the body and were not yet to be 'found' in a unified mind located in the head. Taylor brings in the research by German philologist Bruno Snell, who wrote *The Discovery of the Mind: The Greek Origins of European Thought*. "Snell remarked on the absence in Homer of words that could happily be translated by our 'mind', or even by 'soul' in its standard post-Platonic meaning, that is, a term designating the unique locus where all our different thoughts and feelings occur" (118). Snell found in Greek literature that there was a gradual change from the Homeric sense of bodily dispersed passions and thoughts to the Platonic sense of a unitary inner mind. "Plato's view, just because it privileges a condition of self-collected awareness and designates this as the state of maximum unity with oneself, requires some conception of the mind as a unitary space" (119). Against expectation the language of interiority was rarely used to make moral points (536, n7). That came later. With the Stoics interiority became the locus of the will, which could give or withhold assent by choice (137), and in the Neoplatonism of Plotinus the language of inwardness became more pronounced (537n4). With Augustine inwardness becomes even more central and very complex as it became the place of the soul, the will, truth, God and moral development. Taylor observed that Augustine was "concerned not just with a turn away from what is outside, but with a search within" (537, n4) and quoted his famous line: "*Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas*, which translates as "Do not go outward; return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth" (129). For Augustine the inner/outer category becomes central and subsumes the other opposites of "spirit/matter, higher/lower, eternal/temporal, immutable/changing" (128-9). And the unity and wholeness of the self is only to be found in God and not (yet) in itself, which idea culminates in Descartes, for whom interiority is the locus of all thought as thinking substance, *res cogitans*, as opposed to *res extensa*, the spatial world of matter and one's body. Taylor considers the addition of "moral sources", which were previously located outside in the well-ordered cosmos as an "epoch-making" and a "radical twist" to Augustinian inwardness (143). Reason rules the passions and dominates a disenchanted world. Reason becomes 'disengaged'. The good life
comes from one's dignity as a rational being (152). Descartes established a “new conception of inwardness, an inwardness of self-sufficiency, of autonomous powers of ordering by reason” (158) resulting in a move towards mechanism and treating experience as a vorhanden object. Another big step happened with the empiricist John Locke, who arguably demolished and rebuild the mind as a “punctual self” emptied from innate ideas and teleological impulses, i.e. the Tabula rasa. Locke “reifies the mind” and uses "metaphors to do with constructing and assembling stuff” (166). Ideas are impressions from outside to be treated as inert objects or propositional entities (164-5). Its context was the rise of a disciplinary stance and practices with its “ideal of rational self-responsibility” (167). Enormously important for Locke’s concept of personal identity is the role of reflexivity by which the self appears to itself. “Its only constitutive property is self-awareness” (49).

The story continues with Hume, Kant, Schelling and Schopenhauer, who all contributed additions or made rejections to this ongoing concept of interiority. The arc more or less ends in the literary experiments of T.S. Elliot, Ezra Pound and Marcel Proust. Inwardness is now complemented by decentering (465). The unitary self is no more and the focus is on the "flow of experience" and on language and its structures (465). The context is the ongoing Romantic reaction against mechanism, capitalism and industrialism (460-65). Meanwhile philosophers like Dilthey and Heidegger combat the role of mechanistic-utilitarian categories and turn from an idealized nature to the pragmatic life-world and try to retrieve experience from conventional, instrumental modes (469).

The upshot of this extraction from Taylor is the idea that 1) not only the concept of identity went through many phases, but that all these thinkers both expressed and influenced how identity was experienced at a non-thematic, quotidian level, and 2) that these identity concepts highlighting interiority can be integrated into a narrative identity theory, which Taylor himself subscribed to but not fully fleshed out theoretically (48-9).

§ 32. Summery, Conciliation and Extension

The fusion of all of the above enumerated differences, variations, dilemmas, developments and dialectics as mediated by--or better expressed, incorporated in--
narrative identity might be best captured in the following paragraph:

With the help of the culturally evolved organizational resources available in narration, humans are capable to cope with such a wide range of personal and collective opportunities and challenges that it became a sedimneted cultural habit to be guided by the explicit courses of action, implicit standards of ethics and pro-social emotions inherent in narratives. And the formative quality of narrative can play itself out in stories which are either situational (MacIntyre, Heidegger, Bamberg), historical (Ricoeur, Hanegraaff), fictive (Ricoeur, Rorty), or grand (Hanegraaff). And, one step deeper switching from narrative cognition to narrative identity, it became a subconscious practice to take on (or slip in) types of identity provided by stories. This process of narrative identity formation started hypothetically somewhere in the beginning of the very long process of humanity's language acquisition and can be construed as the co-evolution of identity and narration: the more complex stories could be told and followed, the more complex our identities and behavior could be, and our increasingly complex identities enabled the production and comprehension of ever more evolved stories, together comprising a circular or spiral co-evolutionary dynamic of stories and identities.\textsuperscript{16}

This dynamic is guided by the Darwinian three-step logic of 1) phenotypic variation in fitness, 2) heritability of fitness and 3) selection by environmental factors (Lewontin, 1970: 1), which applies to both the cultural evolution of stories and by extension to identities. In regards to the cultural evolution of narrativity these three steps can be filled out with 1) origin in creative re-composition of already told stories or re-filling of already existing story templates, 2) stories being tellable, followable and memorable enabling transferability, and 3) selection of stories because of advantageous, mimetic applicability enhancing one's individual or group coping mechanisms. As far as identity is concerned we can line this up with the travails adolescents go through in their identity formation phase in which they 1) experiment with diverse identities as

\textsuperscript{16} In \textit{Oneself as Another} (1992: 149) there is a hint in this direction when Ricoeur connects the loss of identity a character might experience and the loss of narrative configuration in modern literature.
enabled by their cultural stock of stories (including counter-identities), 2) come upon a sense of identity (or character) which can be sustained from situation to situation (and therefore also be transferred from person to person), and 3) provide advantages in dealing with one’s “phase-specific psychosocial crises” (Erikson, 1959: 128).

In summary, as far as the temporal stretches are concerned at which narrativity is operative, a case can be made that between the long-term cultural evolution of narrative cognition over evolutionary time (Donald, Boyer) and the short-term life span scale of the developmental impact narratives have on individual identity formation (Nelson), a mid-term historical time span can be inserted to look at variations of narrative structures and identity over generations (Rorty, Taylor).

Having filled out an advanced concept of narrative identity the following questions can be posed. What is narrativity in and of itself? Does narrativity operate like a metaphor in the identity formation process? How do metaphors transfer intelligibility from one domain to another? How does that work out when narrativity is metaphorically projected to the domain of personal identity and the significance of its life-span? Here we are wading into further complications surrounding an already complex phenomenon of narrative identity.
CHAPTER 3: COMPLICATIONS

COMPLICATIONS A: NARRATIVITY

§ 33. Introduction

The leading question of this section is how to understand narrativity phenomenologically, not only as a complex accomplishment of interwoven intentional acts with its own principle and recognizable constitutive synthesis of *emplotment*, but also in its multi-layered genesis going from the most elementary and simple acts of constitution to narrativity itself. This would amount to an archaeology of meaning not unlike Husserl developed in his investigation into the origin of geometry (Husserl, 1970c) and as presented earlier in the discussion on the difference between static, genetic and generative phenomenology (§17).

In this regard two French writers Ricoeur appropriated to specifically understand the concept of plot, became quite fruitful. They were the semanticists and narratologists Claude Bremond and Elaine Cancalon and their paper "The Logic of Narrative Possibilities" (1980; original publication in French in 1966). Bremond and Cancalon (hereafter referred to as Bremond) tried to develop a logic of narrative roles, i.e. find an underlying schematism generating all possible combinations based on his understanding of a logic of action.

Using his insights I will present the following opening stratagem: There arguably is a layered and hierarchical structure of enabling and constraining possibility conditions going from *Intentionality* to *Post-Narrative Identity* and its layers would be the following:

1) Intentionality (§36)

2) Intentionality of action (§36)

3) Action Structure *per* Bremond (§34)

4) Narrative Character (subject + action) (§34)

5) Plotted Story (character emplotted) (§34)
Ricoeur appropriated from Bremond the connection between 3) and 4) and added his own 5). I add the connection 1) to 2) to 3) and the connection 6) to 7).

Each layer has its own reigning logic and each connecting step has its own logic of derivation. When going from top to bottom one could call such a move *archaeological* and going from bottom to top one could name it *constitutive*. In phenomenological terms the applied kind of phenomenology is *genetic*, i.e. it looks at how each level creates products through active syntheses, which then become the building blocks for the next level to synthesize in novel ways, creating ever new products to be used by the next level (Husserl, 1970a, V, §14 & 41-3; Sokolowski, 1971: 325).

The sequence of analysis here followed starts with 1) Bremond's concept of action and 2) how that elementary building block can generate a table of narrative roles, which 3) then become the foundation for structured narratives. Later, in §36, I will go archaeologically from 1) action into 2) its underlying structure of intentionality of action and to 3) intentionality *tout court*.

**§ 34. Action Structure**

Bremond provides the following figure depicting his elemental action sequence:

![Figure 4. Bremond's Three-step Action Sequence (1980: 388)](image-url)
Ricoeur's simpler version is in this figure:

![Figure 5. Ricoeur's Three-step Action Sequence (1985: 39)](image)

This basic schema is used by Bremond to generate a logic of narrative roles by which he can generate an exhaustive inventory of narrative possibilities of actions and roles. The first differentiation is between 'sufferer' and 'agent' and their inter-action in which an agent's action results become the action possibility for the sufferer. Again, Bremond provides a simple figure for this logic.¹⁷

![Figure 6. Bremond's Action and Reaction Sequence (1980: 388)](image)

The following figure is a schematic summary of Ricoeur's representation of Bremond. The next differentiation Ricoeur zooms in on is whether the sufferer is objectively (physical or circumstantial) or subjectively (emotional or informational) affected and, correlatively, what an agent might have done to make that happen. This table acquires further differentiations with considerations whether 1) actions resulted in a change or not in the circumstances of the sufferer and 2) if, when there is a change, the change is an amelioration or deterioration. Though not all possibilities fit in to illustrate the symmetry between sufferer and agent, it gets quite close to “a table of possible places occupied by the contingent characters of contingent narratives”

¹⁷ Based on Mandler (1984) McAdams sees a triple-phased sequence as what five-year-olds would already understand as a “conventional story grammar”. The sequence would be action-consequence-reaction. “In a simple, goal-directed episode, for example, an initiating event may prompt the protagonist to attempt some kind of action, which will result in some kind of consequence, which in turn will be followed by the protagonist’s reaction to the consequence” (McAdams, 2011: 105; italics in original).
In Bremond's 1980 *Postface* he rearranged his categories in a more "economical" set of tables with the help of "Aristotle's Square". His diagram of "essential narrative schemata", which he also calls his "basic armature", combines the descriptive categories of *sameness* and *change* with the prescriptive categories of *favorable* and *unfavorable* yielding the following quadrant:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Process</th>
<th>Favorable</th>
<th>Unfavorable</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>Modification</em></td>
<td>Amelioration</td>
<td>Degradation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Preservation</em></td>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Frustration</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 8. Basic Armature of Essential Narrative Schemata (Bremond: 407)

Though Bremond provides an almost exhaustive table of actions and most of those imply an evaluation by both the agent and the sufferer and thereby would solicit a reaction, this is still insufficient to constitute the full sense of narrativity. Ricoeur thinks

---

18 This is not entirely correct as Aristotle's Square has to do more with logic than categorization. Bremond's diagrams are closer to what I name 'quadrants' and Hanegraaaf describes as "double polarities"(2017: 131).
that this inventory does not yet constitute a logic of narrativity. To know all the possible roles which can be assumed by narrative characters "is not yet to know any plot whatsoever" (1984: 43; italics in original). What is still needed is to have a sequence of actions and reactions configured according to our stock of plot-types. Ricoeur refers to Arthur Danto here and his idea that a narrative needs at least two actions: a first initiating action and then a second action, which both evaluates and reacts to the first. According to these criteria the above Figure 6 by Bremond actually does constitute a minimal narrative of two connected actions. It starts with an evil deed performed and then there is a deed of avenging the first deed, which implies a motivational evaluation.19

To be fair to Bremond, he does mention the logic of narrativity through a plotted sequence of events. "All narrative consists of a discourse which integrates events of human interest into the unity of a single plot" (390). His explicit conditions of narrativity are a) succession of events or sequence, b) integration into a structure, i.e. a plot, and c) a human interest or plan. "For it is only in relation to a plan conceived by man that events gain meaning and can be organized into a structured temporal sequence" (390).

