Can there be a better source of meaning than everyday practices?

Reinterpreting Division I of *Being and Time* in the light of Division II

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I. Average versus Primordial Understanding

In my Commentary on Division I of *Being and Time*, I spelled out Heidegger’s basic theses that (1) people have skills for coping with equipment, other people, and themselves; (2) their shared everyday coping practices conform to public norms; (3) the interrelated totality of equipment, norms and social roles form a whole which Heidegger calls “significance.” (4.) Significance is the basis of average intelligibility. Ignoring the obvious irony, in Heidegger’s conclusion that “publicness primarily controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted, and it is always right” (165), I concluded that, for Heidegger, as for Wittgenstein, the source of the intelligibility of the world and of human being is the average, everyday, public practices. This interpretation still seems right to me, but I went on, mistakenly, to conclude from the basis of intelligibility in everydayness, that, for Heidegger as for Wittgenstein, there was no better kind of intelligibility.

But Heidegger says that Division I provides a phenomenology of banal, average, everyday understanding and so will have to be revised in the light of the authentic way of being he describes in Division II. My Commentary was, therefore, often criticized on the grounds that I presented as Heidegger’s final view, theses that were taken back in Division II. None of the critical reviewers, however, said what my exclusive consideration of Division I led me to get wrong. And, as far as I could tell, none of the claims made in Division I were taken back in Division II.

I now see, however, that focusing exclusively on Division I did, indeed, lead me to make at least one serious mistake. I overlooked warnings, scattered throughout Division I, that the average intelligibility described there would later be shown to be an inferior form of understanding, in contrast to a richer and more primordial kind of understanding described in Division II.

I noted Heidegger’s claim that “by publicness everything gets obscured,” (165), but I couldn’t see how there could be a higher intelligibility than the public, average,
intelligibility provided by the social norms. I claimed that Heidegger would surely have
going to metaphysical intelligibility accessible only to philosophers. After all,
the whole point of intelligibility is that it be shared or at least *sharable* by those brought
up in a given culture or form of life. So, I simply denied that for Heidegger there could
be any higher intelligibly than that in the public practices.

I’ve since come to see that I was wrong. Heidegger clearly holds that there is a
form of understanding, of situations, on the one hand, and of Dasein itself, on the other,
that is superior to everyday understanding. He calls this superior understanding
“primordial understanding” (212). I still hold, however, that this primordial
understanding cannot be some radically different way of making sense of things, since,
for Heidegger the phenomenologist, any higher intelligibility must somehow be based on
and grow out of the average intelligibility into which everyone is socialized. But what
could such a more primordial form of understanding be?

To get a clue, it helps to recall what we learn from Ted Kisiel’s researches into
the sources of *Being and Time*. According to Kisiel, the book grows out of Heidegger’s
work on Aristotle: Division I elaborates on *techne*, everyday skill, and Division II on
*phronisis*, practical wisdom. So we would expect Heidegger to present in Division II
his own version of the mastery of the cultural practices that, according to Aristotle,
enables the *phronimos* to “straightway” “do the appropriate thing at the appropriate time
in the appropriate way.” But just what phenomena do Aristotle and Heidegger have in
mind with *techne* and *phronisis*? The way to find out is to let these phenomena show
themselves as they are in themselves, so I will take a moment to describe, in a very
abbreviated way, four stages one goes through in acquiring a new skill in any domain,
and especially what one goes through in becoming a *phronimos*, the person of practical
wisdom who is a master of his or her culture’s practices.

II. A Phenomenology of Skill Acquisition³

*Stage 1: Novice*

Normally, instruction begins with the instructor decomposing the task
environment into context-free features that the beginner can recognize without the
desired skill. The beginner is then given rules for determining actions on the basis of
these features.
The student automobile driver learns to recognize such domain-independent features as speed (indicated by his speedometer), and is given the rule, “Shift when the speedometer-needle points to 10.

The child who is learning how to act appropriately in his or her culture, might be given the rule. “Never tell a lie.”