§ 35. Parallel with Labov

This three-phased sequence dovetails with the structure of everyday stories which Labov & Waletzky (1967) found, though this requires a little elaboration based on a more detailed presentation of Labov's narrative model.20

Labov considered narrative serving two purposes. First, it is a technique used by a narrator to construct linguistic units which would match his or her personal experiences, especially its temporal ordering. Secondly, it expresses a personal interest or point of view which makes the narrative socially salient. The first function is referential and the second is evaluative (4).

19 It is not clear why Ricoeur overlooked Bremond's action and reaction sequence. Both the simple and the action-reaction sequence were depicted on the same page in Bremond's paper.

20 The paper can be seen as a great example of finding 'invariants' through the technique of free imaginary variation. Though I am sure that Husserl did not have a monopoly on this procedure, once one is familiar with it, it can be easily recognized in its procedure and clear results.
The smallest units of linguistic expression they named *clauses*, which are simple phrases, and the smallest unit of a narrative would consists of any “sequence of clauses that contains at least one temporal juncture” (21) of the form a-then-b. This minimal structure is congruent with Bremond’s and Ricoeur’s minimal narrative action sequence. The example used given is:

(1)  
   a  I know a boy name Harry.  
   b  Another boy threw a bottle at him right in the head,  
   c  and [then] he had to get seven stitches.  

All three units are *clauses* and the switch between b and c is the temporal conjunction, illustrated by the insertion of the adverb *then*, which makes this sequence a narrative. If clauses b and c were switched and connected silently or explicitly by the conjunction *because*, Labov would not consider it a narrative.

(2)  
   a  I know a boy name Harry.  
   b  He had to get seven stitches,  
   c  [because] another boy threw a bottle at him right in the head.  

Paragraphs (1) and (2) contain the same clauses and the same information, but because of its sequential temporal structure (1) is a narrative and because of its systemic structure (2) is an explanation. Both are related with the idea that traditionally narrative is seen as a simpler and inferior kind of explanation, though some would challenge that idea and see explanation as actually a derivative of narrative and inferior in explanatory power (see below). Labov concluded that “the a-then-b is in some sense the most essential characteristic of narrative” (25).

But (1) is still not a full narrative because it lacks the element of evaluation, the point or ‘*so what?*’ of the story. The evaluative element can be found if a separate clause would have been added like “that must have been terrible” or in a more subtle manner through intensifiers like, for example, accentuating the word *seven* to indicate the narrator’s point of the story, i.e. how badly Harry was hurt.

To illustrate with the help of the above example how a full narrative would look like
one could add an *Abstract* like "Some people get badly hurt"; an *Orientation* like "Last summer in New York"; and a *Coda* like "And ever since I kept an eye on Harry". The story would then flow as follows:

Some people get badly hurt. Last summer in New York I knew a boy named Harry. Another boy threw a bottle at him right in the head and he had to get seven stitches. Ever since I kept an eye on Harry.

The diagram drawn by Labov to illustrate the “normal form of narrative”, which most narratives exactly duplicate, is as follows:

![Fig. 9. The Normal Form of Narrative (1967: 37)](image)

The arrow indicates the point where both the narrative started and finished, that is, with the narrator. One can delete the *Orientation* and *Coda* clauses without damaging the nature of a story. These are independent parts, because one can leave out the historical dating and geographical placing of the narrative context as well as the names and backgrounds of characters and still have a story to tell. But one cannot get rid of the *Complication - Evaluation - Resolution* sequence and still have a followable story. These are the dependent moments of a story. Take out one and the story falls apart. And the element hardest to eliminate by imaginary variation is the evaluation. Within Bremond's typology the evaluative element is already baked into the action sequence. Agents persuade, esteem, ameliorate, protect, etc. and the sufferers experience the positive or negative consequences. There is hardly anything evaluative neutral or purely descriptive about such actions. The evaluative element can be made explicit, but not eliminated. Compare for example the following two
versions of the same story:

1) The captain insulted the officer. The officer was very offended. The officer struck the captain.

2) The captain insulted the officer. The officer struck the captain.

By leaving out the explicit evaluative clause of "The officer was very offended" the gist of the story does not change much. That the officer would be offended is first made possible by the captain's insult and then firmly implied in the officer's reaction. But the fact that the officer was offended and that the offense was the motivation to strike was never stated as such. And even if one would formalize the story to its bare bones, our sense of plot and its inherent evaluative element would still be triggered when we would read for example:

3) A said X to B, then B did Y to A.

Our narrative intelligence (our implicit capacity of being able to follow and tell stories) just gets triggered and will project possible plot lines and concrete images to flesh out the sequence of skeletal clauses. This spontaneous capacity, similar to and building upon our naturally evolved agent detection bias--usually discussed in the context of explaining the belief in God (Gray & Wegener, 2010: 9-11)--could be seen as our socially evolved plot detection bias, which could be named Hyperactive Plot Detection Device. There has to be a story, peopled by agents, and it has to be intelligible in terms of sequence and evaluation.

§ 36. Intentionality of Action

To connect Bremond's concept of narrative action with the phenomenological concept of intentionality we can start with Ricoeur's more simple action sequence of possibility - passage - completion and construe it as a variation on the phenomenological concept of action with its intentional structure and dynamics. An intentional analysis of deliberative action would result in the sequence of a) a deliberately planned and projected practical possibility, b) executed through a set of pre-reflective skills with, if necessary, rational guidance till fulfilled, which c) can be identified as successful if and when the projected and actualized state of affairs coincide.
To compose a table of elementary kinds of action I propose for a basic and first differentiation to distinguish between *instinctive*, *habitual* and *deliberative* actions, for which the intentional analyses would go thus. In the case of an instinctual and automatic action there is initially a) a perception of an affordance (food, drink, security, procreation), b) triggering an instinctual pursuit of this affordance, till c) there is satisfaction when fulfillment is commensurate to the urge. In the case of habitual action we deal with a) a pre-reflective perception of a possibility, b) allowed to be executed almost immediately and is c) completed when possibility and actualization coincide. The short analysis of deliberative action was already given above.\(^{21}\)

All these action intentionalities are a variation of the basic pattern of intentionality, as already presented in §12, of any experience whatsoever going from a) empty intending (urge, possibility, plan), to b) fulfilling (execution) and to c) identity or bringing-in-coincidence in different degrees of agreement of desired state with actual state, going from frustration (distinction, *Entscheidung*) to partial fulfillment to total fulfillment (Husserl, 1970a, VI, §§10-12: 210-15; See also Appendix B).

**§ 37. Narrativity**\(^{xvi}\)

Before moving on with a discussion on how narrativity might apply to one's life span, a little refresher on the definition of narrativity so far assumed might be helpful.

A Narrative is a complex linguistic construction incorporating many and diverse elements of human life like events, complications, perspectives, evaluations, etc., in a tellable and followable story format, which dynamically moves along with a beginning, middle and end, and all held together by its plot.

Polkinghorne gives the following definition: “Narrative is the cognitive process that gives meaning to temporal events by identifying them as parts of a plot” (1991: 136) and Nelson's goes as follows:

Narrative is the unfolding of events through time as told from a particular perspective of time, person, and situation, involving a departure from expected canonical happening of events that requires reflection and explanation; and it may explicitly or

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\(^{21}\) This differentiation I found initially in Arnhart (2009; see endnote vi) with confirmation in the work on action by French phenomenologist Elizabeth Pacherie (2008, 2011, 2012).
implicitly recapitulate recurrent enduring, perhaps universal, themes of cultural significance. The microstructure of a narrative emerges from macrostructure as the parts from the whole, bound by narrative devices of discourse grammars” (Nelson, 1996: 189).

§ 38. The Role of Categorial Intuition in Emplotment

In this little section I will make a further connection between intentionality and narrativity by interpreting the imaginative procedure of emplotment in terms of categorial intuition. The phenomenological question to address here is how categorial intuition plays a role in the act of emplotment, i.e. what is its contribution to narrative composition?22 Take the example of one of the most famous short stories, one which was attributed to Ernest Hemingway.23 "For sale: baby shoes, never worn". This story not only contains at the implicit level an enormous amount of images, associations, emotions and practical understandings, but also, and most importantly, the hidden structure of a narrative. First there is the implied orientation of a mature female, probably a part of a couple; then the initial complication of this person becoming pregnant, which justified practical preparations like the purchase of baby shoes; then the maximum complication of an abrogation of the pregnancy, which is blended with the evaluation of its tragic nature and the subsequent resolution of putting the baby shoes up for sale through an advertisement. The particularity of this story is that only the resolution is presented and that we, as recipients of the story, are able to more or less infer the whole story and its plot by our acquired narrative intelligence, i.e. the tacit skill to turn fragments and incomplete information into a narrative.24 This is what Ricoeur named emplotment and is also enabled by the configuring activity of the productive imagination. And what the imagination configures through emplotment are identifiable elements, which can be expressed in full propositional form as simple states of affair, like 'she/they got pregnant', 'she/they obtained baby shoes', 'she/they

22 Initially I thought that metaphors and emplotments could be seen as extended or complicated forms of categorial intuition, but, after getting the knack of the role of productive imagination in the pre- and con-figuring of any meaningful experience whatsoever, I had to conclude that metaphors and emplotments are not variations of categorial intuition, but do built upon its products and that it is the productive imagination which provides in all instances their peculiar form of intelligibility.

23 For a discussion of the origin of the story see Haglund (2013).

24 This analysis could be expanded with "Kaplan's machinery" of transforming utterances into full propositional statements with the help of contextual or implied clues (Schuller, 2014).
lost the baby', 'to lose a baby is sad', 'she/they placed an advertisement', etc. All these simple, elemental states of affair express what categorial intuition already observed to be the case, either in real life, for example a person composing a first-hand report, or in one's fictive imagination, as we add narrative configuration to the minimal six-word story.

§ 39. Narrativity and life Span Coherence

A pivot point in this research, as it opened the road back to Kant, came with the twin papers "The Life Story Schema" (Bluck & Habermas, 2000) and "Getting a Life: The Emergence of the Life Story in Adolescence" (Habermas & Bluck, 2000) by two developmental psychologists, the American Susan Bluck and the German Tilmann Habermas. They made a clear differentiation between on one side the explicit autobiographical memories we mull over in our heads (autobiographical reminiscing) and those we tell others about our lives (life narratives), and on the other side the implicit, mental organization or template underlying and enabling the production of such manifest, linguistic self-narratives and autobiographical memories. They named this non-manifest capacity the Life Story Schema and conceived it as the crucial connector between one's sense of self and one's autobiographical memories. This schema is both the storage room of "a skeletal version of one's life" (128) and the principle connector of the salient components of one’s life like specific events, lifetime periods and recurring themes. It also acts as an arbiter in retrieving and inter-connecting specific memories when engaged in explicit life narrations. It pre-structures such narratives and stays relatively stable throughout one's life as it gets only gradually upgraded "as life is being lived" (127). Some autobiographical memories become more charged, others fade away. The point is that the Life Story Schema is more or less hidden in the tacit dimension and its structure can only be inferred from the explicit self-narratives and memories it helps to produce. It can never attain full manifestation. Again, its organizational structure is more abiding than the products it enables:

The ancillary episodes and interpretations that are selected for inclusion at any particular time are guided by situational norms and will depend on the reason for producing the narrative on that occasion. After the narrative is completed, the mental representation (the life story schema) persists, whereas no representation of the
Bluck & Habermas inferred a four-fold cognitive capacity operative in the *Life Story Schema* providing coherence in one's self-narrative activities, especially during the identity formation process in adolescence. They identified two basic, "skeletal" cognitive competencies or coherences.

One is *temporal coherence*, i.e. the capacity to order life's events in a temporal order and how events might be connected (130-1). It provides a temporal record of one's life as a whole, especially as far as it is organized by one's motivations and attainment of goals. This temporal coherence can also act as a source of resilience in times of change and challenge.

The second skeletal coherence is the gradually acquired "cultural concept of biography" (131-2), i.e. a normative template for what culturally counts as important events and conventional life phases, and when they are supposed to be experienced. This template of *cultural coherence* will vary in different cultures, classes and between genders.

The next two more individualized competencies would form one's individual uniqueness. The first is *causal coherence* providing a template of the specific reasons and explanations how events and episodes in one's own phase of life are causally connected. It is a tacit understanding enabling the more explicit "explanations of one's own developmental trajectory and particular life changes" (133). It provides an ordered sense of continuity to one's life by linking events.

The second also more individual organizational principle is *thematic coherence*, i.e. the ability to see recurring themes or even an overall theme in one's life and give life an overall meaning (132). This underlying coherence can be inferred in its specifics when people make evaluative statements about their lives or capture their lives in a central metaphor like "My life is a voyage" or a one-liner like "My life has been a series of ups and downs".

In their summary it becomes clear that the organizational principle they find operative in the production of life narratives is nothing less than the imaginative capacity of emplotment as conceptualized by Ricoeur.
The *Life Story Schema* draws on important memories of life events, but goes beyond that by linking events temporally and interpretively into a story of one’s life. In doing so, it binds self and memory. This schematic representation of one’s life events over time connects the present self with the personal and unique history and changing contexts of the individual. The life story schema provides an individualized, flexible history of the self that preserves self-continuity across roles and motivates future actions and goals (141).

Both the organizational principle comprising the *Life Story Schema* and the imaginative synthesis operative in *emplotment* aim at a thematic, plotted, flexible, dynamic, holistic structure giving coherence to its components and when applied to one's life span giving it meaning, context and direction. And both concepts have a deep background pointing back to Kant and his concept of the transcendental faculty of imagination.

But before traveling that route a presentation is necessary of how something like a *Life Story Schema* is not only operative in one's identity formation process as an aid to build one's life story, but also, one step further, might be construed as the organizational principle of narrative identity itself. In the conceptualization of Bluck & Habermas one *has* a *Life Story Schema* (mediating between self and memory), while arguably in narrative identity theory one *is* one’s *Life Story Schema* enabled by a metaphorical projection of narrativity into identity. How that projection might occur necessitates a deeper understanding of metaphorical cognition.

**COMPLICATION B: METAPHOR**

§ 40. Metaphorical Cognition

The idea leading into this section about metaphoricity is that narrative identity is enabled by a metaphorical projection of the intelligibility inherent in the domain of narrativity into the more elusive domain of one’s temporary self and life-span identity.

The definition of metaphor is that it is an innovative figure of speech in which a word or phrase from a familiar source domain is applied to an object or action in a more abstract or complex target domain to which it is not literally applicable but still
provides some clarification (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980).

A metaphor may thereby provide clarity by identifying hidden similarities between the two domains. And because most terms come with a host of alternative definitional meanings and associated properties, powers and relations, they may also create intended literary flourishes or unintended confusion.

The terminology, definitions and example could be organized in this table.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Term</th>
<th>Definition</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Metaphor</td>
<td>An innovative figure of speech</td>
<td>“The snow blankets the earth”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Metaphier</td>
<td>Term used figuratively</td>
<td>The blanket (noun) / to blanket (verb)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Metaphrand</td>
<td>Object or action described</td>
<td>The way the snow covers the earth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tenor</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Source Paraphiers</td>
<td>Properties, powers and relations associated with a</td>
<td>A blanket has qualities like covering; protection; sleep;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>metaphor</td>
<td>warmth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target Paraphrands</td>
<td>Properties, powers and relations projected unto the</td>
<td>The earth 'sleeping' while covered; promise of awakening in spring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>metaphrand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Fig. 10. Composition and Logic of Metaphor

An introductory example is the phrase “The snow blankets the earth” taken from Jaynes (1976: 57). With the terminology and definitions provided by Jaynes and Richards (1965) one can say that 1) the full expression is a metaphor; 2) the term used figuratively is the verb to blanket; it is the vehicle or metaphier transferring meaning to 3) the state of affairs the figurative term is applied to, in this case the relationship between snow and the earth it covers (the tenor or metaphrand); 4) in the process explicit and implicit meanings like protection, sleep and warmth (paraphiers) are projected from the vehicle to the tenor creating new meanings, in this case the idea of the earth 'sleeping' while covered and a promise of awakening in spring.
Arguably George Lakoff and Mark Johnson were the pioneers in analyzing the pervasive cognitive qualities of metaphors in their 1980 *Metaphors We Live By*. Later, in their groundbreaking *Philosophy in the Flesh* (1999), they presented a integrated theory comprised of four basic elements.

The first element is Johnson's *theory of conflation*. Young children initially conflate on one hand their subjective experiences and verbal judgments with on the other hand sensorimotor experiences. For example the experience of warmth and affection are easily conflated. Later they will learn how to differentiate these domains, even while the "cross-domain associations" will endure and form the basis for later, easy to understand expressions like a "warm smile".

The second element is the *theory of primary metaphor*, i.e. the idea that all complex metaphors are composed of smaller, simple primary metaphors, which are grounded in simple sensorimotor experiences. For example *Understanding is Grasping* is a primary metaphor in which the subjective act of comprehension is conceived in terms of the sensorimotor experience of object manipulation (54).

The third part is the *neural theory of metaphor*, which looks at simultaneous neural activities in, and neural connections between, different regions of the brain in which different conceptual and sensorimotor domains are lodged.

The fourth is the *theory of conceptual blending* pioneered by Fauconnier and Turner (2002). They added to the source and target domain model of metaphors a “Generic Space” and a “Blending Space” in the middle creating thereby a “Four Space Model”.
Analogies, metaphors and many, if not all, other cognitive operations involve the two extra spaces. They are relevant partial structures mediating between source and target. The Generic Space contains skeletal, abstract elements like roles, frames and schemas common to both source and target domain. The Blended Space combines richer, more detailed specifics from source and target domains creating often impossible and counter-factual images. They posit that it is in the Blended Space that contradictory schemas are sorted out as far as applicability is concerned, yielding new meanings only to be experienced as a "flash of comprehension" (44). The processes involved are fast, subconscious and semi-automatic.

The integrated theory--the four parts together--has an overwhelming implication: We acquire a large system of primary metaphors automatically and unconsciously simply by functioning in the most ordinary of ways in the everyday world from our earliest years. We have no choice in this. Because of the way neural connections are formed during the period of conflation, we all naturally think using hundreds of primary metaphors (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999: 47)

In other words, this research program is laying out, theory by theory, an important part of the tacit dimension of the linguistic mind.

§ 41. Metaphors and Categorial Intuition

At a phenomenological level of analysis one could say that a metaphorical proposition requires a more complex procedure towards fulfillment than a simple proposition. Extrapolating from simple propositions to the more complex propositions of metaphors can be done by adding an extra step in the process of intentional fulfillment. If one says "The snow blankets the ground", the relationship between the
earth and the snow upon the earth is mediated by the parallel meaning of the noun blanket in its relationship to what it covers. The categorial structuring operative in the judgment is in the silent, spatial preposition 'upon' in the sense of covering, which both relations share. This is the basic and shared categorial structure (placed by Fauconnier in the Generic Space). Then, and built upon this structure, a transference of seemingly contradictory qualities takes place. In the example the snow's quality of coldness is conflated with the warming features associated with a blanket, which now brings out qualities of the snow as if it protects the earth from possibly an even colder fate (this sorting would happen in the Blended Space). This blending of paradoxical qualities, and the sorting out which of the blendings makes sense, I would call provisionally transference and categorize its meaning-formation as one of the manners in which the productive imagination operates.

COMPLICATION C: SCHEMATISM

§ 42. Schematism\textsuperscript{xvii}

The goal in this section is to work our way backwards to Kant. Ricoeur made the connection between emplotment and the productive imagination explicitly stating that "the configurating act [of emplotment] is, as I have maintained, an operation of the productive imagination, in the Kantian sense of the term" (1985: 3) and that we "ought not to hesitate in comparing the production of the configurational act to the work of the productive imagination" (1983: 68).

The route backwards from Bluck & Habermas to Kant is more complex. Their paper gave some indication of the origin of the concept of schematism in certain writers which led me to a group of cognitive psychologists making extensive use of the concept of schematism like Neisser (1976); Schank & Abelson (1977); Rumelhart (1980); Alba & Hasher (1983) and Semino (2001). And it was Rummelhart and Semino who directed me to Kant as the originator of schema theory, i.e. that schemata are "building blocks of cognition", the "fundamental elements upon which all information processing depends" (Rumelhart, 1980: 33; italics in original).

\textsuperscript{25} As a matter of fact a snow cover does prevent certain crops from freezing.
§ 43. Schema Theory in Cognitive Psychology

As narrated earlier, while delving into the background of the Habermas & Bluck paper “Life Story Schema” I waded into a group of psychologists working on memory, scripts, schemata and other cognitive phenomena, which was very helpful. The idea is that knowledge is organized in loosely integrated clusters, which get activated when prompted. A much used example, at the quotidian practical level, is the RESTAURANT script, which is the framework for a host of roles, props (thematic coherence), sequences (temporal), dos and don'ts (cultural) and conditionals (causal), which get triggered either top-down by just the concept 'restaurant', or bottom-up by reading/hearing a story and inferring after two or more contextual clues that the setting is a restaurant, or when you plan to be or are physically at such a place. According to these psychologists such schemas or frameworks are very efficient manners of organizing both knowledge and procedural know-how.

Rumelhart's characterization is that,

Schemata are employed in the process of interpreting sensory data (both linguistic and nonlinguistic), in retrieving information from memory, in organizing actions, in determining goals and subgoals, in allocating resources, and, generally, in guiding the flow of experience (33-4).

He then exclaims that "any device capable of all these wondrous things must be powerful indeed". To illustrate the working of schemata he presents some helpful analogies. First, schemata are not unlike the script of plays. For example we can conceive of the cluster of knowledge and know-how enabling the act of buying something as not unlike a loose, abstract play script containing the characters of a seller and a buyer, and the props of merchandise and money. The idea is then that "an instantiation of a schema . . . corresponds to an enactment of a play" (36; italics in original). Second, schemata are like theories, but then "informal, private, [and] unarticulated" (37), which can account for what we perceive; be rejected if found wanting; guide predictions; and infer non-perceived aspects. Third, and more active, schemata are like procedures, computing and evaluating their own fit with the available data and directing its network of subprocedures.

Schemata can be connected to the Husserlian concept of emptily intending something in the sense that such intending is conceived as a structured projection with flexible
procedures towards, and approximate expectations about, possible fulfillment. If we think we see a snake in the dark we did so because there were clues to perceive some form as a snake, i.e. we instantiated our snake schema and experienced it as fitting triggering evasive action, which would be for most people part of the snake schema. If the form was actually a rope, we will soon realize that the projected snake schema did not fit and we will switch to a rope schema. And to take a shot ahead of the game, such empty, projected, schematic intentionalities are arguably guided and produced themselves by the productive imagination.

§ 44. The Transcendental Faculty of Imagination in Kant

The issue is the role and status of Kant's *transcendental imagination* as a pivotal mediating faculty between conceptual understanding and empirical intuition, where the real production of knowledge happens in the manner of a synthesis of components, when intuitions are subsumed under concepts or concepts are applied to intuitions (Kant, 1978: 180f / A 137f / B 176f).

Kant needed this mediation because in his system concepts were empty and intuitions still a bit under-organized. If "thoughts without content are empty [and] intuitions without concepts are blind" the question becomes how to make "concepts sensible" and "intuitions intelligible", because "only through their union knowledge can arise" (93 / A 51 / B 75). And their union needed a mediator in the form of the transcendental imagination, which is comprised of two essential elements: a schematism plus images. The schematism is a set of rules (i.e. coherences of different kind) connected to the concept (or, at the highest level, a category), under which enabling and constraining influences an image or set of images are generated which can connect with the intuition, which so far is only organized in spatial and temporal form, i.e. the inner and outer sense (183 / A 142 / B 182). Kant uses the example of the concept of a triangle and a dog to make his point. The concept provides a rule by which the imagination can generate semi-determinate images applicable to a dog, for example that it is a "four-footed animal" (182-3). The idea is that the rules are still empty enough to connect to the concept and the images filled enough to connect with intuitions.
As far as the dozen higher categories of understanding are concerned--like substance, causality, possibility, community (111-5 / A 76-83 / B102-9)--these are all variations of temporality. Substance abides, causality is sequential, possibility passes away, and community is synchronic. And the schemata connected with these categories are nothing but the rules by which we understand these variations as they play out in intuitions (183-5 / A 142-6 / B 181-4). If we perceive a tight diachronic sequence of events as causal, i.e. the first event is perceived as necessarily preceding the second one as its cause, it is because the category of causality had indirectly organized--mediated by schemata and images--the manifold in perception in that manner.