Stage 2: Advanced beginner

As the novice gains experience actually coping with real situations, he begins to note, or an instructor points out, perspicuous examples of meaningful additional aspects of the situation. After seeing a sufficient number of examples, the student learns to recognize them. Instructional maxims can then refer to these new situational aspects.

Of course, if the beginner follows the rule, “Shift at 10 miles an hour,” the car will stall on a hill or when heavily loaded. So the advanced beginner learns to use (situational) engine sounds as well as (non-situational) speed in deciding when to shift. He learns the maxim: “Shift up when the motor sounds like it’s racing and down when it sounds like it’s straining.”

Likewise, the policy of not lying will get a child into fights and excluded from important events so, with the coaching of their parents, children learn to tell their friends when leaving their homes that they had a good time regardless of the truth. Thus, the child learns to replace the rule “Never lie” with the maxim “Never lie except in situations when making everyone feel good is what matters.”

Stage 3: Competence

With more experience, the number of potentially relevant elements that the learner must recognize becomes overwhelming. At this point, since a sense of what is important in any particular situation is missing, performance becomes nerve-wracking and exhausting, and the student may well wonder how anyone ever masters the skill.

To cope with this overload and to achieve competence, people learn through instruction or experience, to devise a plan or choose a perspective that determines which elements of the situation must be treated as important and which ones can be ignored. By restricting attention to only a few of the vast number of possibly relevant features and aspects, such a choice of a perspective makes decision making easier.
A competent driver leaving the freeway on an off-ramp curve, learns to pay attention to speed of the car, not whether to shift gears. After taking into account speed, surface condition, angle of bank, etc., the driver may decide he is going too fast. He then has to decide whether to let up on the gas pedal, take his foot off the pedal altogether, or step on the brake, and precisely when to perform any of these actions. He is relieved if he gets through the curve without being honked at, and shaken if he begins to go into a skid.

A young person learns that there are situations in which one must tell the truth and others in which one lies. Although this is daunting, the adolescent learns to decide whether the current situation is one of building trust, giving support, manipulating the other person for his or her own good, harming a brutal antagonist, and so forth. If, for instance, trust is the issue, he then has to decide when and how to tell the truth.

The competent performer, then, seeks rules and reasoning procedures to decide upon a plan or perspective. But such rules are not as easy to come by as are the rules and maxims given beginners. There are just too many situations differing from each other in too many subtle ways. More situations, in fact, than are named or precisely defined, so no one can prepare for the learner a list of types of situations and what plan or perspective to use in deciding what to do in each. Competent performers, therefore, must choose a perspective by themselves, without being sure that it will turn out to be appropriate.4

Such decisions are risky, however, so one is tempted to seek the security of standards and rules. When a risk-averse person makes an inappropriate decision and consequently finds himself in trouble, he tries to characterize his mistake by describing a certain class of dangerous situations and then makes a rule to avoid them in the future. To take an extreme example, if a driver pulling out of a parking space is side-swiped by an oncoming car he mistakenly took to be approaching too slowly to be a danger, he may make the rule, never pull out if there is a car approaching. Such a rigid response will make for safe driving in a certain class of cases, but it will block further skill refinement. In this case it will prevent acquiring the skill of flexibly pulling out of parking places. In general, if one seeks to follow general rules one will not get beyond competence.
But without guidelines, coping becomes frightening rather than merely exhausting. Prior to this stage, if the rules do not work, the performer, rather than feeling remorse for his mistakes, can rationalize that he has not been given adequate rules. Now, however, the learner feels responsible for his choices. Often, his choice leads to confusion and failure. Of course, sometimes things work out well, and the competent performer experiences a kind of elation unknown to the beginner. Thus, learners at this stage find themselves on an emotional roller coaster.

As the competent performer becomes more and more emotionally involved in his task, it becomes increasingly difficult for him to draw back and adopt the detached rule-following stance of the beginner. While it might seem that this involvement would interfere with rule-testing, and so would lead to irrational decisions and inhibit further skill development, in fact just the opposite seems to be the case. If the detached rule-following stance of the novice and advanced beginner is replaced by involvement, one is set for further advancement, while resistance to the acceptance of involvement and risk normally leads to stagnation and ultimately to boredom and regression.\(^5\)

**Stage 4: Expertise**

With enough experience with a variety of situations, all seen from the same perspective but requiring different tactical decisions, the competent performer seems gradually to decompose the class of situations into subclasses, each of which shares the same decision, single action, or tactic. This allows an immediate response to each situation.

The expert driver, generally without paying attention, not only feels in the seat of his pants when speed is the issue; he knows how to perform the appropriate action without calculating and comparing alternatives. On the off-ramp, his foot just lifts off the accelerator or steps on the brake. What must be done, simply is done.

Also, with enough experience and willingness to take risks, most children grow up to be ethical experts who have learned to tell the truth or lie spontaneously, depending upon the situation, without appeal to rules and maxims. Aristotle would say that such a person has acquired the virtue of truthfulness. Some people grow up to be experts capable of responding appropriately to a wide range of interpersonal situations in their culture. Such social experts could be called virtuosi in living.
As a result of, accepting risks rather than falling back on standards and rules, and a commitment to being better than average, the virtuoso in living, develops the capacity to respond appropriately even in situations in which there are conflicting concerns and in which there seems to those looking on to be no appropriate way to act. Pierre Bourdieu describes such a virtuoso in the complexities of gift giving among the Berbers:

Only a virtuoso with a perfect command of his “art of living” can play on all the resources inherent in the ambiguities and uncertainties of behavior and situation in order to produce the actions appropriate to each case, to do that of which people will say “There was nothing else to be done,” and do it the right way.\textsuperscript{6}

This is obviously Aristotle's \textit{phronimos}. Of course, there may be several wise responses. Indeed, on my account, the idea of a \textit{single} correct response makes no sense since other virtuosi with different funds of experiences would see the matter differently, and even the same \textit{phronimos} would presumably respond differently once he had had more experience and therefore could discriminate a richer repertoire of situations.

**III. The Phronimos as a Socially Recognized Virtuoso**

We can now generalize this account of skill acquisition, and return to \textit{Being and Time} to see whether the virtuoso’s increasingly refined sense of the social situation is, perhaps, the more primordial understanding Heidegger has in mind. We can do this by seeing how Aristotle’s \textit{phronimos} is related to Heidegger’s resolute Dasein. Heidegger is clear that the average way of acting is to obey standards and rules. He describes “Dasein’s lostness in the one”, as following “the tasks, rules, and standards … of concernful and solicitous being-in-the-world” (312).

In contrast, Heidegger’s resolute individual deviates from the banal, average, public standards to respond spontaneously to the particular situation. In Heidegger’s terms, irresolute Dasein responds to the general situation (\textit{Lage}), whereas resolute Dasein responds to the concrete Situation (\textit{Situation}). As Heidegger puts it: “for the one …the [concrete] Situation is essentially something that has been closed off. The one knows only the ‘general situation’” (346), while “resolute Dasein” is in touch with the “concrete Situation of taking action” (349). The distinction between these two kinds of situation seem to come out of nowhere in \textit{Being and Time} but it clearly has its origin in Heidegger’s detailed discussion of \textit{phronisis} in his 1925 \textit{Sophist Lectures}. There he says:
Dasein, as acting … is determined by its situation in the largest sense. This situation is in every case different. The circumstances, the givens, the times and the people vary. The meaning of the action itself, i.e. precisely what I want to do, varies as well….It is precisely the achievement of *phronisis* to disclose the respective Dasein as acting now in the full situation within which it acts and in which it is in each case different.7

Given the phenomenology of skill acquisition, it should be clear that the concrete Situation does not have some special metaphysical or private kind of intelligibility cut off from public, everyday intelligibility. Rather, intelligibility for the *phronimos* is the result of the gradual refinement of what start out as general responses that grows out of long experience acting within the shared cultural practices. Thus, in discussing *phronisis* Heidegger quotes Aristotle’s remark that “Only through much time…is life experience possible.”8 And in *Being and Time* he is explicit that the intelligibility of the [concrete] Situation disclosed by resolute action is a refinement of the everyday:

Authentic disclosedness modifies with equal primordiality both the way the ‘world’ is discovered and the way in which the Dasein-with others is disclosed. The ‘world’ which is available does not become another ‘in its content’ nor does the circle of others get exchanged for a new one; but both being toward the available understandingly and concernfully, and solicitous being with others, are now given a definite character…. (344).