How such a "transcendental product of imagination" comes about is according to Kant something we might never find out. He deduces its existence from the knowledge producing operations of the mind, but thinks it "is an art concealed in the depths of the human soul" (183 / A 141 / B 180). The point here is that schemas, schemata and schema-images and their operations enabled by the transcendental imagination are the hidden, tacit know-how from which more explicit knowledge products are generated like recognitions, classifications, connections, etc., by which we organize our perceptual realm and can subsume it under concepts. Later Kant dropped this tripartite interaction of three faculties and placed the schematism as part of the understanding (Heidegger, 1962b: 141-4).

§ 45. Heidegger's Phenomenological Interpretation of Kant

Heidegger did not agree with Kant's downgrading of the productive imagination and reorganized and integrated the three faculties of intuition, understanding and imagination with a plant metaphor such that the understanding and intuition are the two stems and the imagination their common root (1962b: 144f).

As all three faculties engage in a priori syntheses Heidegger renames the a priori synthesis of a concept its unity and the spatio-temporal synthesis in intuition a synopsis, then to only give the full power of knowledge producing synthesis to the imagination with its schematism and schema-images synthesizing the categorial unity of the concept with the spatio-temporal synopsis of intuition.
Heidegger even went a step further by deriving both the faculty of understanding and the faculty of intuition from the imagination such that they are incorporated in one holistic structure, which deprives the understanding from its traditionally imputed logocentric primacy, and deprives intuition from its allegedly un-problematic, pre-formed givenness.

Another step Heidegger took was to organize the three faculties in a temporal, unitary structure which lines up with Husserl's structure of time-consciousness and the sequentiality of intentionality (1997: 243-6). The primary synthesis of pre-cognition (imagination) "opens up and projects in advance a whole" (246), which enables a synthesis of apprehension (intuition), which in its turn enables a synthesis of reproduction (understanding). All three syntheses have their unified ground in the unity of time.

\textit{Insofar as all three modes of synthesis are related to time and insofar as these moments of time make up the unity of time itself, the three syntheses maintain their unified ground in the unity of time} (246; italics in original).

By accentuating the three different ecstatics of time one could say that the imagination is reaching futurally ahead towards an intuited immediate now, which significance can be grasped, just-later, by the understanding in reaching back to the no-longer-now.

This unitary sequence can also be reformulated with Husserl's terminology of a three-staged Intentionality (empty - fulfilled - identity) and a triple-structured specious now (protention - source point - retention). In the protentive phase of the specious now an empty intentionality projects a categorically structured whole, which then might find fulfillment in a perceptual source-point, which, in the retentive phase, enables identification of the projected and fulfilled meaning and its expression in language.

In all these operations the faculty of transcendental imagination has primacy. Without its pre-figurative (or pre-cognitve or categorially structured) empty, projections no meaningfully structured intuitions can be experienced, let alone subsuming them under appropriate concepts which apply to their significance.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{26} The multiple congruencies between Kant, Husserl and Heidegger I have to tried to capture in a triple column table. See Appendix C: By Way of Kant: Heidegger’s Deepening of Husserl's
As much as Kant's thoughts on the productive imagination were directly and indirectly influential and fruitful in the development of schema theory by cognitive psychologists, and as much as it could be argued that both Kant's work and its appropriation by Heidegger can further deepen this theorizing, it came as a surprise that Heidegger had abandoned this line of thought and had arguably not integrated it in his later work. According to Brian Elliott this change was due to Heidegger's overall shift away from phenomenology after his deep engagement with Kant and writing *Being and Time*, towards aligning his thinking with poetry and a "mythopoetic conception of historical reality" (119). In the change the concept of the productive imagination as the fundamental source of the integration and unification of human experience goes into a "silent retreat" (2). On the other side, according to William Richardson, the results of Heidegger's deep engagement with Kant did survive, but in a different terminology. He makes the connection between the projective nature of the transcendental imagination and the manner in which *Dasein* projects and even *is* its possibilities (2004: 153f).

§ 46. Definitional Conclusion of Schema Theory

As a tentative conclusion of this discussion of schema theory I propose the following: Schemata are the interacting and interconnected images, prototypes, rules and procedures lodged in the tacit dimension operative as 1) a mediator connecting the sensible realm of intuitions with the intelligible realm of empirical concepts (and transcendental categories as Kant worked out), creating meaningful and actionable experiences. Schemata also, and more originary, are active in 2) pre-figuring both the realm of a) sensible and co-dependent bodily motor experiences (kinesthetics) and b) their interpretation in language guided by empirical, categorial and existential concepts (as phenomenologists worked out). Underlying the diverse schematisms of life is the productive imagination which is the fount of all the formative structures preceding experience which synthesize and meaningfully structure its heterogeneous elements. The productive imagination is active, not only in the manner how humans understand metaphorical expressions and emplotted narratives, but also how it is embedded in our daily practices, is operative in play, and guides scientific procedures.  

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Concept of Intentionality and Its Temporal Horizon.
CHAPTER 4: DENOUEMENT

§ 47. Rescue with Kant's Third Kritik

Not only did Kant's notion of imagination, and Heidegger's phenomenological reworking of it, prove very fruitful in understanding schema theory, but Kant also contributed in no small manner to an epiphany about how the welter of human experiences I had delved into during this research could receive some form of schematic organization. This flash of understanding happened in the struggle to understand Kant's notion of the aesthetic imagination.

In Kant's philosophy the concept of the imagination plays two different roles. The first one is cognitive in the production of knowledge when the imagination is the mediator between intuition and understanding. The imagination connects the two with rules and schema-images. This was addressed in Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (1878). The relationship can be pictured as follows:

![Kantian Mandala of the Three Major Faculties](image)

The imagination produces 1) rules from a concept, which is a first step in making concepts sensible, and 2) can connect intuitions to schema-images, which is the first step to make intuitions intelligible. When the rules and schema-images accord a proper subsumption of an intuition under a concept can occur, or, in the other direction, a proper application of a concept to an intuition can take place. Meanwhile the understanding and intuition are kept apart.

The second role of the imagination is aesthetic and is addressed in Kant's Critique of Judgment (1987). With the example of a a poem Kant makes the case that in reading
and processing its rich language the imagination attains a freedom from the understanding, because it is not bound by any one specific conceptualization and actually provides the understanding with a "wealth of undeveloped material" (184-5 / Ak. 315-8)\textsuperscript{27}

If one would think in symmetries, then the notion of a free, playful imagination coupled with the understanding might suggest a corresponding notion of a free imagination, but then coupled with perception. If poetry and other literary arts are relatively independent of perception, and imagination attains a certain creativity in this freedom, how about the imagination attaining a certain measure of freedom when it is relatively unbound from the understanding and provides our intuition with a "wealth of undeveloped material"? Of course in the visual arts we perceive more than what is perceptually presented. An "aesthetic idea" (186 / Ak. 317) is communicated by the artist and we, depending on our cultured state of receptivity, can, with the help of the imagination, perceive the idea. Then there are other non-verbal, creative practices in which conceptual understanding plays hardly any role at all like dance, children's play, sports and sexuality.

![Simple Three-ring Mandala](image)

Fig. 13. Simple Three-ring Mandala

The above questions inspired the re-configuration of the Kantian mandala in fig. 13 into a three-ring mandala comprised of the imagination, understanding and intuition and their overlaps enabling fictionality and play.

\textsuperscript{27} Following the practice in the Hacket edition to refer to the original pagination by preceding it with Ak. i.e. the 1902 \textit{Akademie} edition.
This figure became the launching pad to re-categorize man's practices and experiences, finding for almost any activity a place within this mandala.

Under the category *Fantasy* one could place the literary arts (narrativity), hypothesis formation, Husserlian free imaginative variation and Jaynes’ concept of "introspectable mind space". In short, any imaginative projection of mental, image-based, situational, fictive possibilities. From a negative view it covers all possible experiences in which the intuition, i.e. sense experience, has no, or at least, minimal input.

In the category *Play* one could place practices and experiences like play, sexuality, mysticism, mindless routines and expert performance. They all involve a perceptual projection of bodily, sense-based, narrowly situational act-possibilities. From a negative view it is all possible experiences in which the understanding has no, or at least, minimal input.

In the *Truth* and *Action* category one can place all experiences in which all three faculties contribute. Staying with Kant and the early Heidegger, the idea is that truth is a product of the harmonious cooperation of all three faculties. Truth is traditionally conceived as located in a proposition as its truth value, but in phenomenology the concept of truth increasingly shifted towards perception and, in the hands of Heidegger, became identified with the 'opening' enabled by the projective faculty of imagination. Following the German-American political philosopher Hannah Arendt, the arguably highest level of action (communal and political) would necessarily bring in the understanding because such action is mostly executed by speech and legislative acts in which conceptual entities like ideals, plans and promises are brought to verbal expression.

For reasons of economy I will place the Complex Mandala and its clarification—in which is also included an enveloping notion of unity of consciousness and the three-phased dynamics of intentionality—in appendix D, "Mandala of Conceptual Structure and Process".
CHAPTER 5: RESOLUTION

§ 48. Dasein’s Schematism.

Instead of dropping the transcendental imagination I will follow the early Heidegger to give primacy to the faculty of the image-producing schematism, which both pre-structures our experiences in cognition and behavior on one side and is the platform for the formation of more abstract concepts on the other. And even while following Heidegger here, I am also making a move to apply this to his own existential philosophy.

To bring in narrativity I would make the case that the 'who' of Dasein is structured by the sub-schema of one's Life Story Schema (which includes its plans and future), which, according to Habermas & Bluck, mediates between one's sense of self and the temporally integrated elements of one's past autobiographical memories, present situation and futural personal projects. The integration is effected by a set of four interconnected coherences: 1) temporal, 2) cultural concept of autobiography, 3) thematic and 4) causal (see §39). Here I would implement the same step Heidegger made by upgrading the schematism from mediator between self and experience to originator of both one's sense of self and of the meaning of our experiences, as they fit and are pre-structured by one's Life Story Schema.

The next step is to bring both narrativity and schematism to the how and what of the 'world' of Dasein and make the case that both 1) our more explicit, abstract concept of the world (our worldview) and 2) our experiences of the world (when watching the news or discussing politics or thinking about where this world is going to, etc.) as the wider context of one's own personal situatedness, are mediated by what I would call a World Story Schema. Parallel to, and integrated with, one's personal Life Story Schema we do carry an unconscious, or rather, tacit view of the world organized by at least a similar set of coherences which organize our life story: temporal (historical periodization; turning points), cultural (ideological and religious templates); thematic (accentuations on strife or progress or chaos or irony); and causal (impact of turning points; conceptualization of 'forces' at work). Because one's World Story Schema is in structure very close to historical narration, Hayden White’s categorization of possible
historical discourses might also give some organization and flesh to the myriad possibilities of this schema (1973: 29f).

The last step to be addressed is the central and integrating structure between the 'who' of *Dasein* and its 'world' by way of investigating *Being-in as such* and how that connects one's *Life Story Schema* with one's *World Story Schema*. Several ideas already address this integration. For example the sociologist Norbert Elias (1978) makes a good case that the structure of one's personality and the structure of society are mutually enabling and constraining and that there is a natural, though jagged development in this mutual entanglement towards greater empathy and self-control.

The influential sociology of knowledge study *The Social Construction of Reality* (1966) by Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann analyses identity formation within the dialectical process between society and individuals. Society is a product of man (*externalization*), which then gains a certain objective status because of routinized *reality-maintenance* by its members (*objectivication*), which then becomes something experienced as 'out there' by the younger, new members who will, through different levels of socialization, appropriate society and with it a certain identity (*internalization*). Because of historical dynamics both culture and identity are, within certain boundaries, quite fluid and contingent.xviii

Structurally the most important idea is an early Heidegger idea about *Being-in as such* (*Inheit*) as a structure of experience closely parallel to communion mysticism, in which the subject is in intimate communion with its object of reverence, but not totally absorbed by it (Schuller 2004a). Maybe this is the case because *mineness* is unsurpassable, even in mystic experiences. A last intriguing idea is that the two schemas of self and world are always already inter-meshed at the tacit, subconscious level, and that to separate them is merely an abstractive move overlooking their primordial inter-dependence as sub-schemas of the unitary, but distributive concept of *Being-in-the-world*.

§ 49. Relation between Narrativity and *Dasein*

A series of questions and assertions suggested themselves to me when experimenting with the manner in which narrativity and *Dasein* could be related based
on Heidegger's 1924 lecture titled "The Concept of Time" (Heidegger, 2007: 200-213; summary in Kisiel, 1992: 315ff). In this presentation, which Gadamer named the "Urform" of Being and Time, Heidegger makes one of his earliest and most succinct moves to characterize our human being in terms of temporality (Kisiel, 1992: 315). His line of reasoning was that in order to understand time one has to understand one's own Dasein in relation to time and that, even before that, one has to get a grasp of "several fundamental structures of Da-sein itself", which turn out to be eight in total, all of which found their more systemically structured place in Being and Time. These structures ranged from the formal indicators like Being-in-the-world to being-with-one-another to the "Everyone" and the for this study important idea of the "self-interpretation of Da-sein" in "speaking", which is the locus where "human being-in-the-world plays itself out and runs its course" and expresses "how it takes itself to be" (204; italics in original). The importance of discourse in any of its manifestations is of course that all of such have a narrative structure. In his conclusion Heidegger presents a series of questions by which his initial question "What is time?" obtains increased precision approximating an appropriate understanding of time.

"What is time?" turned into the question "Who is time?" More precisely: Are we ourselves time? Still more precisely: Am I time? Or closer still: Am I my time? (Heidegger, 2007: 213)

The last question became for me the launching pad into a series of my own queries around three leading questions.

1) Am I my story?

This questions is based on the idea that Dasein not only understands itself through narrative discourse, but constitutes itself in that act. And here story is not taken as a "what", but as a "how", a classical move in phenomenology where there is a continuous displacement of questions regarding the what to the how, resulting in the question:

2) Is the how of my being, the how of story?

And is the how of stories, emplotment? "Am I the plot of my life?" And if emplotment is a cognitive synthesis enabled by the productive imagination, the question becomes
"Am I the capacity, process and product of my productive imagination?" The last lead question was,

3) How do I live my story?

Here the reasoning became clearly Arendtian with an initial differentiation between living one's life in a fictive mode, i.e. being caught in un-realized narrative scenarios acted out in in one's mind space, and a factic mode of pursuing possibilities in the three realms of one's *vita activa*: 1) being genuinely engaged in one's daily labor in the context of one's household; 2) being genuinely engaged in one's productive work in a career; and 3) being genuinely engaged in one's sociopolitical situation as a field of possible political actions (Arendt, 1998). 28

§ 50. The Ontological Status of the Narrative Self

The proposed idea that our identities are structured like a narrative does not necessarily yet settle the question whether humans *have* a life story or if we *are nothing but* our life story. Husserl would suspend such questions and Heidegger fully engage them. The idea is that narrativity not only provides a necessary clarity to the temporal nature of *Dasein*, but that narrativity arguably also constitutes the kind of being *Dasein* is. "Dasein is narrative", one could say, or that the meaning or essence of our being is provided by, and is nothing more than, the plotted coherence inhering in narrativity. Some of the opening quotes at the beginning of this study can be tweaked toward one interpretation or the other. For example Bruner's statement that "we *become* the autobiographical narratives by which we 'tell about' our lives" (2003; italics in original) can be interpreted as if 1) there is an ontological difference already in place between an entity *prior* to the stories which can be told about 'it' and those *posterior* told stories themselves, or as if 2) the being which we become through autobiographical narratives exclusively exists by, in and through this telling. In the first case, under the canopy of the verb *to have*, we can conceive ourselves as entities like an immaterial Soul or Higher Self more or less independent of our temporal world and

28 Arendt acknowledges the epistemological importance of narrativity in man's quest for self-knowledge, but does not seem to cross over into the ontological position. "Who somebody is or was we can know only by knowing the story of which he is himself the hero--his biography" (Arendt, 1998: 186).
history, which entity carries along with itself its personal life story as a contingent addition to its core identity. This trans-temporal higher entity can dip into its life story for purposes of self-reflection, or as a collection of storied adventures with which to entertain others, or just as a memory aid to keep track of its projects and ever-changing social position. In the second case, under the canopy of *being*, all the above enumerated functions of our life story are acknowledged, but now they are integral elements of our identity hanging as a web together but without a clear center of ownership. Carr is quite clear in taking this position: “The unity of self, not as an underlying identity but as a life that hangs together, is not a pregiven condition but an achievement” (Carr, 1991: 97). In its most stark formulation the proposition here is that, *if there is no life story there can be no identity*. Or, as Ricoeur might have said it, “narrative is the guardian of personal identity, insofar as there can be no thought about identity without narrated identity.” The original phrase which I appropriated and changed is:

> In its schematic form, our working hypothesis thus amounts to taking narrative as the guardian of time, insofar as there can be no thought about time without narrated time (1988: 241).

§ 51. Postscript

The original plan of study was two-fold and had as its title "The Possibility Conditions and Overcoming of Narrative Identity". Because the first part proved to be so engaging the second part never received its due. To give a flavor of what might have been in store I will end this research with the provisional view I had in mind.

Narrative Identity can be considered a middle phase in a larger psychological development which includes a post-narrative moment congruent with Dreyfus' highest stage of skill acquisition, i.e. expert coping (practical and ethical) based on an engaged, circumspective, non-representational awareness of one's situation and its possibilities, which is not dependent (anymore) on any narrative organization. Only when triggered by questions about one's past or running into dilemmas not solvable through perception, the narrative organization of one's identity might temporarily kick in until the review is over or the situation is re-configured with analytic and/or narrative tools and thereby re-perceived such that the situation can be again acted upon.

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## Appendix A: Structural and Chronological Compositions of Identity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Heidegger &amp; Ricoeur</th>
<th>Ricoeur</th>
<th>McAdams</th>
<th>Nelson</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Temporality</strong></td>
<td>Idem / Ipse</td>
<td>Personal identity: New Big Five</td>
<td>Language acquisition through collaborative construction.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Cosmic to owneness</strong></td>
<td>Sameness to Selfhood</td>
<td>Universal to unique</td>
<td>Childhood to maturity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Origininary time; authentic; one's own;</strong></td>
<td><strong>Moral self;</strong> Primalcy of Other; Constancy of self; Ipse freed from Idem</td>
<td><strong>Ipse</strong></td>
<td>Use of material externalizations of symbolic forms in written language, libraries, databases</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Narrative time; meditating inter-subjectivity</strong></td>
<td><strong>Narrative self;</strong> Ipse diverges from Idem; narrativity mediates</td>
<td><strong>Idem</strong></td>
<td><strong>Theoretic;</strong> formal organization; 1) incorporating unknown worlds; 2) decontextualization of experience; 3) understanding others</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Clock time; scientific; objective</strong></td>
<td><strong>Habitual self;</strong> Perseverance of character; acquired identifications &amp; sedimented habits; identifiable character traits; Ipse overlaps with Idem</td>
<td><strong>Characteristic adaptations</strong></td>
<td><strong>Narrative;</strong> reconstructing past events; marking ongoing experiences; planning future happenings; storied mind; sharing via folk language</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Identifiable bodily traits</td>
<td><strong>Evolutionary design</strong></td>
<td><strong>Mimetic;</strong> pre-semantic activities of play and routines</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>Episodic;</strong> arranged and guided events</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix B: Flow Chart of Intentionality in Different Experiences

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Intending</th>
<th>Emptily</th>
<th>Enactment &amp; Fulfillment</th>
<th>Identity / product</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Empty intending</td>
<td>Intuitive fulfilling</td>
<td>Identifying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Signitive act</td>
<td>Intuitive act</td>
<td>Bringing-in-coincidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Originarily intuited</td>
<td>Experience of self-sameness; Evidence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Act</td>
<td>Signifying</td>
<td>Fulfilling</td>
<td>Identifying</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object</td>
<td>Absent; futural;</td>
<td>Present in the present</td>
<td>Unity of time</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>protended;</td>
<td></td>
<td>Interplay of retention and protention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>expected</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example (Simple intuition)</td>
<td>'Mean' sheep</td>
<td>See sheep</td>
<td>Meaning and seeing coincide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Stabilized, sedimented perception of sheep</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Example (Categorial intuition)</td>
<td>'Mean' car is</td>
<td>See car is scratched</td>
<td>Meaning and seeing coincide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>scratched</td>
<td></td>
<td>Stabilized, perception of scratched car</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action, free and autonomous (Husserl, 1971)</td>
<td>Deciding on a</td>
<td>Executing plan combining pre-reflective skills and</td>
<td>Coincidence of projected and actualized state of affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>practical</td>
<td>rational guidance</td>
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<td></td>
<td>possibility</td>
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<td></td>
<td>guided by rational</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>motives</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action, habitual and routinized</td>
<td>Pre-reflective</td>
<td>Almost immediate allowance of execution</td>
<td>Completed when possibility and actualization coincide</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>perception of a</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>possibility</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action, instinctual and automatic (Gibson)</td>
<td>Instinctual</td>
<td>Instant pursuit of affordance</td>
<td>Satisfaction if fulfillment is commensurate to the urge</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>perception of an</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>affordance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Action structure (Ricoeur, 1984)</td>
<td>Possibility</td>
<td>- Passage to the act or - No passage to the act</td>
<td>- Completion or - Noncompletion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Action structure (Bremond, 1980)</td>
<td>Virtuality (goal to be attained)</td>
<td>Actualization (act necessary to attain goal)</td>
<td>Goal attained (act successful)</td>
</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy (Phenomenological intuition)</td>
<td>Phenomenological propositions</td>
<td>Phenomenological seeing Eidetic intuition</td>
<td>Essences</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philosophy (Existential intuition)</td>
<td>Formal indications Non-theoretical concepts</td>
<td>Event of appropriation Vitally lived experience of experience</td>
<td>Being of Truth; Truth of Being</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theology (Explanatory intuition)</td>
<td>Explanatory dogma(s) represented through apologetics</td>
<td>Leap of faith after being 'taken in' by apologetics</td>
<td>Belief; holding-for-true Strong enough to withstand refutations and contradictions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith (Heidegger)</td>
<td>Questioning what is own-most to faith (holding-for-true) from within what is own-most to truth</td>
<td>Letting what is own-most to truth hold sway</td>
<td>Holding-onself-in-truth through originary questioning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faith (Tillich)</td>
<td>The appeal of the Unconditioned appearing through rituals, symbols, formulas, behavior</td>
<td>Centered act of the total personality Being grasped by the power of ultimate concern</td>
<td>Ultimate concern for the Unconditioned through one's chosen faith</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Science (Explanatory intuition)</td>
<td>Hypothesis Plausible model Provisional theory</td>
<td>Gestalt-switch / conversion after experiment(s) deduced from model</td>
<td>Law; fittest model, surviving attempted refutations and promising new venues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scholasticism</td>
<td>Intellectus</td>
<td>Res</td>
<td>Veritas: adaequatio rei et intellectus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hermeneutic experience (Gadamer)</td>
<td>Fore-understanding of text grounded in one's horizon</td>
<td>Ongoing revision of fore-understandings through Q&amp;A and trial &amp; error through reading</td>
<td>Emerging unity of coherence of meaning. Fusion of horizons of reader and text</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------------------------</td>
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<td>------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metaphorical meaning (Lakoff &amp; Johnson)</td>
<td>Projection of familiar meaning from source domain unto . .</td>
<td>. . . less familiar target domain; semantic collusion; filtering of applicable meanings</td>
<td>Emerging innovated meaning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Narrative construction (Ricoeur)</td>
<td>Projection of possible plot structure based on acquired repertoire</td>
<td>Ongoing filling out because of twists &amp; turns, complications</td>
<td>Leading to denouement with inherent evaluation, theme, point or moral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Empathy (Stein; Thompson, 2007: 386)</td>
<td>Emergence of the emoted body of another, especially his face</td>
<td>Explication by inquiry into the intentional object to which the other is emotedly directed</td>
<td>Comprehensive objectivication of the explained experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Law of Thermodynamics (Carnot; Prigogine, Sagan)</td>
<td>Gradiance / tension between physical opposites (pressure, temperature, mass)</td>
<td>Temporary restructuring by dissipative structures</td>
<td>Stabilized by proliferation / reproduction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix C: By Way of Kant: Heidegger’s Deepening of Husserl’s Concept of Intentionality and Its Temporal Horizon