Thus, “Even resolutions remain dependent upon the one and its world” (345).

Also, according to Aristotle, since there are no rules that dictate that what the *phronimos* does is the correct thing to do in that type of situation, the *phronimos*, like any expert, cannot explain why he did what he did. Heidegger, of course, agrees:

The Situation cannot be calculated in advance or presented like something occurrent, which is waiting for someone to grasp it. It only gets disclosed in free resolving which has not been determined beforehand but is open to the possibility of such determination. (355)

So when Heidegger asks rhetorically, “But on what basis does Dasein disclose itself in resoluteness?” he answers:

*Only* the resolution itself can give the answer. (345).
All the virtuoso can do is stay open and involved and act on the basis of his or her past experience. The resulting resolute response defines the Situation. As Heidegger puts it, “The Situation is only through resoluteness and in it” (346). Like the *phronimos*, the resolute individual presumably does what is retroactively recognized by others as appropriate, but what he does is not the *taken-for-granted, average* right thing – not what *one* does – but what his past experience leads him to do, given his spontaneous understanding of that particular Situation.

Moreover, as we have seen, since the Situation is specific and the *phronimos’* past experience unique, what he does cannot be the appropriate thing. It can only be an appropriate thing. Still, unlike Kierkegaard’s Knight of Faith, Abraham, suspending the ethical, who can only be understood by himself and others as a madman or a murderer, “Resolution,” according to Heidegger, “does not withdraw from ‘actuality’, but discovers first what is factically possible; and it does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost ability-to-be in the ‘one’” (346). Thus, in responding to the concrete Situation the resolute individual is recognized as a model; not of what general thing to do, but of how each person is to respond in his or her own way. Presumably it is in this way, “when Dasein is resolute, it can become the ‘conscience’ of others” (344).

It should now be clear that Kisiel’s argument that Heidegger, in his account of resolute Dasein in Division II, is working out Aristotle’s phenomenology of practical wisdom helps make sense of Heidegger’s cryptic remarks about the resolute Dasein’s response to the concrete Situation. But Kisiel’s plausible way of understanding the passages in question is complicated by another group of interpreters who point out that Heidegger’s account of authenticity is also deeply influenced by his early interest in the account of radical transformation in St. Paul, Luther and Kierkegaard. These interpreters understandably focus on Heidegger’s use of the Christian term for radical transformation, crucial to Kierkegaard, the *Augenblick*. ¹⁰

This two phenomena are totally different, yet there is a confusing moment where Heidegger introduces the *Augenblick* in a way that seems clearly to refer to the *phronimos’* daily dealings with things and equipment. He says:

To the anticipation which goes with resoluteness, there belong a Present in accordance with which a resolution discloses the Situation.... The *Augenblick*
permits us to encounter for the first time what can be ‘in a time’ as ready-to-hand or present-at-hand. (387, 388)

But then Heidegger appends a footnote saying, “S. Kierkegaard is probably the one who has seen the existentiell phenomenon of the Augenblick with the most penetration…” (479). What can this mean?

Once we focus on the two phenomena, we can see that a satisfactory interpretation requires clearly distinguishing two experiences of the source, nature, and intelligibility of decisive action -- the Greek experience, arising from a concrete understanding of the Situation, that makes possible masterful coping in the world and the Christian experience, arising from a primordial understanding of Dasein itself, that makes possible a transformation of self and, and as we shall soon see, also the world. Heidegger seems to be distinguishing Dasein’s understanding of the current Situation from Dasein’s experience of its most primordial way of being, and yet trying to subsume them both under the notion of an Augenblick when he says, “Dasein gets brought back from its lostness by a resolution so that both the current Situation and therewith the primordial ‘limit-Situation’ of being-towards-death, will be disclosed as an Augenblick that has been held on to.” (400) (We will see why Heidegger here refers to death in a moment.)