Brackets: (equivalents); [pagination]; {personal insertion}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Future</th>
<th>Present</th>
<th>Past</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kant</strong>&lt;br&gt;Three-fold Synthesis unified in Transcendental Apperception {of/by time-less subject} [A118]&lt;br&gt;&quot;The schema is [the] sensible concept {categorial configuration} of an object in agreement with the category.&quot; [A146]</td>
<td>- Imagination&lt;br&gt;- Image-Schematic&lt;br&gt;- Mediating [A138]</td>
<td>- Intuition&lt;br&gt;- Empirical&lt;br&gt;- Sensible&lt;br&gt;- By itself blind&lt;br&gt;- To be subsumed under concepts&lt;br&gt;- Receptivity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Reproduction&lt;br&gt;- Link</td>
<td>- Perception&lt;br&gt;- Stem</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>2. Synthesis of 1 {categorial configuration}.</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Heidegger’s Correction</strong>&lt;br&gt;All three syntheses have their unified ground in the unity of time [MH246]&lt;br&gt;Primary synthesis opens up and projects in advance a {categorially structured} whole [MH246]&lt;br&gt;Temporality as basic constitution of the subject [MH249]</td>
<td>- Root&lt;br&gt;- Synthesis of a) syndosis in intuition and b) unity in concept&lt;br&gt;- Primary synthesis</td>
<td>- Stem&lt;br&gt;- Syndosis (synopsis) in intuition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Pre-cognition&lt;br&gt;- Right now&lt;br&gt;- Right-now-not-yet&lt;br&gt;- Reaching ahead</td>
<td>- Apprehension enabled by pre-cognition&lt;br&gt;- Actual now&lt;br&gt;- Immediate now&lt;br&gt;- Reaching out</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Husserl</strong>&lt;br&gt;Triple-phased Intentionality&lt;br&gt;Unified in the Transcendental Ego and its intertwined transversal and longitudinal intentionality constituting the unity of flux [EH107-9]</td>
<td>Empty</td>
<td>Fulfilled</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Protention</td>
<td>Source-point</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Primary expectation</td>
<td>Primal Impression</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Pre-actual</td>
<td>Now-point</td>
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<td><strong>Heidegger</strong></td>
<td><strong>Gadamer</strong></td>
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<td>----------------</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Three-fold of Temporal Ecstases</td>
<td>-Temporal intentionality of hermeneutic experience</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Not to be understood in terms of ordinary time [H326]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Projection</td>
<td>-Fore-understanding of text grounded in one's {image-schematic} horizon</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Only Dasein in its essential futurality can freely...</td>
<td>-Ongoing revision of one's fore-understanding(s) by trial &amp; error and Q &amp; A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Existence</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Fore-running...</td>
<td>-Emerging unity of coherence of meaning</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Thrown-project... in the moment of vision...</td>
<td>-Fusion of horizons {schematisms} of reader and text</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Facticity...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Thrownness... its inherited possibilities and take over its thrownness [H385]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Falling... one's repeating fate [TK10]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-All three ecstases have their unified ground in Primordial Temporality [H329]</td>
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<tr>
<td>-&quot;Temporality is the primordial 'outside-of-itself' in and for itself&quot; [H329]</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Dasein's authentic care in <strong>anticipatory</strong> resoluteness...</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Being-ahead-of-itself</td>
<td>-Mathematical, point-like, instantaneous cut between past and future</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-Death</td>
<td>-Endless series of uniform no-longer-nows [TK10]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>...discloses the <strong>current</strong> Situation of the “there”...</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Being-alongside</td>
<td>-Retaining [H355]</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Ecstatic stretch tensed between birth &amp; death</td>
<td>-'On the former occasion'</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Being-already-in [H327-8]</td>
<td>-Earlier [H407]</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Birth [TK10]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Derivative temporality of circumspective, common sense, daily concern</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Awaiting</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-'Then, when...'</td>
<td>-Endless series of uniform not-yet-nows</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Later on</td>
<td>-Making present</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Making present</td>
<td>-Today</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>-Now that...'</td>
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<tr>
<td>-Today</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>{Primacy of categorial configuration by faculty of transcendental imagination}</td>
<td>{projected, empty, categorial schema-image}</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-{fulfilled categorial image in intuition}</td>
<td>-{applied categorial concept on identified intuition}</td>
<td></td>
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Appendix D: Mandala of Conceptual Structure and Process
Complex Mandala with enveloping notion of unity of consciousness / Dasein and the three-phased dynamics of intentionality

Fig. 14. Full Mandala of Conceptual Structure and Process
Explanation of the Concepts, Faculties and Processes depicted in the Figure

Structure of the Mandala

The holistic and near-exhaustive structure of the figure is represented in the black circles and their categories #4-12 based on Kant's concept of three basic faculties (#5-7) and Heidegger's phenomenological interpretation of those. The three grey boxes (#1-3) and the arrows are structural duplicates (or parallels) of #5-7 in order to bring out certain circular, tri-lectical dynamics based on Husserl's notion of intentionality and its three temporal phases.

Temporality

The figure depicts one ultimate horizon of understanding, i.e. Temporality (#12). Temporality is the non-exceedable, transcendental possibility condition without which inner complexity nothing could be experienced nor understood whatsoever. It is not one category among others, but the one making the others possible as all ontological categories are variations of Temporality.

One overarching unity, Apperception / Dasein (#4):

All experiences happen in the unity of a temporally stretched consciousness (or Temporarily Extended Self [TES]), which enables and constrains all syntheses happening. This consciousness is Dasein's be-ing of its historical-situational t/here.

Six kinds of experience:

Fields #5-11 (except #10, which is a special case. See below) are enabled by Temporality and Apperception.

Three major faculties of synthesis:

Imagination (#1 & 5). The faculty of transcendental imagination connects concepts with intuitions. In connection with concepts it can be conceived as generating a set of image-producing rules (schematism), which product, i.e. schema-images, can be connected with appearances (Intuition). Originally conceived by Kant as the mediator between Concept and Intuition, he also conceived it as its root, which idea was fully developed by Heidegger, who conceived it as the primordial possibility condition of
both Intuition and Understanding.

**Intuition (#2 & 6).** Providing the raw, empirical materiel initially organized by the categorial framework of space and time providing temporal and spatial 'appearances' or *Gestalts*.

**Understanding (#3 & 7).** The transcendental faculty of understanding provides the pure form, or *a priori* principles, of the syntheses of thought which apply, by way of the imagination, to the objects given through the Intuition.

In Husserlian terms the understanding is the empirically empty rule book of how syncategorematic terms like 'and', 'or', 'is', 'next to', 'higher than' etc., organize and connect categorematic terms like 'house, 'brown', resulting in 'categorial expressions' like 'this green house is taller than that brown house'. Categorial expressions will find their fulfillment in 'categorial intuitions', in this case by seeing the two houses and organizing ones field of perception such that one sees that 'this green house is taller than that brown house'.

**The 3-step process (#1, #2, #3) in various phenomenological conceptualizations:**

The original template for this process is Husserlian intentionality: The temporal sequence of intentionality of empty (#1), fulfilled (#2), and stabilized intending (#3). Meaningful experience starts in emptily intending something, which achieves possible fulfillment in a sense-based intuition, which subsequently can be subsumed and stabilized under a concept through re-cognition.

Though sense-based intuition is the basic kind of intentional intuiting, one can subsequently-- through abstraction and reflection--have *founded*, higher-level, non-perceptual intuitions like, for example, understanding ('seeing') that the cat-animal pairing is one of the form of 'species-genus'. This is the transition from single-ray to multiple-ray experiences, or going from simple (seeing a cat) to categorial Intuitions (seeing that the cat is *on* the mat).

The Husserlian concept of a three-phased process can be lined up with his concept of inner time consciousness in which a specious now can be differentiated into a) a
protentive, just-not-yet phase of a primary expectation (#1, futural), b) a source-point phase of a primal impression, (#2, present) and c) a retentive just-passed phase of a primary remembrance (#3), with all three being interdependent moments of the unity of experiential flux held together by an intertwined transversal and longitudinal intentionality.

Heideggerian correction(s):

The imagination is the pre-cognitive, emptily intentional, projective starting phase (#1), which achieves possible fulfillment in a sense-based intuition (#2), which subsequently can be interpreted under a concept through re-cognition (#3).

This sequence can also be lined up with the three-phase dynamic of the three fore-structures of interpretation: fore-having (#1), fore-viewing (#2) and fore-conceiving (#3).

Most importantly all three phases line up with Heidegger's concept of Temporality, i.e. the ecstasies of time. Pre-cognition is a future-oriented reaching ahead / a right-now-not-yet (#1); fulfillment is in the immediate right-now (#2); and cognitive stabilization is in the past just-now-no-longer (#3).

Gadamerian hermeneutics. The act of interpretation of a text starts with a fore-understanding of the text (empty) grounded in one's horizon (#1, schematism); then, while reading, an ongoing revision of one's fore-understanding(s) by trial & error and question & answer (#2, fulfilling), out of which can emerge a unity of coherence of meaning (#3, stabilization), leading to a fusion of horizons (or absorption of schemas) of reader and text.

Dreyfus' phenomenology of skill acquisition. Skill acquisitions usually start with verbal instructions (concepts, #3) which then get translated into specific rules of dos and don'ts and projecting possibilities (images, #1), which by trial and error and question and answer get fulfilled (holistic experience of body-environment experience, #2), which will feedback upon and refine the ever more accurate tacit understanding (#1) of the initial instructions (concepts, #3).

Pacherie's triple-leveled phenomenology of action. Pacherie differentiates three
intentionalities in the execution of an action. It starts with an abstract, deliberative overarching goal, named D-intention (#3), which then has to be translated, with the help of one's background knowledge or tacit understanding (#2), into a contextual perception of a concrete situated goal, named P-intention (#2), ultimately leading to M-intention(s), which is the execution of an instantaneous goal through bodily movement and its inherent proprioceptions and kinesthesia (#1). At the same time, all along the process, multiple corrections are possible by feed-forward and feed-back mechanisms.

Variations in psychology. Background knowledge, scripts, scenarios, paradigms, etc. (#1) become activated by, and will format, one's field of perception, including its possibilities (#2), leading up to possible new insights and understandings (#3), which in their turn either a) enriches (usually), b) transforms (sometimes), or c) replaces (rarely) the background schema (#1) resulting in a) an enriched, b) transformed or c) totally novel experience (#2).

Three major categories of experience enabled by the three major faculties and their possible interactions:

Art, Fantasy, Hypothesis and Art (#8). Imaginative projection of mental, image-based, situational, fictive possibilities. From a negative view it covers all possible experiences in which the Intuition, i.e. sense experience, has no, or at least, minimal input. Ground on which multiple important phenomena are based:

Art in the Kantian sense as a free play between the faculties of understanding and imagination.

Narrativity. The construction of a fictive story world with characters and events with no necessary reference to reality. Words (#3) triggering schemas and images (#1) creating fictive experiences within a fictive world (#2), which are further enriched, redirected, made problematical as the story enfolds.

Free Imaginative Variation. Husserl's major technique to separate out essential structures (moments) from contingent components (parts) by running in the imagination different variations of a phenomenon and see which component is
integral and which is contingent. This procedure qua experience has its own intentional arc and its own kind of Intuition of 'essences' (Wesenschau) and manner of conceptualization.