Thus Heidegger describes the Augenblick at a level of formality that covers any decisive moment in which Dasein, as an individual, breaks out of the banality of the one and takes over its situation, whether that be the Greek phronimos’ act of seizing the occasion (Kairos) or the Christian experience of being reborn. Clearly, for Heidegger, either type of decisive moment is an Augenblick. In a course given shortly after the publication of Being and Time, the Greek and Christian views, their radical difference, and their formal similarity are spelled out together. Heidegger first speaks about the Augenblick in general terms: “Dasein’s self-resolution (Sich entschliessen) to itself …to what is given to him to be, this self-resolution is the Augenblick”. He then fills this out in Aristotelian terms, explaining, “The Augenblick is nothing else than the glance of resoluteness, in which the full Situation of an action opens up and is held open.” But Heidegger then begins a new paragraph with the warning that “What we here indicate with ‘Augenblick’ is what Kierkegaard was the first to really grasp in philosophy – a
grasping, which begins the possibility of a completely new epoch in philosophy for the first time since Antiquity.”

IV. The Greek Cultural Master vs. the Christian World Transforming Innovator

In *Being and Time*, then, it turns out that there are two different forms of higher intelligibility —concrete and primordial -- and that each is disclosed by a different type of resoluteness. The first is discussed in Chapter 2 of Division II. There, Heidegger defines resoluteness as “self projection upon one’s ownmost being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety….” (343) This kind of resoluteness arises from facing the fact that one can’t get behind one’s thrownness so as to make it explicit and justify it. The consequent anxiety is the realization that one’s average understanding with its rules and standards has no intrinsic authority.

According to Heidegger, anxious, guilty resoluteness is required to make possible the mastery exhibited by the phronimos who, because he has held onto anxiety and so no longer takes for granted the banal public interpretation of events, can see new possibilities in the most ambiguous and conflicted situations and so can do something that all who share his world will retroactively recognize as what was factically possible at the time. But, of course, the Aristotelian phronimos has not sensed the ungroundedness of the general cultural understanding of what it means to be a human being. In fact, although the Greek phronimos could not justify his particular action in response to a particular concrete situation, he could, if he had taken Aristotle’s ethics course, see that, in general, what one does when one is a Greek, expresses the essential rational character of human nature. Presumably according to Heidegger, an Aristotelian phronimos’s anxiety-based understanding of the uniqueness his concrete situation, nonetheless, sets his understanding apart from the one’s average understanding in terms of rules and standards, and he is, therefore, effective and admired, even though he is not yet fully authentic.

According to Heidegger, besides the effective coping of the phronimos, made possible by an expert grasp of the *Situation in the widest sense*, there is a fully authentic way of acting made possible by Dasein’s primordial understanding of its own way of being. This authentic way of acting is a more complete form of resoluteness in which Dasein not only faces the anxiety of guilt, viz. the sense that the everyday social norms of
its society are thrown rather than grounded and so have no final authority, but also faces the anxiety of death, viz. that Dasein has to be ready at all times to give up its identity and its world altogether. In such an understanding, Dasein manifests “its authenticity and its totality” (348).

Heidegger ranks the two ways of holding onto anxiety and the kind of resoluteness each requires by remarking that only the second is authentic and whole. We have defined “resoluteness” as a projecting of oneself on one’s ownmost being-guilty ….Resoluteness gains its authenticity as anticipatory resoluteness. In this, Dasein understands itself with regard to its ability-to-be, and it does so in such a manner that its will go right under the eyes of Death in order thus to take over in its thrownness that entity which it is itself, and to take it over wholly. (434)

Thus anticipatory resoluteness makes possible an even more profound and innovative form of intelligibility than the pragmatic understanding evinced by the phronimos.

To be innovative in this Christian sense requires anticipatory resoluteness — anxiously facing both death and guilt. The resolute phronimos merely experiences his thrownness and so has the sense that the social norms are not rules to be rigidly followed. He therefore gives up a banal, general understanding of social norms and responds to the concrete Situation, but he can still be understood by his peers to have effectively solved a shared problem. In anticipatory resoluteness, however, anxiety in the face of death has freed Dasein even from taking for granted the agreed-upon current cultural issues. This makes possible what Heidegger calls repetition.

Repetition makes a reciprocal rejoinder to the possibility of existence that has-been-there….But when such a rejoinder is made to this possibility in a resolution, it is made in a Augenblick; and as such it is at the same time a disavowal of that which in the today, is working itself out as the ‘past’. (438) (My italics.)

Here the Augenblick names a case of radical innovation, what Kierkegaard calls a new creation. In the moment of decisive action, authentic Dasein takes up a marginal practice from its cultural heritage and uses it to transform the present. So Heidegger concludes:
[Fate] is how we designate Dasein’s primordial historisizing, which lies in authentic resoluteness and in which Dasein hands itself down to itself, free for death, in a possibility, which it has inherited and yet has chosen. (435)

In accepting its fate, Dasein take over or repeats a marginal practice in a new context, and thereby exhibits a form of life in which that marginal practice has become central and the central practices have become marginal. Such an innovator is so radical that he transforms his generation’s understanding of the issue facing the culture and produces a new authentic “we.” He thus goes beyond not only the banal general understanding of his peers, but even beyond the Situational understanding of the *phronimos*. 18

Heidegger sensed that such a fully authentic Dasein’s reinterpretation of what his generation stands for – how the shared social practices hang together and have a point -- allows him to transform his culture, but, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger could not yet see how radically a culture could be transformed. Only when he had understood that the style of a culture –its whole understanding of being -- could change, could he fully grasp what it would be like for a cultural innovators such a the statesmen, gods, and philosophers to disclose new worlds. 19

**Conclusion**

In summary, according to Division II of *Being and Time*, public, average, everyday understanding is necessarily general and banal. Nonetheless, this leveled, average understanding is necessary both as the background for all intelligibility and in the early stages of acquiring expertise, and so it is both ontologically and genetically prior to any more primordial understanding.

Once, however, an expert has broken out of the banal thanks to the anxious realization of his thrownness and, by repeated risky experience in the everyday world, has learned the discriminations that constitute his skill. With further involved experience he can go on to become a phronimos, a cultural master, who responds to the situation in a more subtle way than an expert can. Finally, by facing the anxiety of death and so seeing that his own identity and even the issues of his culture could be radically changed, a fully authentic Dasein can manifest an even higher kind of primordial understanding. As an innovator or history maker, he can take up marginal possibilities in his culture’s past in
way that enables him to change the style of a whole generation and thereby disclose a new world. But all of this requires that there be the shared intelligibility of the one that can be deepened and even radically transformed but can never be overcome or left behind. So the public norms described in Division I are never abandoned, but they turn out in Division II, to be the basis of phenomena understood by the Greeks and the Christians but never dreamed of by the by pragmatists and Wittgensteinians.


2 Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger’s Being and Time*. Kisiel says: “The project of BT thus takes shape in 1921 - 24 against the backdrop of the unrelenting exegesis of Aristotle’s texts … from which the pretheoretical models for the two Divisions of BT, the *techne of poesis*, for the First, and the *phronesis of praxis* for the Second, are derived.” 9.


4 Such a decision as to what matters in the current situation, i.e. what sort of situation it is, requires that one share the sensibility of the culture and have the ability to respond to the similarities recognized by one’s fellows.

5 Patricia Benner has described this phenomenon in *From Novice to Expert: Excellence and Power in Clinical Nursing Practice*, Addison-Wesley, 1984, 164.