Introspectable mind space. Imaginative, metaphorical, reduced reproduction of one's world in which a metaphorical 'I' projects an analogue 'me' into possible scenarios of futural what-could-be's and past what-could-have-beens. This is what Jaynes calls 'consciousness' (and his students J-consciousness), which is mostly accompanied with strong emotions of uncertainty and guilt about alternate outcomes projected both into the past as well as into the future.

Hypothesis-, theory- and paradigm-formation takes place, like the Kantian concept of Art, in the free interplay between Imagination (#1) and Understanding (#3), with the obvious caveat that its testing is in Intuition (#2).

**Play, sexuality, mysticism, mindless routines and expert performance (#9).** Perceptual projection of bodily, sense-based, narrowly situational act-possibilities. From a negative view it is all possible experiences in which the Understanding has no, or at least, minimal input.

Overall congruent with Heidegger's concept of tacit, implicit understanding (Verstehen) in the many daily, routine, 'mindless' practices in one's life world.

Overall congruent with Dreyfus' concept of expert coping when there is a strong integration or intimate coupling between actor and situation, mediated by fine-grained, sensitive circumspective awareness, and not (necessarily) mediated by thought. The role of Understanding is a) to guide the skill acquisition process to its non-mental, circumspective expert level or b) as a fall-back position to make quick analyses and corrections when careful circumspection does not lead to expected states of affairs.

Overall congruent with Gibson' concept of animal affordance or the perception of, and acting upon, biologically relevant possibilities like food, water, danger, security and procreation.
Truth & Action (#11).

Truth is traditionally conceived as located in a proposition (#3) as its truth value, but in phenomenology increasingly shifted towards perception (#2) and, ultimately in the hands of Heidegger, identified with the 'opening' enabled by the projective faculty of imagination (#1) accompanied by a strong critique of any leveling of such experience by conceptual abstractions (#3).

Action. Though Dreyfus would place expert level action (including mature moral actions) in box #9 of Play with its tight post-cognitive perception-action cycle, with Arendt the highest level of action (communal and political) would necessarily bring in the Understanding (#3) because such action is mostly executed by speech and legislative acts in which conceptual entities like ideals, plans and promises are brought to verbal expression.

One impossibility (#10)

Because the imagination is the *sine qua non* for the functioning of the other faculties, there can be no intelligible product coming from the interaction between the faculties of Intuition and Understanding alone.

If perceptions are not meaningfully pre-formated by the faculty of the imagination then there can be no *Gestalt* generated, which could be subsumed under a concept in an act of understanding.

And--by reasoning from concept to its application in a perception--without the imagination no rules nor rule-based images (schema-images) could be generated for a concept to find any footing in Intuition to apply itself to.

As Kant stated, “concepts are empty” and “perceptions are blind” and without the imagination the twain will never meet.
i Given the importance of narrativity to understand time, and also following Heidegger's central contention that the concept of Being, including our own mode of human being (Dasein), will have to be understood within the horizon of an interpretation of time (1961: 19/H1), it seems to be a small step then to chain the two propositions together and make the case that 1) in order to understand our own being we need to understand time, and 2) to understand time we need to understand narrativity, and therefore 3) the understanding of Dasein as a thoroughly temporal being, can only be achieved with the help of narrativity. On top of that reasoning, by switching levels from epistemology to ontology one could make also the following case that, 1) if Dasein is not only understandable in temporal terms but actually is time, and 2) time is not just understandable in narrative terms but actually is narratively structured through and through, then 3) Dasein is and only is its narrative.

ii I find the use of illustrations, figures and models very helpful, not only for myself to anchor my thoughts, but also for explanatory purposes. Its justification I find in the convergence of a few ideas. First of all it has been observed that many of the metaphors we use for understanding complex verbal expressions are rooted in either our visual domain or the one of manual object manipulation (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980: 48 & 1999: 238-40 & 240-41). In Lakoff & Johnson's notation of basic metaphors, THINKING IS PERCEIVING, and also THINKING IS OBJECT MANIPULATION and ARGUMENTS ARE BUILDINGS. "In general, we take an important part of our logic of knowledge from our logic of vision"(1999: 238). Secondly, Jaynes thinks that our deliberative thinking is executed in our inner mind space when we see ideas and manipulate them around as building blocks to build arguments, which seems to combine most mind metaphors into one metaphorical 'space'(Jaynes, 1976: 50ff, 64-5). His definition that "[c]onscious mind is a spatial analog of the world and mental acts are analogs of bodily acts"(66) will be further explained and put into play later. Thirdly, and most intriguingly to explain the aptness of visual metaphors and the structure of Jaynesian three-dimensional inner mind space, is Steven Pinker's idea that in the evolutionary process our deliberative rationality developed (or "rode piggy-back") on top of our stereoscopic visual brain system. "Our capacity for abstract thought has co-opted the coordinate system and inventory of objects made available by a well-developed visual system" (Pinker, 1997: 191). Reflexive note: When one tires to conciliate (a technical term in Jaynes) the above three ideas one might very well be exercising this capacity of moving around and fitting heterogeneous elements into a new thought through a quasi-spatial manipulation of building blocks. And, running ahead a bit on what Kant might contribute to this discussion, we could also conceive this operation as the synthesis of different concepts and intuitions with the help of images and image-schemas all directed by the mediating transcendental faculty of imagination, or productive imagination, which concept will take center stage later on.

iii One other method to which I became accustomed while engaging Analytic philosophy and found myself applying in this research is to look for dual layers in phenomena with a surface level getting explanatory clarification from what can be detected to happen in a more or less mechanistic manner at just one level deeper. The paradigmatic example by which I was introduced to such thinking was 'a diamond scratching a glass'. On the surface level one can observe a diamond leaving a scratch in a piece of glass, which at one level deeper can be explained by the fact that the carbon atoms of the diamond are stronger bonded than the molecules comprising the glass and that under certain pressure and movement the carbon atoms of the diamond will stay intact and displace the glass molecules by breaking their bonding (Gillett, 2007; Schuller, 2014). This manner of explanatory modeling was named 'Inter-Level Mechanistic Explanation' or ILME. The major reason that this idea of mechanistic explanation came into play is that some, if not most, of the operations by which meaning is experienced—from quotidian skills like cooking to composing a philosophical thesis—are so subterranean and tacit, that it helps to try to model them in a more or less mechanistic manner. Such modeling can be done with the caveat in mind that we are not talking about purely physical mechanisms—though the experience of meaning is anchored in brain-environment interactions—but about how non-verbal, embodied meaningful practices and verbal meanings are connected in their own realm and between them. If you would only look at figure 4 (Pacherie, 2008: 197) capturing the multiple interactions of feed-forward and feedback
mechanisms involved in the process of going from verbal planning to embodied action, and see how much of that system is actually accessible to waking consciousness, you might get a sense of how many interactions are subterranean and how much its modeling might help us understand the whole process. The figure was composed by the French phenomenologist Elizabeth Pacherie (2008) and can be seen as belonging to a tradition of naturalized phenomenology as pioneered by Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1962) and developed among others by Dreyfus (2002), Dreyfus & Dreyfus (1986), Varela et al (1991) and Thompson (2007). Not only the Pacherie model of action can be interpreted as an instantiation of the ILME model, but also the 'network model' by cognitive psychologists Gillen Fauconnier and Mark Turner (2002). According to the authors this model captures the tacitly executed conceptual projections and blendings which need to happen when we understand counterfactuals, metaphors and simple scenarios (§40). Other instantiations were developed by George Lakoff and Sriniv Narayanan in their 'computational models' of metaphoric reasoning and narrative (1999, 2010). The fascinating part of that research is that the authors apparently were able to isolate the necessary components and their interactions in the generation of metaphors and narratives such that those could be formalized into computer programs "able to interpret simple stories and narrative fragments in the domain of international politics and economics" (2010: Abstract). Underlying the footwork by these authors, I would argue, is their own implicit understanding and application of Husserl's technique of free imaginative variation (or eidetic reduction) by which they were able to create ILME-like models. Reflexive note: As far as I am concerned, I am weaving these complex connections guided by my own half implicit, half explicit understanding of the double-layered models operative in phenomenology (eidetic reduction covering the procedural how), cognitive psychology (network and computational models covering the thematic what) and analytic philosophy of science (ILME covering the explanatory why), all in their subterranean cooperation explaining cognitive accomplishments.

iv Heidegger adopted and regarded as crucially important Husserl's concepts of intentionality and categorial intuition (1985: 27ff). Heidegger's transformational spin on these concepts was to reverse the relationship between consciousness and world, which in Husserl's thought could be seen as if consciousness imposed its intentional categories on life like a form on matter (congruent with Kant), while Heidegger saw life as already categorically or syntactically structured, which immanently understood significance could be interpreted and expressed in language. This pan-hermeneutic notion of life is well captured in Heidegger's phrase "the hermeneutics of facticity", in which the preposition of has to be read as a double genitive: though we have a certain leeway in interpreting our facticity, the latter has already a deeply hermeneutic nature brought about by our ancestors and into which we are inducted as we acquire language and our culture's practices (Heidegger, 1999). To verbally express this pan-hermeneutic life as we live it, Heidegger developed his innovative language of "formal indications" or existential categories like Being-in-the-world, which indicate the elusive how of our experience of existence, which can only show in the enactment of the experience itself (Kisiel, 1996 & 2002).

v A secondary source is the quasi-phenomenological work by the "world philosopher" (Williams, 2004) and spiritual teacher of Indian origin, Jiddu Krishnamurti. His aim was a thorough critique and transformation of modern selfhood, and claims for himself to have gone through a fundamental transformation in relation to cognition. His talks and descriptions of his own experiences will contribute to the notion of overcoming narrative identity, which identity is in essence a cognitive accomplishment though deeply buried in the tacit dimension. The investigation of this aspect will have to be executed in another study.

vi Another more naturalistic framing of this field of different levels sandwiching narrative identity and action can be found in a four-fold differentiation of behavior between:

1. pre-personal, instinctual, evoked behavior;
2. cultural, habitual, acquired behavior;
3. rational, deliberative, reflective behavior,
4. meditative, perceptive, trans-reflective, intuitive behavior.
Especially the first three structures can be found explicitly with the psychologists in this study like MacAdams (2010: 180), Nelson (1996: 26-58) and Boyd (2009: 31-41); and with the naturalist phenomenologists Varela et al (1991: 185-214) and Thompson (2007: 166-218). My first exposure to this helpful categorization was through the libertarian political scientist Larry Arnhart (2009: 19-34), who derived it from Aristotle's concepts of physis (nature), ethos (habits) and logos (deliberation) and also found this trichotomy in Darwin's concepts of impulsive instincts, slowly-gained habits and deliberate reflection (19-20; see Darwin, 2004: 132-51). Per Richardson (2004: 78-103) this trichotomy can also be found in Nietzsche as a stratification of three different levels of selection: natural, social and elective.

vii In psychology one can find parallels with the concept of the specious now and the syntheses enabled thereby. In the research program on memory it is called the episodic buffer of our working memory system, which system would integrate long term memory (explicit memory) and action, and also make the comprehension of language possible (Baddely, 2000, 2012). "The episodic buffer is assumed to be a limited-capacity temporary storage system that is capable of integrating information from a variety of sources. It is assumed to be controlled by the central executive, which is capable of retrieving information from the store in the form of conscious awareness, of reflecting on that information and, where necessary, manipulating and modifying it. The buffer is episodic in the sense that it holds episodes whereby information is integrated across space and potentially extended across time" (Baddely, 2000: 421).

viii To be added is the idea that the experienced now is also specious enough that we can reflect upon our own experiences as they flow by (or we flow in them) by bending backwards on our experience in its not-yet-passed just past phase (Husserl, 1969: 161-3). As I am writing this sentence I can catch myself writing this sentence and can switch at different speeds between the act of reflection, which might interfere with the writing, and the act of writing itself, which pushes reflection into the background and even possibly terminate it as the focus of consciousness is directed again exclusively on the subject matter written about, that is, I can non-self-consciously write about self-consciousness. This act is not based on explicit memory, like when I can say that I remember having started this paragraph with the words "to be added". This manner of reflection is also a necessary aspect of doing phenomenology. At the end of hearing the Beethoven meme, when the melody is experienced as the unity of retended notes, we can reflect back on this unity through reflection and transform the lived experience of the meme into an object of investigation.

"Since each phase is retentionally cognizant of the preceding one, it encloses in itself, in a chain of mediate intentions, the entire series of retentions which have expired. . . . It is thanks to retention . . . that consciousness can be made into an Object" (Husserl, 1969: 162).

Though the above analysis pertains to a more refined, controlled philosophical kind of reflection--by which hard to detect constituent elements of experience can become 'objectified' for investigation--in our daily, naive acts of reflection most people tend to separate and objectify the subject-pole of experience. Usually we are absorbed, self-forgettingly in our daily activities, but so now and then, and for some people often even to the point of pathology, we will reflect on our daily experiences and highlight its subject-pole by which a sense of enduring self-same unity might arise usually named "my self" or ego. This sense of self is usually lived as if it had always already been present and enduring, even when forgotten in absorbed experiences. Initially Husserl thought that the ego was an "empirical object" like any other and should not be thought of as a principle providing the unity of consciousness (1970a: II, 85-6 ), but changed his mind when he claimed to have discovered the transcendental ego as a permanent necessity transcending and uniting any and all of its temporary, changeable experiences (1962: §57, 156-7). Sartre strongly disagreed and made the case that the ego does not inhere in consciousness but is one of its products through the act of reflection (1957: 42-54). Whether self-constituted or as a by-product of reflection, once the personal or empirical ego is constituted, a narrative identity can be grafted upon it by metaphorical transference. The point is that the speciousness of the now has a complex, stretched structure which allows multiple acts to be executed resulting in multiple products (Husserl, 1973: 175-6).
During this study I found numerous psychological studies contributing fine-grained differentiations I had not found (yet) in phenomenological studies. Of course I cannot be sure about that, because the phenomenological field is so vast. At the same time I found that certain phenomenological insights could have contributed to the conceptual rigor of psychological studies. Especially in the following empirical linguistic and psychological studies I observed this dialectic: Paul Bremond (1980; Ricoeur, 1985: 38-44) and the minimal structure of narrative (§34); Moore & Lemon (2001) and the emergence of the temporally extended self; Nelson (1996) and the emergence of narrative intelligence (§27); Baddeley (2000, 2012) and the specious now (§18); Erikson (1968; 1980) and the establishment of personal identity; Lakoff and Johnson (1980; 1999) and the meaning innovations through metaphor (§40); Jaynes (1976) and the emergence of inner mind space. In short, almost any psychological study I used provided third person descriptions of experiences which, through imaginative empathy, could be re-experienced and thereby become available for phenomenological reflection and connected to the findings of other phenomenologists.

It could be argued that the generative phenomenology program is for a large extent fulfilled by the hermeneutic-existential phenomenology program initiated by Heidegger in his investigation of our Dasein's primordial structure of being-with-others (Mitsein) and historicality (1962, II, V); further elaborated by Gadamer's phenomenology of the implicit, always already operational impact of history and traditions in the form of inherited, productive, interpretative prejudices (1960, Second Part, Chapter II: 238f); and Ricoeur's idea of our being embedded, even entangled, in the formative narratives of our predecessors (1988: 109-16). Heidegger's hermeneutic breakthrough had its parallel in Husserl's transition from a solipsistic account of inter-subjectivity in his Cartesian Meditations (1969b: Fifth Med.: 89f) to a more communal account in the Crisis book with its leading generative-phenomenological concept of the Lifeworld (1970b, Part III A: 103-89).

Borrowing terms from Labov one could say that humans like to attain one or more resolutions in life in the sense of denouements of, or dis-entanglements from, accumulated complications, leading to some variant of climactic or happy ending. We usually prefer resolved stories, especially our own, though, I would add, dwelling in the other Labovian phases of a narrative as fundamental life attitudes are definitely possible and recognizable. For example there might be narrative-psychological types of eternal beginners fearing futural commitment (orientation); drama and tension seekers enjoying the complexities of the immediate present (complication); moralists judging anything and everything form an ethical-theoretic position, reflectively overlooking the whole of temporality (evaluation); and problem solvers directed towards a desirable future (resolution). This line of thought, with its accentuated narrato-temporal dimensions, was inspired by Heidegger's notion that the three "ectases" of time (1962a: 375-78 / H 327-9) can become accentuated stances towards life: dwelling on the past (facticity); focusing on the present (falling), openness towards the future (ex-istence; standing-out), with the last one the more primal and authentic one (1962a: 389f / H 339f). The above enumeration of narrative types is not only based on a derivation from the tripartite, horizontal structure of Dasein's temporality, but also from the three vertical positions of pre-reflective actor, self-conscious agent and deliberative author as elaborated by both Jahn (2017) and MacAdams & Cox (2010).

For example, the founding fathers of the American republic might become a collective of heroes, which, either in their current, flattened, popular interpretation become half-understood, pedastalled, mythic figures with limited impact, or they can become a fount of radical and deep understandings of the broader, civilizational enlightenment project of which they were part and parcel, eliciting political commitments to realize the not yet fully completed revolutionary project of free citizenship within the context of a democratic republic. And again, I do not mean that these persons become merely exemplars to be imitated, but that their imputed projects become deeply embedded in, and formative of, our own narrative identity, especially in its open-ended, forward looking gaze. The same ambiguity bedevils the image and impact of radicals like Jesus, Gandhi or Martin Luther King as exemplars. In the default popular imagination they have become sanitized and harmless, and their potential to impact identity
formation is dependent on those daring and creative individuals who would dig deep into their lives and appropriate their unrealized past projects.

xiii Here I like to point out another parallel with Heidegger. When *idem* identity overlaps with *ipse* identity its manner of being is arguably *inauthentic*, i.e. it has not yet differentiated itself from its *factic* background by emancipating itself from its half-consciously acquired habits and identifications formatting its average everydayness. When, *per* Ricoeur, *ipse* identity starts to loosen itself from *idem* identity through more resolutely developed commitments and a shift occurs from naive egoism to the primacy of the *Other*, the person is arguably in a mode of *authentic* individuation (Heidegger, 1962: H 42-3 / 68). And I would place such achievement on a developmental scale of gradable realization or intensity and not construe it, *per* Heidegger (1962: H 385 / 437), as an all-or-nothing visionary act taking hold of the whole of one's life in one swoop, though this cannot be ruled out as historical examples might be found fitting the criterion.

xiv Besides, or on top of, the important dialectic between *idem* and *ipse* identity, Ricoeur identified another important dialectic constituting our selfhood, which would put some limit to the tendency of narrativity to be all-encompassingly inclusive. This dialectic is situated between *selfhood*, i.e. one's narrative identity, and *otherness*, i.e. that which is radically different from it, though still integral to one's selfhood. Otherness comes in three categories. They are 1) the otherness of one's own body as part of the material, causal world, mediated by the phenomenon of *Flesh*, which is the lived, experienced body with its senses, motility and tacit skills through which this body and its world are disclosed (319f); 2) the otherness of other persons, mediated by the phenomenon of *intersubjectivity*, in which process a self and another mutually constitute each other as both similar and radically different (329f); and 3) the otherness of one's *conscience*, which is the most hidden relation of the self with itself, and is mediated by a *call*, silent or not, coming from one's conscience, issuing an appeal to itself to take hold of itself and become properly itself by emerging from the anonymous *They* (341f). Ricoeur considers all three not as impositions upon selfhood from outside "as though to prevent its solipsistic drift", but as belonging to the "ontological constitution of selfhood" (317). Though Ricoeur does not address systematically their connection, it could be observed that it is through one's lived body with its senses, motility and expressiveness that we encounter other people by seeing their face and gestures, and hearing their voice, which can trigger one's conscience as a summons to act authentically by becoming proper to the unique event of encountering one another. Unexpectedly Ricoeur does not bring into play the rich epistemological virtues of narrativity to mediate this ethical-ontological dialectic between selfhood and otherness. After all it is not hard to remember or imagine that a culture's stock of canonical stories will present numerous events depicting bodily challenges, social demands and ethical dilemmas, which can evoke the sometimes uncanny strangeness of one's own body, of one's encounters with others, and of one's own conscientious promptings. And, because of the triple-phased mimetic process, such readings will have an effect on our perception of, and acting in, our lifeworld.

xv Bamberg's micro-analysis of the emergence of self and identity in daily, local interactions might easily be wedded to the "radical microsociology" of American sociologist Randall Collins (1998 & 2004), who built upon earlier work by sociologists Emile Durkheim and Ervin Goffman. His focus is on specific social situations which he names "interaction rituals (IR)" which contain the following ingredients. It is a situation in which 1) at least two persons participate with 2) their attention on the same object or action (and each knowing that the other is also paying attention to the same subject), 3) sharing a common mood, 4) which mood together with the attention becomes intensified, resulting in 5) a sense of sharing and group-formation including a sense of mutual moral commitments, which 6) will fill the participants with "emotional energy (EE)", which might be carried by participants from situation to situation and thereby create "interaction ritual chains (IRC)" (1998: 22-3). The interaction rituals he refers to can be just daily dialogues, entertainment events or attending a conference. In short, any situation fulfilling the above criteria. Successful participants also build up or lose "cultural capital (CC)" as their skills, contributions and especially emotional infusion of available EE, are acknowledged or challenged. Though Collins does not address the process of identity formation which will
happen in such situations—as a sociologist he considers situations as primary and individuals as secondary (2004: 3-6)–it should not be a stretch to argue that the ongoing process over time of accumulating and spending EE and CC in IRCs will contribute to, or even constitute, one's sense of self during interactions and out of which a sense of more enduring identity might emerge when movements from one IR to another develop patterns and stability. The closest maybe Collins comes to addressing the contribution of social situations to individuality is the statement that "much of what we consider personality consists of the extent to which persons carry the energy of intense Interaction Rituals" (1998: 23).

The Career of Narrativity. Narrativity went through a radical change of status once the narrative turn took place. Traditionally it was considered a peripheral kind of discourse. When the cognitive qualities of narrative became clear it arguably attained equality to explanatory discourse. And at this time quite some psychologists and philosophers consider narrative the natural origin of, and the superior to, other kinds of discourses. An early challenge to the reign of explanatory discourse came from the American historian Hayden White (1973, 1980). Then the epistemological importance of narrative intelligibility was explored by MacIntyre (1981), then firmly established in Ricoeur's *Time and Narrative* (1984-88). The theory attained a relatively early universalization in Bruner's paper "The Narrative Construction of Reality" (1991) and reached recently a full theoretical exposition in *A New Theory of Mind: The Theory of Narrative Thought* (Beach & Bissell, 2016).

The Career of Schematism. It first lit up in Kant's A edition of his first *Critique*, only to be muffled away in the B edition. A direct line from Kant goes to Heidegger (1962b, 1997), who interpreted Kant's concepts of schematism and productive imagination from within a phenomenological framework as a part of his project as laid out in *Being and Time*, but did not further incorporate his findings in later works. Schema theory received a good boost from Merleau-Ponty in his phenomenological processing of real life cases of persons with deviations in their perception and motor intentionalities leading to the concept of body schema in his body-centric thought. Then some linguists and psychologists picked it up in the 1970s and 1980s. Early pioneers were cognitivist psychologists Ulric Neisser (1976), Roger Schank and Robert Abelson (1977) and David Rummelhart (1980). The latter, in his paper "Schemata: The Building Blocks of Cognition", made an explicit connection to Kant and, like him, claimed an essential role for schemata in cognition. They are making the case that all cognition and behavior is organized by unconscious frameworks, scripts, schemas, schemata, etc., which all spring into action when prompted by situational clues. Mark Johnson, who also was instrumental in establishing the metaphor research program (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980) integrated multiple lines of psychological and philosophical investigations on metaphors, schemata and the imagination in his *The Body in the Mind: The Bodily Basis of Meaning, Imagination, and Reason* (1987). Some of these scientists are a bit flummoxed by the question of the ontological status of these schemata because they are not directly visible and can only be deduced to be necessarily there (Bluck & Habermas). Kant also thought that the working of the transcendental imagination is inaccessibly tucked away somewhere in the soul.

As a last thought, I do think that most of the logic of societal and individual change can be understood through a Darwinian theory of cultural and social selection, which would draw on and transform a functionalist stream in sociology (Runciman, 2009). Some social practices are more functional or advantageous for society than others. Actually, sometimes even deceptions and self-deceptions are functional for reality- and identity-formation and reality- and identity-maintenance (Trivers, 2011).