7 Martin Heidegger, *Plato’s Sophist*, Indiana University Press, 1997, 101. In his *Sophist* course, Heidegger has not yet made a clear distinction between *Lage* and *Situation*. In this lecture course, he uses both terms interchangeably to refer to the concrete situation. See, for example, page 102: "out of the constant regard toward that which I have resolved, the situation [*Situation*] should become transparent. From the point of view of the *proaireton*, the concrete situation [*konkrete Lage*] . . . is covered over.”

8 Ibid. 97.

9 I’m following Heidegger in reading *Ent-schlossenheit* as openness not determination. See, “The Origin of the Work of Art,” in *Poetry, Language, Thought*, Harper and Row,
1971. “The resoluteness (Ent-schlossenheit) intended in Being and Time is not the deliberate action of a subject, but the opening up of human being … to the openness of being.” 67

10 But in 1924 Heidegger uses the term Augenblick to describe the phronimos’s instantaneous insight into the Situation: “in phronisis …in a momentary glance [Augenblick] I survey the concrete situation of action, out of which and in favor of which I resolve [Entschliesse] myself.”10 This reading is confirmed by Basic Problems where the Augenblick is equated with Aristotle’s kairos, the moment of appropriate skillful intervention. “Aristotle saw the phenomenon of the Augenblick, the Kairos,” Heidegger says. 10

Still, Augenblick is also Luther’s translation of St. Paul’s instant in which we shall be changed in a “twinkling of an eye.” So John Van Buren says rather darkly that “Heidegger took the movement that concentrates itself at the extreme point (eschaton) of the kairos to be the kairological time that he had already discovered in the Pauline eschatology.”10

In WS 1924-25, Heidegger, indeed, connected kairos in Aristotle with the Pauline theme of kairos as ‘the twinkling of an eye’: But he explains this by adding: Phronisis is the glancing at the this-time, at the this-time-ness of the momentary situation. As aisthesis, it is the glance of the eye, the Augen-blick, toward the concrete at the particular time….10

Clearly Heidegger is here describing the cultural virtuoso’s resolute dealing with the concrete Situation, not the moment of rebirth of the Christian in which he gets a new identity, nor the moment of the coming of the Messiah when the world will be transformed and the dead raised in the twinkling of an eye.

11 Which Kierkegaard calls becoming a new creation, see Søren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, Penguin, 1985, 70.


13 Ibid.

14 Ibid. (My italics.)

It is hard to reconcile this claim that only anticipatory resoluteness reveals Dasein authentically and fully with the claim in the earlier discussion of the resoluteness of facing guilt that “we have now arrived at that truth of Dasein which is most primordial because it is authentic.” (343)

I think Heidegger was simply confused as to how he wanted to relate the two kinds of resoluteness. Generally, he sticks to the view that authentic resoluteness is the most complete kind of resoluteness because it involves facing death. But he is never clear whether anticipatory resoluteness is the telos of just plain resoluteness, and so already implicit in the Greek understanding, or whether anticipatory-resoluteness is a radically new form of resoluteness that was introduced by the Christians and is, therefore, “completely new in philosophy….since antiquity.”

They are all instances of “truth establishing itself.” See “The Origin of the Work of Art”, 61, 62.

The phenomenon of world disclosing is described and illustrated in, Charles Spinosa, Fernando Flores, and Hubert L. Dreyfus, Disclosing New Worlds, The MIT Press, 1997.

The most extreme form of the transformation such a history-making Dasein brings about is a cultural version of the Augenblick of Christian conversion. This, for Kierkegaard, is the Augenblick as the fullness of time. The whole culture is reborn into a new world. But, unlike Kierkegaard’s Abraham, who cannot explain himself and so cannot be recognized by his peers as having done something appropriate but only as a murderer, the history-maker, because he draws on a shared heritage, is not totally unintelligible. He is a charismatic figure who can show a new style and so be followed, like Jesus was followed by his disciples, even though they did not understand the meaning of what they were doing. He will not be fully intelligible to the members of the culture, however, until his new way of coordinating the practices is articulated in a new language and preserved in new institutions.